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Abstracts
Paper 1: Returns to Capital and Informality
We study the pattern of returns to capital in the formal and informal manufac-
turing sectors in Ethiopia. We use a rich panel dataset of manufacturing rms in the
formal sector for the period 1996-2006 and two rounds of repeated cross-sectional data
of the urban informal sector rms. Both parametric and semi-parametric regression
techniques are used to study the magnitude and pattern of returns to capital. Our
results show that the median return to capital in the formal sector is 15-21%, while in
the informal sector it is 52-140%. Higher returns in the informal sector potentially ex-
plain growing informality in Ethiopia. Investment in the informal sector is, however,
limited since returns to capital decline as owners share of time spent in the enter-
prise decreases. This restricts both formal and informal rms from establishing new
informal rms in order to take advantage of the higher returns in the sector. Unlike
the prediction of the poverty trap hypothesis, we nd that returns to capital decrease
with capital stock, creating an opportunity for small rms to grow by re-investing
their prot. Making rm locations closer to customers a¤ordable, creating equitable
linkages with the formal sector and providing assistance on marketing skills are there-
fore policy recommendations that can encourage growth and eventual graduation of
informal sector rms.
Paper 2: The Performance of New Firms: Evidence from Ethiopias
Manufacturing Sector
We investigate the relative importance of technological and demand constraints
for rm performance using a panel dataset of Ethiopian manufacturing sector (1996-
2006). Previous empirical research on rm performance use revenue based productiv-
ity which confounds true e¢ ciency with price e¤ects. Using information on price and
physical quantity of rmsproducts, we decompose revenue based productivity into
physical productivity, price and idiosyncratic demand shocks. Comparison of various
components of productivity across rms, using product and rm xed e¤ect estima-
tion, reveals that entrants have lower demand and output prices than established
rms. However, we do not nd a robust di¤erence in productivity between entrants
and established rms. Thus, young and small rms are found to be most vulnerable
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to demand constraints. Analysis of rm survival using probit regression reveals that
rmsmarket access is a more important determinant of survival than productivity.
Securing access to markets and providing assistance on marketing skills during most
vulnerable stage of rm entry are intervention areas so that e¢ cient rms with long
term growth prospect are not driven out of business.
Paper 3: The E¤ects of Agglomeration and Competition on
Prices and Productivity: Evidence for Ethiopias Manufacturing
Sector
We use census panel data on Ethiopian manufacturing rms to analyze the ef-
fects of enterprise clustering on two key determinants of rm performance: physical
productivity and output prices. We show that distinguishing between productivity
and prices is important for understanding the e¤ects of agglomeration and competi-
tion. We nd a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect of agglomeration of rms
on prices, suggesting that new entry leads to higher competitive pressure in the local
economy. We also nd a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of agglomeration
on physical productivity, consistent with the notion that clustering leads to positive
externalities. The net e¤ect of enterprise clustering on revenue-based measures of per-
formance is small and not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Our results thus highlight
the importance of separating price from productivity e¤ects in this type of analy-
sis. Cluster formation through creating industrial zones; and enhancing networking,
technological learning as well as rm competition are key policy recommendations to
boost enterprise productivity and cluster-based industrial development.
Paper 4: Ethnic Cleansing or Resource Struggle in Darfur? An
Empirical Analysis
The conict in Darfur has been described both as an ethnic cleansing campaign,
carried out by the Sudanese government and its allied militias, and as a local struggle
over dwindling natural resources between African farmers and Arab herders. In this
paper, we use a previously unexploited data set to analyze the determinants of Jan-
jaweed attacks on 530 civilian villages in Southwestern Darfur during the campaign
that started in 2003. Our results clearly indicate that attacks have been targeted at
villages dominated by the major rebel tribes, resulting in a massive displacement of
those populations. Resource variables, capturing access to water and land quality,
also appear to have played an important role. These patterns suggest that attacks in
the area were motivated by both ethnic cleansing and resource capture, although the
ethnic variables consistently have a larger impact.
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Summary of the Thesis
This thesis consists of four self-contained essays summarized below.
1 Returns to Capital and Informality
According to the 2005 national labor force survey of Ethiopia, 71% of the
urban employment is in the informal sector (CSA, 2006). The mere size of
the sector makes it both a policy concern and an instrument for employment
creation and poverty alleviation. It is a concern because rms in the sector
operate in a complex business environment outside the umbrella of supporting
institutions that provide access to nance and secure property rights, ham-
pering their productivity. They also operate in localized markets with limited
access to reliable and wider markets. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the
informal sector is widely associated with working poverty and low productivity
that limit its prospects of providing a sustainable livelihood (ILO, 2008). Sup-
porting informal rms with the aim of improving their productivity, growth
potential as well as eventual graduation from the sector is at the core of many
development programs (MOTI, 1997; ILO, 2008). A central question for pol-
icy makers is, therefore, whether informal rms hold a potential for income
growth for their owners and for becoming successful large rms in the future.
One hypothesis on the growth constraints of microenterprises, which pri-
marily constitute informal and small formal rms, is that these rms may be
locked in a poverty cycle which is di¢ cult for them to break out from, leading
to a poverty trap. According to the poverty traphypothesis, rm growth
is constrained by poor access to external nancial resources in combination
with low return to investment for rms with limited capital to start with
(McKenzie et al., 2006). The poverty trap not only limits rm growth, it also
discourages graduation into the formal sector and hence leads to persistent
informality.
The current study primarily investigates the second dimension of the poverty
trap hypothesis: the relationship between returns to capital and rm size in an
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e¤ort to understand whether credit constraints are binding constraints to long-
term rm growth, when present. The study also poses two research questions
that are related to rmsdecision to enter the formal sector: whether returns
to investment are higher in the formal sector and whether small rms can
grow upon entry into the formal sector. To answer these research questions,
we analyze the magnitude and pattern of returns to capital across di¤erent
size categories and sectors using both parametric and semi-parametric regres-
sion techniques. We use a panel dataset (1996-2006) of formal rms and two
rounds of repeated cross-sectional data (1996 and 2003) for the urban informal
rms in the manufacturing sector in Ethiopia.
The empirical results indicate that median returns to capital are higher in
the informal sector. The higher return may imply better market fundamentals
or pronounced nancial constraints in the sector. If it is indeed the former, one
form of mechanism to take advantage of better market fundamentals would be
to establish new informal rms. This possibility, however, is limited in the sec-
tor because of the organizational structure of informal rms. This is because;
our empirical results show a declining median returns to capital as the share of
owners time in the total labor input of informal enterprise decreases. Owners
time may play an important role for enterprise performance both because it
implies increased supervision on workerse¤ort and owners may possess skills
that are not easy to nd in the labor market. This makes establishing new
informal rms not a viable strategy to take advantage of higher returns in the
informal sector and leaves informal rms with the option of growing by saving
and re-investing their prots.
On the other hand, median returns to capital in the formal sector do
not decrease as the share ownerstime in total labor input of the enterprise
decreases, allowing small rms to take advantage of the higher returns to
capital by establishing new formal rms. The di¤erence in returns to capital in
the two sectors may then be explained by di¤erences in business environment:
formal rms, for instance, are contractual rms in which the physical presence
of owners can be made less important by introducing enforceable employment
rules and regulations, paying higher e¢ ciencywages and hiring management
sta¤ to induce higher workerse¤ort. Further evidence against better market
fundamentals in the informal sector is also found when comparing formal and
informal rms with comparable capital stock. Median returns are higher in the
formal sector. This indicates that for small informal rms there is a premium
for staying informal, but as they get larger, they are better o¤ joining the
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formal sector.
Coming to the issue of rm growth, there is no empirical support for the
presence of poverty trap both in the formal and informal sectors since returns
to capital decline with invested capital stock. This implies that small rms
can grow by re-investing their prots even if they are credit constrained pro-
vided that rms have a secure access to markets to realize the actual prots
and that prots are not diverted into other competing household needs. When
micro entrepreneurs were asked about the main factor constraining the current
operation and expansion of their enterprises, lack of/inadequate market and
shortage of working capital topped the list. These shortages are inevitable
since the enterprises mainly serve localized markets and very few informal
rms strategically locate themselves close to markets, competitors or raw ma-
terial sources. Making rm locations closer to customers a¤ordable, creating
equitable linkages with the formal sector and providing assistance on market-
ing skills are therefore policy recommendations that can encourage growth and
eventual graduation of informal sector rms.
2 The Performance of New Firms: Evidence from
Ethiopias Manufacturing Sector
In this paper, we investigate the economic performance of new rms in Ethiopian
manufacturing sector. The sector experienced rapid increase in rm entry with
the number of rms in the market growing by 83% over the period 1996-2006.
However, exit rate among new rms in Ethiopia has been high too (Gebreeye-
sus, 2008). We investigate two research questions: why do new rms have
high exit rate? And how do they perform conditional on survival? Previous
studies have shown that likelihood of survival decreases when economic perfor-
mance of rms deteriorates (Frazer, 2005; Söderbom et al. 2006; Gebreeyesus,
2008; Shiferaw, 2009) and that economic performance increases with rm age
(Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002; Van Biesebroeck, 2005). A common inter-
pretation of these ndings is that African markets drive out poorly performing
rms and that rms learn to update their productivity as they grow older.
Better economic performance of rms is often inferred in much of the lit-
erature from high sales value of output conditional on factor inputs: revenue-
based productivity measure. This measure of rm performance, however, con-
founds output price with physical productivity (Katayama et al., 2008; Foster
et al., 2008). In this study, we show that it is essential to distinguish be-
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tween physical productivity and high prices to analyze whether the type of
rms most likely to survive in Africa are those most able to extract rents and
charge higher prices or those with highest productivity. Similarly, previous
results on learning using revenue-based productivity are also subject to this
concern. To our knowledge, no previous study in the literature on African
manufacturing rms makes this distinction. The study also contributes to the
debate on which types of skills matter for enterprise success in Africa by in-
vestigating the relative importance of technological and demand constraints
for rm performance (Pack, 1993; Sutton & Kellow, 2010).
In this study, we seek to ll these gaps in the literature using rm-level
panel data set of Ethiopian manufacturing sector (1996-2006). Availability of
product module information in our dataset enables us to construct product-
specic prices and quantities at rm-level. Equipped with this information,
we can thus distinguish between prices, physical productivity and product
demand shocks to investigate how these correlate with the likelihood of exit
and how they develop in the rst few years following entry into the market.
Comparison of various components of productivity across rms, using
product and rm xed e¤ect estimation, reveals that entrants have lower de-
mand and output prices than established rms. However, we do not nd
a robust di¤erence in physical productivity between entrants and established
rms. Thus, young and small rms are found to be most vulnerable to demand
constraints. Analysis of rm survival using probit regression reveals that rms
market access, demand shocks in particular, is a more important determinant
of survival than productivity. Securing access to markets and providing as-
sistance on marketing skills during most vulnerable stage of rm entry are
intervention areas so that e¢ cient rms with long term growth prospects are
not driven out of business.
3 The E¤ects of Agglomeration and Competition
on Prices and Productivity: Evidence for Ethiopias
Manufacturing Sector
Geographical agglomeration, or clustering, of enterprises can be an impor-
tant source of improved rm performance. By locating close to suppliers,
customers and competitors, an enterprise may be able to benet from infor-
mation spillovers, obtain better access to skilled labor, and face lower cost of
capital and transaction costs (Marshall, 1920). Various studies have shown
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that agglomeration economies are an important source of productivity and
employment growth in developed countries (Glaeser et al., 1992; Henderson,
1997; Combes, 2000; Blien et al., 2006). However, very few studies exist pro-
viding quantitative evidence on e¤ects of agglomeration economies in Africa
(Fafchamps and El Hamine, 2004; Fafchamps and Söderbom, 2011).
If markets are poorly integrated, an increase in the number of rms in the
local market also creates competitive pressure forcing rms to be more e¢ cient
in order to stay in the market. Previous studies have shown that competition
enhances the incentive to engage in innovation, improve rm productivity and
cut output prices (Aghion et al., 2009; Bigsten et al., 2009; Syverson, 2007).
One methodological weakness of previous studies on the e¤ect of agglomer-
ation and competition on rm performance is the use of productivity measure
that confounds price with true productivity e¤ects (Foster et al., 2008). The
most common productivity measure used is the sales value of enterprise output
conditional on factor inputs: revenue-based productivity measure. Katayama
et al. (2008), for instance, argue that ndings that geographically clustered
rms are relatively productive attributed to agglomeration economies may
simply reect higher prices in urban areas.
The current study empirically analyzes the e¤ects of enterprise clustering
on rm performance in Ethiopia. It contributes to the literature by separately
investigating the price and productivity e¤ects of competition and enterprise
clustering using census based panel data of Ethiopian manufacturing sector
over the period 1996-2006. Key to our analysis is the availability of informa-
tion on price and physical quantity of rms products. Using the information
on rms physical output, we investigate the e¤ects of clustering and local
competition on physical productivity: physical output conditional on factor
inputs.
We measure cluster size by the number of producers in rms local market.
The premise of the current study is that, in a poorly integrated economy, an
increase in the number of producers in a given location may have two e¤ects.
First, entry into the local market may be associated with a reduction in the
market power and in the output prices of established rms following new entry.
Second, entry may lead to higher productivity, either because competition
provides a disciplinary device on rms or because the higher density of rms
results in externalities and more general agglomeration e¤ects.
We nd that agglomeration of rms reduces output prices, suggesting that
new entry leads to higher competitive pressure in the local economy. In addi-
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tion, consistent with the notion that clustering leads to positive externalities
and enhances competition, we nd a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect
of agglomeration on physical productivity. However, we do not nd any robust
e¤ect of the conventional revenue based productivity measures such as sales
or value added net of factor input. Our results thus highlight the importance
of separating price from productivity e¤ects for understanding the e¤ects of
agglomeration. Cluster formation through creating industrial zones; and en-
hancing networking, technological learning as well as rm competition are key
policy recommendations to boost enterprise productivity and cluster-based
industrial development.
4 Ethnic Cleansing or Resource Struggle in Darfur?
An Empirical Analysis
Darfur is a westernmost province of Sudan with a population of about 6.5
million inhabitants. The population is often categorized as Africanfarmers
and Nomadic Arabtribes. The African tribes are usually sedentary agricul-
turalists and include some of the indigenous tribes Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa.
The Arab tribes typically practice nomadic lifestyle with seasonal migration
across farmland which is a cause for the long standing resource struggle be-
tween di¤erent groups in Darfur for fertile land and access to water. The
issue of land became more critical following the growing pressure on natural
resources as a result of land degradation, and expanding agricultural land to
meet the demands of increased population (OFahey & Tubiana, 2009; Abdul-
Jalil, 2006).
The recent conict in Darfur started in 2003 when Sudanese Liberation
Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) opposition groups,
mainly from Fur, Masalit and Zahgawa tribes, attacked government outposts
due to their perceived marginalization of Darfur in a national context. The
government of Sudan (GoS) and local militias, the Janjaweed, made a counter-
insurgency campaign during 2003 on civilian villages (Flint and de Wal, 2008).
By 2008, 300,000 deaths and 2.7 million displacements of individuals are re-
ported as a result of the conict (BBC, 2008). The current study focuses on
this second dimension of the conict and investigates what determines which
civilian villages are attacked or not and also the intensity of attack.
There is a debate in the literature on whether the conict was an ethnic
cleansing campaign, carried out by the Sudanese government and its allied
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militias or a local resource struggle between African farmers and Arab herders.
The o¢ cial view of the GoS is the latter, and it claims that there was no
government involvement in the conict. The importance of land degradation
and a deteriorating climate for understanding Darfur has been emphasized by
(UNEP, 2007; Sachs, 2006). However, using annual data on rainfall in Darfur,
Kevane and Gray (2008) fail to nd any clear link between rainfall and conict
onset.
The International Criminal Court (ICC, 2010) and United Nations Se-
curity Council (2005), on the other hand, claim that ethnic cleansing, often
described as a sustained attempt by one group to remove another group -
dened in ethnic, religious, or political terms - from a given territory, is the
main motivation of the conict in Darfur. In the most recent version of the
warrant of arrest against Sudans president, the ICC briey refers to "acts of
murder and extermination" that were perpetrated against the Fur, Masalit,
and Zaghawa groups in certain localities in West Darfur (ICC, 2010, p 6).
In this study, we test these hypotheses in explaining the counter-insurgency
attacks against 530 civilian villages in Southwestern Darfur. Key to our analy-
sis is the availability of detailed information on ethnic composition of each
village before and after the conict from all known villages in the area. On
the basis of GIS data, we also create a number of proxy variables for appro-
priable natural resources, the density of vegetation, access to alluvial soils and
distance to surface water. We propose two main hypotheses to be tested in the
empirical analysis: The probability and intensity of attacks on villages should
increase with the proportion of rebel tribes in a villages population and with
the level of appropriable natural resources.
We also o¤er a basic theoretical framework for understanding how ethnic
cleansing might emerge as an equilibrium outcome in a conict between com-
peting groups. A key insight from our model is that village attacks by the
militia, primarily interested in resource capture, will only take place: if the
perceived social costs of attacking certain ethnic groups have decreased due
to government propaganda aimed at making the groups in question legitimate
targets of attack; if the direct opportunity cost of predation is low due to poor
normal production potential, and if the militia are relatively more dominant
than the villagers, probably because of government support.
Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the proportion of the rebel tribes,
the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, in the population is a robust determinant of
the probability and intensity of attacks. This result is robust to the choice of
xi
alternative resource variables, control variables, samples, and levels of aggre-
gation. Resource variables, capturing access to water and land quality, also
appear to have played an important role. These patterns suggest that attacks
in the area were motivated by both ethnic cleansing and resource capture,
although the ethnic variables consistently have a larger impact.
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Abstract
In this paper we study the pattern of returns to capital in the formal
and informal manufacturing sectors in Ethiopia. We use a rich panel
dataset of manufacturing rms in the formal sector for the period 1996-
2006 and two rounds of repeated cross-sectional data of the urban infor-
mal sector rms. Both parametric and semi-parametric regression tech-
niques are used to study the magnitude and pattern of returns to capital.
Our results show that the median return to capital in the formal sector
is 15-21%, while in the informal sector it is 52-140%. Higher returns in
the informal sector potentially explain growing informality in Ethiopia.
Investment in the informal sector is, however, limited since returns to
capital decline as the amount of time a rm owner spends in her enter-
prise decreases. This time constraint restricts both formal and informal
rms from establishing new informal rms in order to take advantage of
the higher returns in the sector. Unlike the prediction of the poverty
trap hypothesis, we nd that returns to capital decrease with capital
stock, creating an opportunity for small rms to grow by re-investing
their prot.
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1 Introduction
The growing phenomenon of informality in Africa is mainly a result of stagna-
tion of the overall economy, and entry barriers as well as regulatory burdens
in the formal sector (Xaba et al., 2000). In sub-Saharan Africa, it contributes
41% to the non-agricultural share of GDP and employs 72% of the labor force
in the non-agricultural sectors (ILO, 2002). According to the 2005 national
labor force survey of Ethiopia, 71% of the urban employment is in the informal
sector. This makes the sector a potential instrument for employment creation
and poverty alleviation. The informal sector in Africa is, however, widely as-
sociated with working poverty and low productivity that limit its prospects
of providing a sustainable livelihood (ILO, 2008). Informal rms operate in a
complex business environment outside the umbrella of supporting institutions
that provide access to nance and secure property rights, hampering their
productivity. They also operate in localized markets with limited access to
reliable and wider markets.
Supporting informal rms with the aim of improving their productivity,
growth potential as well as eventual graduation from the sector is at the core
of many development programs; see for example the national micro and small
enterprises development strategy of Ethiopia (MOTI, 1997) and decent work
strategies for the informal economy of ILO (ILO, 2008). A central question for
policy makers is, therefore, whether informal rms hold a potential for income
growth for their owners and for becoming successful large rms in the future.
Such a growth prospect would imply a potential for the improvement of the
thin industrial base of Africa and its contribution to economic development
and poverty reduction.
The current study aims at investigating the presence of a poverty trap in
the Ethiopian formal and informal sectors. Credit constraints and increas-
ing returns to investment are the two building blocks of the poverty trap
hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, rm growth is constrained by poor
access to external nancial resources in combination with low return to in-
vestment for rms with limited capital to start with. Firms are then locked
in a poverty trapdue to inability to mobilize both internal and external -
nancial resources (McKenzie et al., 2006). Whether Ethiopian rms are credit
constrained or not is not the focus of the current study. Rather, we are in-
terested in investigating whether it is binding to rm growth, when present.
We do so, by investigating the second dimension of poverty trap hypothesis:
the relationship between returns to capital and rm size. A poverty trap in
the informal sector, if present, would imply lack of graduation and persistence
of informality. Whereas the presence of a poverty trap in the formal sector
not only limits the growth prospect of small formal rms but also discourages
formalization.
To this end, the study answers mainly two research questions that are key
for the decision to enter the formal sector. First, does the formal sector o¤er
an attractive return to investment for informal rms to join? This relates
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to the occupational choice literature where informality is explained by high
cost of being formal relative to its benets: earning di¤erentials (Carneiro and
Heneley, 2001; Fajnzylber et al., 2006; Badaoui et al., 2010; McKenzie and
Sakho, 2010), ability to participate in productivity enhancing public services
(Leverson and Maloney, 1998; Bigsten et al., 2004) and more e¢ cient credit
markets (Straub, 2005; Antunes and Cavalcanti, 2007; Dabla-Norris et al.,
2008).
The empirical ndings on benets of formality are mixed. Based on esti-
mated productivity di¤erentials of small formal and informal rms in Kenya,
Bigsten et al. (2004) argue that informality is driven mainly by the cost of
being formal rather than by the productivity di¤erential between rms in the
two sectors. Fajnzylber et al., on the other hand, nd higher prots due to
formalization: paying taxes and belonging to business association in partic-
ular. Mckenzie and Sakho also nd that formality increases prots only for
mid-sized rms, but lowers prots for both the smaller and larger rms. Our
study contributes to this discussion by investigating size threshold e¤ects in
benets of formality using a sample of both informal rms and rms larger
than micro and small enterprises (MSEs). To our knowledge, this is the rst
attempt to provide a micro-level explanation for informality in Africa using
di¤erences in returns to capital.
This brings us to the second research question: is there a growth potential
for small rms upon entry? Particularly, does the formal sector provide a
conducive business environment for small rms to grow incrementally by re-
investing their prots? The prospect of incremental growth is important for
the entry decision because, when faced with borrowing constraints, rms can
save and mobilize internal nancial resources to grow in the formal sector. Low
returns to investment for a smaller amount of starting capital, however, forces
rms to enter only as large rms in order to have a better growth prospects.
Such a requirement may create an entry barrier to the formal sector for rms
that are unable to mobilize a large amount of external nance.
Previous studies have found a negative relationship between rm size and
growth in Africa (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002; Gebreeyesus and Bigsten,
2007). Yet, the African manufacturing sector remains to be dual largely
attributed to a regulatory burden, credit markets and commercial policies
bias against small rms, returns to size, geographically fragmented localized
markets as well as skewed demand toward simpler goods (Fafchamps, 1994;
Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002; Tybout, 2000).1 According to Fafchamps,
large African rms benet from returns to size and government policies, while
microenterprises take advantage of their ability to bypass laws and regulations
and lower labor costs. Medium-size rms, on the other hand, are too small to
capture returns to size and qualify for direct government support but too large
to avoid laws and regulation. Hence, rms with easy access to capital enter
1Dual industrial structure is dened by the co-existence of a small number of large rms
producing the largest share of output and a very large number of small rms but not so
many mid-sized rms.
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the industry at the high end, while rms with limited nancial resources can
only enter at the low end. He argues that small rms cannot incrementally
grow by reinvesting annual prots if the cost disadvantage of middle-sized
rms is su¢ ciently large. Similarly, Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys nd that very
few small rms grow to a large scale, whereas formal rms that start at a large
scale have a relatively stronger growth performance as they grow older in Cote
dIvoire.
The current study aims to contribute to the above growth and industrial
structure literature by empirically investigating whether small rms can grow
by re-investing their prot; whether credit constraints are binding to rm
growth and whether it explains the persistence and expansion of informal sec-
tor. We use two rounds of cross-sectional data for the informal sector and
eleven years of panel data for the formal sector in Ethiopia. Both paramet-
ric and non-parametric regression techniques are used to estimate returns to
capital and to investigate its relationship with invested capital stock.
Our results show that returns to capital decrease with capital stock in both
the formal and informal sectors. Contrary to the poverty trap hypothesis, this
implies that small rms can grow even if they are credit constrained by re-
investing their prot. We also nd that, controlling for rm size, informal
rms have higher returns to capital than formal rms. The higher return
may indicate investment opportunities, and hence explain the expansion of
informality in Ethiopia; or it may indicate the presence of nancial constraints,
which might have restricted investment in the sector. If indeed high returns
indicate the former, we expect informal rms to invest and grow. Investment in
the informal sector is, however, limited because of the organizational structure
of informal rms. We nd that returns to capital decline as the share of owners
time in total labor input of the enterprise decreases. In the formal sector,
on the other hand, we nd an opposite pattern of returns to capital. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the conceptual
framework and testable hypotheses of the study; Section 3 presents discussions
on data and descriptive statistics; Section 4 presents the empirical results and
robustness checks of our main ndings; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Previous Research
A relatively small number of studies have estimated returns to capital in de-
veloping countries. Using the Cobb-Douglas production function, Bigsten et
al. (2000) estimate the median returns to capital to be 22% across manu-
facturing rms in ve African countries. McKenzie et al. (2006), using a
cross-section of microenterprises in Mexico, estimate annual returns to capi-
tal to be 180% for microenterprises investing less than $200 and 40-50% for
rms investing more than $500. Recent studies focus on mitigation of abil-
ity bias and measurement error in returns to capital estimation by using a
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natural experiment of credit shock due to policy change (Banerjee and Duo,
2004) and randomized allocation of capital for rms (De Mel et al., 2008).
Experimental studies nd largely similar estimates of returns to capital to the
non-experimental evidence. Banerjee and Duo (2004) nd annual returns to
capital in medium-sized Indian rms to be at least 72%, while De Mel et al.
(2008) estimate annual returns to capital in Sri Lankan microenterprises to be
55-63%.
The evidence on returns to physical capital in developing countries suggests
that the returns are relatively high for small rms and well above the market
interest rates. However, investment in these rms does not always respond to
returns.2 Capital constraints and uncertainty are the most commonly cited
reasons for such a pattern. Firms do not take on investment opportunities with
higher rate of return whenever they are uncertain about their ability to capture
the returns to their investment; and credit constraints limit them even when
they want to invest. Under capital market imperfections, due to imperfect
information, cumbersome contract enforcement and lack of competition among
lenders, a rms protability a¤ects its capacity to nance investment.3
Studies focusing on microenterprises (De Mel et al., 2008; McKenzie et al.,
2006) suggest credit constraint as the primary explanation for the higher rate
of returns to investment in small rms. However, most studies on Africas
manufacturing sector show that credit constraints play a limited role in ex-
plaining low investment despite high prot rates. Bigsten et al. (1999) nd
that of an additional unit of prot, only 6-10% is used to raise the rate of
investment. In their 2003 study, testing for credit constraints in the manufac-
turing sector of six African countries, Bigsten et al. do not nd strong evidence
that rms, with the exception of small rms, may be credit constrained. Stud-
ies on investment in Africa, on the other hand, nd that rm-level investment
is negatively a¤ected by uncertainty due to investment irreversibility and con-
clude that risk rather than nancial constraints has a strong negative e¤ect
on investment (Bigsten et al., 1999; 2005; Gebreeyesus, 2006; Shiferaw, 2009).
The current study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating
whether credit constraints are binding to rm growth in Ethiopian formal and
informal manufacturing sectors. We draw on the poverty trap literature which
attributes low investment rates to the joint presence of credit constraint and
increasing returns to capital. First, we investigate the relationship between
returns to capital and rm size and its implication to the existence of a poverty
trap. We then develop alternative testable hypotheses in explaining the growth
and persistence of informality.
2Anagol and Udry (2006), for instance, compare returns to capital in pineapple cultivation
vs. traditional maize and cassava cultivation in Ghana. They note that despite a higher
return in pineapple cultivation, not many rms switch to it.
3See Banerjee (2003) for a theoretical discussion of causes of capital market imperfection
and Banerjee and Duo (2005) for extensive review of literature on returns to capital and
investment.
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2.2 Returns to Capital Estimations
The rst step to estimate returns to invested capital stock, is to use estimates
from a regression of log prot on polynomials of log capital stock together
with other control variables.
lni = 0 + 1 lnKi + 2 (lnKi)
2 +   + n (lnKi)n +  1Xi + i (1)
where i is prot, Ki is capital stock of rm i and Xi is a set of control
variables such as rm age and employment, sector and year e¤ects. Additional
human capital and other owner characteristics are used for the informal sec-
tor.4 Median regression technique is implemented to estimate all the prot
equations in this study to mitigate the bias introduced by inuential observa-
tions and measurement errors in returns to capital estimations.5 The implied
conditional median return to capital is calculated using equation 2:6
@Med [i j() ]
@Ki
=

1 + 22 lnKi +   + n  n (lnKi)n 1



Med [i j() ]
Ki

(2)
The estimation of returns to capital using higher order polynomial depends
on the degree of polynomial used.7 To allow for functionally less restrictive
estimation of returns to capital, median regression of log prot on categories
of capital stock based on percentiles of capital stock is also used,
lni = 0 + 1Kcat10i + 2Kcat20i +   + nKcat100i +  2Xi + i (3)
where capital stock is sliced up into ten percentiles. Kcat10i = 1 means
that capital stock of rm i is less than or equal to the 10th percentile for
the sample, Kcat20i = 1 implies that rm is capital stock falls between
the 10th and 20th percentiles and so on. In this specication, conditional
meadian returns to capital (R) are estimated by dividing a change in the
median prot by a change in the median capital stock between two consecutive
capital categories:
R =
z  z 1
Kz  Kz 1 =
 
expz z 1  1 z 1
K
(4)
4Unfortunately, we do not have such human capital variables for the formal sector, but
we believe that the impact of owner characteristics is more pronounced in the informal rms
as they are often run without hiring additional workers.
5Using the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality rejects the normality of log prot both for
formal and informal sector at 1%.
6Eq. (2) estimates the conditional median returns to capital for each value of capital
stock in our sample. When comparing median returns across sectors, we rely on median of
the median returns to capital throughout the paper.
7The degree of the polynomial is decided by increasing the degree of capital stock until
the next highest polynomial degree of capital stock is insignicant.
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where z denotes percentiles of capital. Observed median prot and capital
stock are used to estimate (4), and the s are obtained from (3).
Finally, we use partial linear regression techinqe to estimate the functional
relationship between returns to capital and capital stock
lni =  
0
Xi + f (lnKi) + i (5)
where the functional form of f() is unspecied.8 i is a mean-zero error
term with variance 2 ; and the vector Xi includes a set of control variables
such as rm age, sector, and year e¤ects specied parametrically. A combina-
tion of di¤erencing and smoothening techniques (Yatchew, 1997; 2003) is used
to estimate (5). The parametric component is rst estimated as if there is no
non-parametric component by using the di¤erencing technique. This proce-
dure involves sorting the data by capital stock such that K1  K2  :::  Kn,
where n is number of observation. We then di¤ernce the sorted data:
lnj   lnj 1 = (Xj  Xj 1) +(f (lnKj)  f (lnKj 1))+ (j   j 1) (6)
where j = 1; 2; :::; n indicates the number of observation.9 Equation (6) is
estimated using least squares and inference based on the di¤erenced equation
still holds in a similar way as in full parametric specications (Yatchew,1997;
2003; Lokshin,2003).10 We then use smoothening techniques to estimate f
non-parametrically. Deducting the parametric component  
0
Xi from the de-
pendent variable, we estimate the non-parametric component f (lnKi) and
the rst order derivative f 0 (lnKi) using locally weighted regression of Fan
(1992).11
2.3 Testable Hypotheses
We start our analysis by comparing returns to capital estimates across di¤erent
rm size categories. Increasing marginal returns to capital would be consistent
with the poverty trap hypothesis. Returns can be higher for the smallest rms
for a number of reasons. First, credit constraints can explain the inability
of small rms to take advantage of high returns. The presence of decreasing
returns to capital, however, would imply that credit constraints are less binding
for long-term growth of small rms. This is only true provided that rms have
secure access to market to realize the actual prots and provided that prots
are not diverted into other competing household needs. For these reasons,
credit constraints may remain important in the short-term.
8Except that f is single valued, has a bounded rst order derivative, and that the
parametric and non-parametric components are additively separable.
9When the sample size increases, f(Kj)  f(Kj 1)  ! 0 since f has bounded rst order
derivative.
10The STATA command PLREG by Lokshin (2003) is used to estimate di¤erence-based
partial linear regression.
11The implied returns to capital is given by R = f
0
(lnKi)expX b + bf(lnKi)
K
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Alternatively, returns to capital can be higher for small rms due to their
organizational structure, since small rms tend to adopt a traditional way
of organizing business that requires the presence of the owner most of the
time. Ownerslabor supply may play crucial role in rm performance possi-
bly because small rms cannot a¤ord to pay their employees high wages to
compensate for labor supervision (Fafchamps and Söderbom, 2006) and/or
because of di¢ culty of matching skills suitable in small rms possibly due to
di¤erences in skills between the owner and the alternative external labor. It is
often the case that, owners of informal rms have skills inherited from family
in similar line of business which may be hard to nd by hiring external labor.
This in turn limits the possibility of the owner to establish many new small
rms to take advantage of the higher returns to capital. If this labor supply
constraint is binding, we would expect higher returns to capital in rms with
larger share of owners time in total labor input. We test this hypothesis using
(7):
lni = 0 + 1 lnKi + 2 (lnKi)
2 + :::+ n (lnKi)
n + 1Sh_owni
+2 (lnKi  Sh_owni) +  ln (Lnon  owner) +  3Xi + "i (7)
where ln (Lnon  owner) is labor input by non-owners and Sh_owni is
ownerslabor share in total labor inputs. Since very few informal rms hire
external labor  ln (Lnon  owner) is:
1Ifnon own>0g  ln (Lnon  owner) + 2 
 
1  Ifnon own>0g

:
where Ifnon own>0g is a dummy variable equal to one if there is positive
labor input from non-owners and zero otherwise. Return to capital is then
estimated using (8) in which the share of owners time a¤ects return to capital
via two channels: the elasticity of prot with respect to capital and the level
of expected prot.
@Med [i j() ]
@Ki
=

1 + 22 lnKi + :::+ nn (lnKi)
n 1 + 2Sh_owni



Med [i j() ]
Ki

(8)
The e¤ect of share of owners time on median returns to capital can be
analyzed using the cross derivative of prot with respect to capital and shares
@2Med[ij() ]
@Sh_owni@Ki
;given by (9):
2

Med [i j() ]
Ki

+ (1 + 22 lnKi + :::+ n  n(lnKi)n 1 + 2Sh_owni) 
1
Ki

@Med [i j() ]
@Sh_owni

(9)
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Based on which
@2Med[ij(Ki;Xi) ]
@Sh_owni@Ki
> 0 is taken as supporting evidence for
the organizational structure hypothesis.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study comes from the Central Statistical Agency (CSA)
of Ethiopia. Two rounds of repeated cross section of the urban informal sec-
tor survey (1996 & 2003) are used. Multi-stage stratied sampling design was
used to select the sample of urban informal sector surveys, in which the pri-
mary sampling units were enumeration areas (EAs).12 First, sample EAs were
selected from the 1994 population and housing census based on probability
proportional to size. Next, a fresh list of households was prepared for the
selected EAs, where one enumerator was assigned to make a complete list of
households in a selected EA by going from house to house. Finally, 30 house-
holds per EA were systematically selected and surveyed. A total of 31,175
informal sector operators from all major urban centers of Ethiopia were cov-
ered in the 1996 and 2003 surveys. Forty percent (12,488) of these rms are
from the manufacturing sector, which this study focuses on.
A rm is considered to belong to the informal sector if it meets all of
the following criteria: it employs fewer than 10 workers, does not keep book
of accounts, is not licensed by any government agency, and produces goods
and services primarily for the market rather than for subsistence (CSA, 2003).
Urban informal sector enterprises are typically home based or individual estab-
lishments operated by the owner with few or no employees. According to the
agency, they are for the most part operating on a very small scale and with
a low level of organization. Most of them have very low levels of productivity
and income, with little or no access to organized markets, credit institutions,
modern technology, formal training and many public services and amenities
(CSA, 2003: 1).
The entrepreneurs were asked about their major reasons for choosing to
operate in the informal sector. Strikingly, for 40% of the operators, lack
of alternative source of income is the major reason for participating in the
informal sector. Another 42% stated small investment requirement as a main
reason for choosing the informal sector. The former suggests that people are
pushed into the informal sector by factors such as poor performance of the
overall economy and that the urban informal sector is a coping mechanism for
the less privileged in the society.
Formal banks, micronance institutions and the government in general
play less important roles in supporting establishments in the urban informal
sector. Own savings followed by loans and donations from friends and family
are the main sources of initial capital. In 2003, a signicant number of opera-
tors (40%) lacked su¢ cient capital despite the fact that rms in the informal
12Enumeration area (EA) is a unit of land delineated for the purpose of enumerating
population and housing units without omission and duplication. An EA in urban areas
usually consists of 150-200 housing units.
9
sector are established with a very low initial capital.13 When asked about the
main factor constraining the current operation and expansion of their enter-
prises, lack of/inadequate market and shortage of working capital topped the
list. These shortages are inevitable since the enterprises mainly serve local-
ized markets and very few informal rms strategically locate themselves close
to markets/customers, competitors or raw material sources. The proportion
of the operators who located their enterprise at home or in its vicinity was
86% in 2003, and the primary reasons for doing so were that the owner lives
there (47%) and other locations were deemed una¤ordable (30%). When asked
about what type of assistance informal sector entrepreneurs would need from
the government, more than 70% of the operators identied access to working
place, better access to bank loans, and assistance with marketing.
Census-based panel data on Ethiopian manufacturing establishments col-
lected by CSA is used to analyze the formal sector. The dataset includes all
establishments employing at least 10 workers and use electricity in production
for the period 1996-2006. The dataset includes capital, labor, raw material
and energy inputs as well as other industrial costs and net indirect taxes. The
number of rms grew from around 600 in 1996 to over 1000 in 2006.
As can be seen in Table 1, informal rms are younger than their formal
counterparts with an average rm age of 9 years. The sector is female dom-
inated (79%) with an average number of years of schooling of 2.4. Owners
labor input takes major share of total labor input in the informal rms.14 In
fact, only 18% of the informal rms have workers besides the owner, with a
zero median share of paid labor. Formal rms, on the other hand, are mainly
operated by hired labor with a minimal share of labor input of the owners:
the working proprietors, active partners, and family workers.15 The share of
a formal sector rm owners time is calculated as a ratio of the number of
working proprietors, active partners, and family workers to the total number
of persons engaged.16
It is also shown that informal rms have lower capital and prot than
formal rms. Capital stock is measured by the average of capital stock at the
beginning and end of the year at replacement value.17 The latter is constructed
13Eighty-two percent of rms in the urban informal sector are established with an initial
capital of less than 500 birr.
14Total labor input in the informal sector is measured as the number of days in a year
worked by the owner and paid and unpaid partners and unpaid family members; paid per-
manent, contract and temporary workers; and paid and unpaid apprentices.
15Labor input in the formal sector is measured as the number of persons engaged rather
than number of days worked due to data limitation. Total labor input in formal sector mea-
sures the number of: working proprietors, active partners, and family workers; permanent
production and administrative workers; paid and unpaid apprentices.
16A corresponding and more comparable measure for the informal sector would be the share
of family labor, dened as the share of the number of days per annum owners and unpaid
family members worked in total labor input of a rm. This and a dummy variable (No other
incomet) with a value of one if the owner does not have any other income-generating activity
and zero otherwise are alternatively used to capture ownerstime spent in the rm.
17Eight formal sector rms with capital stock greater than 150 million Ethiopian birr are
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by adding net investment and beginning of the year capital stock adjusted
for depreciation rate. Di¤erent depreciation rates are assumed for di¤erent
categories of capital.18 Prot, in the formal sector, is dened as value added
less total wage expenditure and capital cost.19 Prot for the informal sector
is, on the other hand, monthly prot times number of months operated.20
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Returns to Capital, Firm Size and Informality
Table 2 presents results of the full parametric specication (1). We employ
a median regression technique on the pooled dataset for both formal and in-
formal rms. Log annual prot is regressed on third and fourth degree poly-
nomials of log capital stock for informal and formal sector rms, respectively.
In addition we control for rm age, employment, year and sector specic ef-
fects. Employment is measured using the total labor input used together with
the share of paid labor. Additional human capital variables such as the age,
gender, and educational status of the owner/manager of the informal sector
rms are also included. In line with the literature on learning e¤ect, the
quadratic rm age e¤ect implies that rms perform better as they get older
until a threshold level after which age has a negative e¤ect on prot. Firms
with larger employment size and with higher shares of paid labor are found to
have higher prots. The latter possibly indicates that rms that employ ex-
ternal labor are more protable than those run by only the owners and family
members. Among the owner characteristics, male-owned/managed rms have
larger prots in the informal sector.
As shown in Table 2, we nd that median returns to capital are higher
in the informal sector than in the formal sector. Median return to capital is
estimated to be 21% for formal rms (Column 1) and 140% for informal rms
(Column 3). When adding additional control variables such as rm size, age
and human capital variables, returns to capital estimates are lower for both
formal (15%) and informal rms (52%). The estimates are in line with previous
estimates of returns to capital. Bigsten et al. (2000) nd median returns to
capital of 22% in the formal sector of ve African countries, whereas De Mel et
considered outliers and are hence taken out of this analysis, which leaves us with 8,876
rm-year observations.
18We used 5% for dwelling houses, non-residential buildings, and construction works, 8%
for machinery and equipment, and 10% for vehicles and furniture and other xtures. The
perpetual inventory method (PIM) is implemented to construct capital stock from the formal
sector panel data.
19Deducting capital cost, which includes equipment rental, interest payments, amortiza-
tion, and dividend payments, in prot calculation may over-estimate prots for rms that
do not rent equipment or borrow, but controls for cost of capital in returns to capital esti-
mations.
20We adopt this method for the informal sector as annual prots are not directly requested
in the questionnaire.
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al. (2008) nd annual returns to capital of 55-63% for microenterprises in Sri
Lanka. McKenzie et al. (2006) also nd annual returns to capital in Mexican
microenterprises to be in the order of 180% for microenterprises investing less
than $200 and 40-50% for rms investing more than $500.
In Table 3, returns to capital are also estimated using a less restrictive
specication by regressing log prot on capital stock categories along with
the other control variables. In column 1 and 2, the coe¢ cient estimates of
capital dummies increase with capital stock which indicates increasing prot
with rm size. Prots are also increasing with rm age and labor input. As
before, adding control variables drives down the coe¢ cient estimates of capital
stock. Similar patterns are observed in the informal sector (Column 3 and 4).
Coe¢ cients of capital generally increase with capital stock though not linearly
as in columns 1 and 2. Table 4 reports the implied median returns to capital
for each capital stock category based on the coe¢ cient estimates in Columns
2 and 4 of Table 3 and calculated median prot and capital stock from the
dataset. The median returns to capital for the smallest formal rm is 16.5%
and for the largest formal rm it is just 5.5%. On the other hand, the median
returns to capital for the smallest informal rm is over 300%, but it gradually
decreases as a rms capital stock increases.
Further, the largest informal rm with a median capital stock of 16,425
birr earns a median return to capital of only 1%, whereas a formal rm with
comparable capital stock earns at least 16.5%, the highest returns to capital in
the formal sector.21 This indicates that for the very small informal rms there
is a premium for staying informal, but as they get larger, they may be better
o¤ joining the formal sector. If the largest informal rms and the smallest
formal rms are similar in all other aspects, our nding may also indicate
benets of being in the formal sector.
In all of the specications above, we nd that returns to capital are higher
in the informal sector. One may suspect that the estimates are possibly inu-
enced by measurement error in prot and capital stock. Yet if there is indeed a
measurement error in our capital stock variable, it rather leads to attenuation
bias, which underestimates the marginal returns to capital.22 Furthermore,
since measurement errors are more prone in the informal sector, it does not
explain why informal rms have higher returns to capital.
Finaly, we also nd that median returns to capital decline with capital
stock both in parametric (Figures 1-4) and non-parmatric specications us-
ing Fans (1992) non-parametric regression technique (Figures 5-6). Table 5
presents coe¢ cient estimates of the parametric components using third-order
21Such a rm may belong to the Kcat10i (for Ki 2 [0; 29559] ) or Kcat20i (for Ki 2
(29559; 73224] ) category in the formal sector as Kcat100i = 1, in the informal sector, if
Ki 2 [7406; 550321]. We expect median returns to capital, for formal rms belonging to
Kcat10i, to be higher than 16.5% in light of the evidence that return to capital is declining
with capital stock.
22The direction of bias in prot per capital ratio, on the other hand, is not obvious. Formal
rms may under-estimate prot to evade taxes whereas informal rms may misreport rm
performance as they do not keep book of accounts.
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di¤erencing. As before, rm age, employment, and a larger share of paid labor
are associated with larger prot. The latter e¤ect is, however, insignicant for
the informal sector as shown in Column 2.
4.2 Firm Growth, Credit Constraints and Owners Labor Sup-
ply
If returns to capital are higher in the informal sector, it suggests that both
informal and formal rms can establish a number of informal rms to take
advantage of the higher returns in the sector. To test this possibility, we
investigate the role of organizational structure in explaining investment in the
informal sector. We do so by controlling for the share of owners time in the
total labor input and its interaction with the level of capital stock. In Table 6,
the share of owners time spent in an enterprise is positively associated with
protability, yet its interaction e¤ect with capital stock is negative and highly
signicant, indicating that the e¤ect of owners time on enterprise protability
is larger for rms with smaller capital stock. The result is robust to the use
of alternative proxy for owners time: share of family labor in total number of
days worked in the enterprise (Column 2).23 Although we do not have owners
time data for formal rms, we nd similar results in Column 4 using share of
working proprietors, family members, and active partners in the total number
of persons engaged in the enterprise.
We also calculate the associated returns to capital with varying levels of the
share of the time spent by owners in an enterprise. We nd that, controlling
for all other explanatory variables in (7), the median returns to capital in the
informal sector decreases as the share of owners time in total labor input of
the enterprise declines.24 An alternative interpretation of this would be that
the owner focuses mostly on high-returns units and hence a reverse causality.
However, the majority of informal rms (85%) are single-unit rms and their
owners commonly have no additional income generating activity (82%).25 The
result suggests that the operation of informal rms is organized in such a way
that the physical presence of the owner is required. This is in line with the
predominance of home-based rms and rms located in the vicinity of the
owners home in the urban informal sector. The physical presence requirement,
therefore, restricts the possibility that formal and informal rms can establish
many new informal rms to take advantage of the higher returns to capital in
the sector.
23Similar results are obtained when using a dummy variable, No other incomet, equal to
one if the owner does not engage in other income-generating activities and zero otherwise.
Results are not shown here in the interest of space.
24 solving (9) we see that returns are increasing with shares if:
Med[ij(Ki;Xi) ]
Ki

2 + (1 + 2 lnKi) (1 + 22 lnKi + :::+ n  n(lnKi)n 1 + 2Sh_owni)

is positive.
25When the dummy variable, No other incomet is interacted with capital stock, median
return to capital is higher for rms in which owners engage in other income-generating
activities. This result runs against the reverse causality argument above.
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In the formal sector, on the other hand, rms seem to operate in a di¤erent
business environment. The median returns to capital in the formal sector
increases as the share of the ownerstime in total labor input of the enterprise
decreases. The result implies that small rms can take advantage of the higher
returns to capital by establishing other new formal rms. This may have
something to do with the fact that formal rms are contractual where certain
enforceable employment rules and regulations, higher e¢ ciencywages and
hiring management sta¤ induce higher workerse¤ort and making the physical
presence of the owner less important.
Our ndings relate to other studies in the literature. An ILO (2005) study
on Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania also shows that women prefer to make
the so-called latent or horizontal expansion, i.e., establishing more than
one rm simultaneously with the intent to diversify, instead of taking risk in
vertical expansion in terms of developing an existing rm through expansion,
innovation and product improvement. However, the current study on the
Ethiopian informal manufacturing sector, of which women constitute about
80%, has shown that returns to capital declines as the share of owners time
spent on the enterprise declines. This limits the possibility of female operators
to protably practice horizontal expansion in the urban informal sector in
Ethiopia. Shiferaw (2009), on the other hand, shows that multi-unit rms
in the Ethiopian formal manufacturing sector are more likely to survive than
single unit rms, suggesting that business expansion through branching out is
a viable survival strategy.
Higher returns in the informal sector may also be due to more pronounced
nancial constraints that limit investment in the sector. Di¤erentiating be-
tween the e¤ects of market fundamentals and credit constraint on investment
is a challenge. The pattern of returns to capital in relation to capital stock,
however, indicates that credit constraints may not be binding for rm growth
in the medium term as rms can save and re-invest. As can be seen in Fig-
ures 1-6, both parametric and semi-parametric regression results indicate that
returns to capital are decreasing in capital stock for both formal and infor-
mal rms. Thus, even credit-constrained rms can grow by re-investing their
prots. While this is evidence against the presence of a poverty trap in the
Ethiopian manufacturing sector, re-investment can still be constrained by in-
ability of rms to save and re-invest prots due to other household needs
such as food, education, and healthcare expenditures. Such competing needs
make capital accumulation, innovation, and expansion di¢ cult (Gomez, 2008).
Moreover, growth and job creation prospects of informal rms may be limited
by lower initial prot due to lack of/inadequate markets, which is reported
to be one of the major constraints in the current operation of informal rms.
Encouraging vertical expansion of existing rms through market development,
creating equitable linkages and marketing skills development are therefore im-
portant policy intervention areas.
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4.3 Robustness Checks
The ndings above might be a¤ected by unobserved rm-specic e¤ects such
as ability of the entrepreneur. Since the informal sector dataset is a repeated
cross-section, we are unable to control for rm xed e¤ects. Instead, we include
a proxy for the ability of the entrepreneur as an additional control variable.
Firms entering the sector because the owner likes the job or expects the ac-
tivity to bring higher income, or because the activity is in the owners family
tradition, are expected to have a higher ability than rms entering for exam-
ple because they lack alternative income sources or the activity requires only
a small investment. Ability_H is a binary variable equal to one for the for-
mer reasons for entry and zero for the latter. Similarly, Gunther and Launov
(2006) categorize the informal sector as consisting of voluntary entry and
involuntary entrysegments.26
As shown in Table 6, Column 3, rms with higher entrepreneurial ability
have signicantly higher prots than those who entered their current activity
for reasons such as lack of alternative source of income and small investment
requirement. The pattern of returns to capital, with respect to the share of
owners time in the enterprise, is in line with the organizational structure hy-
pothesis discussed in the previous section. Firms with higher share of owners
time have higher returns to capital. However, returns to capital decline with
the share of owners time spent on the activity.
To control for ability bias in the formal sector, we exploit the panel dimen-
sion of our dataset to estimate prot equation. To use a xed e¤ect model,
our explanatory variables should be strictly exogenous. But the exogeneity re-
quirement might be violated due to possible measurement errors and omitted
variables such us unobserved rm productivity and favorable demand shocks
that a¤ect input use. First di¤erencing models, on the other hand, provide
us with a possibility of using lagged explanatory variables and/or their lagged
rst di¤erences as instruments using the di¤erence GMM of Arellano and
Bond (1991) and the system GMM developed by Blundell and Bond (1998),
respectively.
Table 7 presents two-step system GMM esimates of prot equation for
the formal sector. Log capital and labor, labor shares and their interaction
with capital stock are instrumented with their two-period lagged rst di¤er-
ences along with levels of other explanatory variables and lagged instruments.
Using the Hansen test, we do not reject the validity of the over-identifying
restrictions. Estimates of median returns to capital fall in the range obtained
in the pooled regressions (Tables 2-6). As before, the share of ownerslabor
26The voluntary entryrepresents the competitive part into which individuals enter vol-
untarily because, given their specic characteristics, they expect to earn more than they
would in the formal sector. The involuntary entry is the part that consists of individuals
who were rationed out of the formal (and possibly the voluntary entry informal) labor
market. Using similar methodology, informal employment in Ethiopia is found to be pre-
dominantly involuntary with only 5-20% rms classied as voluntary entry (Ru¤er and
Knight, 2007).
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and its interaction with capital stock have signicantly positive and negative
e¤ects on prot, respectively (Columns 2 and 3) and median returns to capital
decline with ownersshare of total labor input.27
5 Conclusions
In this study, we investigate the presence of poverty trap in Ethiopian manu-
facturing sector that may result from the joint presence of credit constraints
and increasing returns to capital with rm size. The current study primarily
investigates the latter in an e¤ort to understand whether credit constraints are
binding constraints to long-term rm growth, when present. Poverty trap not
only limits rm growth, it also discourages graduation into the formal sector
and hence leads to persistent informality.
To this end, the study poses two research questions related to rmsde-
cision to enter the formal sector: whether returns to investment are higher
in the formal sector and whether rms can grow upon entry into the formal
sector. To answer these research questions, we analyze the magnitude and
pattern of returns to capital across di¤erent size categories and sectors. We
use a rich panel dataset for the period 1996-2006 for the formal rms and two
rounds of repeated cross-sectional data for the urban informal rms.
The empirical results indicate that returns to capital are higher in the
informal sector. Higher returns in the informal sector may indicate better
market fundamentals or pronounced nancial constraints in the sector. In the
case of the former, we would expect formal and informal rms to establish new
informal rms to take advantage of the higher returns. However, investment
in the informal sector is limited by the evidence that returns to capital are
declining as the share of owners time in total labor input of the enterprise
declines. This may be due to inability to compensate for reduced supervision
by paying higher wages or the di¢ culty to match owners skills by hiring
external labor in the informal sector. Moreover, when comparing formal and
informal rms with comparable capital stock, we nd that returns are higher
in the formal sector. This indicates that for the very small informal rms there
is a premium for staying informal, but as they get larger, they may be better
o¤ joining the formal sector.
On the other hand, returns to capital in the formal sector increase as
the share of owners time in total labor input of the enterprise decreases,
allowing small rms to take advantage of the higher returns to capital by
establishing new formal rms. The di¤erence in returns to capital in the
two sectors may be explained by di¤erences in business environment: formal
rms, for instance, are contractual rms where the physical presence of owners
can be made less important by introducing enforceable employment rules and
regulations, paying higher e¢ ciencywages and hiring management sta¤ to
induce higher workerse¤ort.
27Median returns range from 15.7% (for minimum share) to -4% (for maximum share).
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We also nd that returns to capital are decreasing with capital stock in
both sectors. This implies that credit constraints are less binding for rm
growth in the long-term. Thus, our ndings are evidence against the pres-
ence of a poverty trap in the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. However,
credit constraints may remain to be important in the short-term as market
conditions determine the realization of actual prots and as other competing
household needs might divert realized prots. Encouraging vertical expansion
of existing rms through market development, making rm locations closer to
customers a¤ordable and creating equitable linkages with the formal sector are
therefore important policy intervention areas to encourage growth and even-
tual graduation of rms in the informal sector. Di¤erentiating between market
fundamentals and nancial constraints in explaining investment patterns is the
natural next step for future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics   
  Informal Sector  Formal Sector 
Variable  Description  Mean   Median N Mean Median N 
Real annual profit 1232.26 497.43 11912 1450088 57068.39 8876 
Profit divided by capital stock 48.45 5.09 10299 335.85 0.20 8774 
Log of real annual profit 6.36 6.50 10311 12.04 11.68 6801 
Log of capital stock 4.69 4.38 10728 13.20 13.20 8774 
Log of no. of days worked per year          5.25 5.38 12307    
Share of days the owner worked  0.91 1 12307    
Share of days family members and owners worked 0.98 1 12307    
No other incomet =1 if the owner does not engage 
in other income- generating activities  
0.82 1 12458    
Log no. of persons engaged     3.45 3.14 8332 
Share of working proprietors, active partners, and 
family workers 
    0.08 0 8332 
Share of paid labort 0.02 0 12421 0.90 1 8332 
lnL(of non-owners)=Log no. of (days worked) non-
owners 
0.95 0 12313 3.4 3.09 8213 
No employees =1 if no employee 0.82 1 12313    
Firm age in years 8.85 5 11984 11.38 4 8727 
Age of Informal sector owner/manager 39.64 38 12479    
Gender of Operator (male=1) 0.21   12488    
Operator’s years of Schooling 2.38 0 12484    
Ability Dummy =1 if ability is higher 0.14  12488      
Source: Own calculations. Ethiopian birr is the unit of financial variables and GDP deflator is used to express financial 
variables in real terms. 
 
 
       
     
  
 
Table 2: Parametric estimation of returns to capital using median regression 
 Formal Informal 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
lnK t 1.425*** 1.036*** 0.890*** 0.287*** 
 (0.263) (0.233) (0.0442) (0.0399) 
(lnK)2t -0.377*** -0.263*** -0.120*** -0.0368*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0468) (0.00981) (0.00853) 
(lnK)3t 0.0307*** 0.0215*** 0.00523*** 0.00167*** 
 (0.00380) (0.00339) (0.000621) (0.000531) 
(lnK)4t -0.000722*** -0.000512***   
 (9.25e-05) (8.26e-05)   
Firm age t  0.0142***  0.0265*** 
  (0.00370)  (0.00374) 
Firm age t2   -0.000131*  -0.000499*** 
  (6.71e-05)  (9.14e-05) 
lnLt  0.543***  0.691*** 
  (0.0284)  (0.0179) 
Share of paid labort  0.258**  0.242* 
  (0.118)  (0.135) 
Age of owner/Managert    -0.00616 
    (0.00530) 
Age of owner/Manager2t    -0.00242 
    (0.00569) 
Male  owner/manager t    1.138*** 
    (0.0552) 
Years of schooling of owner/manager t    0.0136 
    (0.00945) 
Years of schooling of owner/manager2t    0.0857 
    (0.0768) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Sector Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  
Obs 6222 6222 8436 8431 
Pseudo R2      0.4033 0.4478 0.1016 0.2293 
Median returns to K 20.83% 14.94% 139.8% 52.97% 
Notes: Dependent variable is log annual profit. Unreported constant included. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
 
  
  
 
           
         Table 3: Returns to capital using median regression  
 Formal Sector Informal Sector 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
K_cat20t  0.434*** 0.298*** 0.0816 0.0886 
 (0.0821) (0.0816) (0.0857) (0.0688) 
K_cat30 t 0.617*** 0.365*** 0.263*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0820) (0.0816) (0.0852) (0.0683) 
K_cat40 t 0.962*** 0.666*** 0.428*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0831) (0.0834) (0.0850) (0.0684) 
K_cat50t 1.211*** 0.866*** 0.431*** 0.288*** 
 (0.0823) (0.0833) (0.0850) (0.0683) 
K_cat60t 1.812*** 1.349*** 0.572*** 0.306*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0851) (0.0856) (0.0689) 
K_cat70t 2.585*** 1.785*** 0.719*** 0.453*** 
 (0.0852) (0.0896) (0.0858) (0.0693) 
K_cat80t 3.469*** 2.319*** 0.586*** 0.403*** 
 (0.0859) (0.0936) (0.0863) (0.0695) 
K_cat90t 4.219*** 2.853*** 0.325*** 0.174** 
 (0.0885) (0.101) (0.0855) (0.0688) 
K_cat100t 5.385*** 3.513*** 0.496*** 0.376*** 
 (0.0904) (0.113) (0.0862) (0.0697) 
Firm age t  0.0118***  0.0273*** 
  (0.00341)  (0.00418) 
Firm age t2  -9.16e-05  -0.000547*** 
  (6.19e-05)  (0.000104) 
lnLt  0.571***  0.682*** 
  (0.0257)  (0.0196) 
Share of paid labort  0.280***  0.234* 
  (0.108)  (0.141) 
Age of owner/Managert    -0.00309 
    (0.00588) 
Age of owner/Manager2t    -0.00502 
    (0.00633) 
Male  owner/managert    1.042*** 
    (0.0664) 
Years of schooling of owner/manager t    0.00466 
    (0.0101) 
Years of schooling of owner/manager2t    0.126 
    (0.0812) 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 6222 6222 7303 7303 
Pseudo R2      0.3978 0.4437 0.0690 0.1922 
Notes: Dependent variable is log annual profit. K_cat10, a dummy for capital stock belonging to the 10th percentile, is taken as a 
reference group. Column 3 & 4 are estimated for sample of firms with capital stock worth more than 10 birr at replacement value. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Unreported constant included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 4: Median returns to capital by percentiles of capital in the formal and informal sector 
 Formal Sector Informal Sector 
Percentiles Profit  K  θ Returns Profit  K θ Returns 
10 16721.53 13538.19 0  420 15.57 0  
20 23538.91 48792.97 0.298 16.47% 427.27 27.97 0.0886 313.96% 
30 30144.02 102815.5 0.365 3.02% 533.60 42.30 0.197 341.26% 
40 42325.62 200449.2 0.666 10.84% 628.12 61.69 0.229 89.49% 
50 57698.36 359310.6 0.866 5.90% 612 89.61 0.288 136.72% 
60 94207.05 707323.1 1.349 10.29% 623.42 138.14 0.306 22.90% 
70 139642.5 1372908 1.785 7.74% 780 243.92 0.453 93.33% 
80 325567 2940272 2.319 6.29% 932.22 582.81 0.403 -11.23% 
90 895561.8 6729345 2.853 6.06% 700 2752.69 0.174 -8.79% 
100 2522789 2.20E+07 3.513 5.48% 857.93 16424.83 0.376 1.15% 
Note: Profit and K measure median profit and capital stock for each percentiles of capital stock. θ is the coefficients of capital stock 
categories taken from Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 for the formal and informal sectors respectively. 
 
  
  
 
Table 5: Partial linear regression with 3rd order differencing  
 Formal Sector Informal Sector 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Firm aget 0.0154*** 0.0268*** 
 (0.00343) (0.00398) 
Firm aget2 -0.000162*** -0.000523*** 
 (6.25e-05) (9.87e-05) 
lnLt 0.534*** 0.651*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0189) 
Share of paid labort 0.254** 0.0574 
 (0.108) (0.134) 
Age of owner/Manager t  0.000501 
  (0.00556) 
Age of owner/Manager2t  -0.00800 
  (0.00598) 
Male  owner/manager t  0.783*** 
  (0.0661) 
Years of schooling of owner/manager t  -0.00428 
  (0.00963) 
Years of schooling of owner/manager2t  0.199** 
  (0.0783) 
Year  Yes  Yes  
Sector Yes  Yes  
Observations 6219 7300 
R-squared 0.163 0.288 
Notes: Partial linear regression model with Yatchew’s (1998) weighting matrix. Clustered standard errors at                                            
firm level in parentheses.  Estimations for the informal sector are made for K>10 as in table 3 columns 3 and 4.                                            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
 
Table 6: Organizational structure and returns to K; median regressions with bootstrapped standard errors 
 Informal Sector Formal Sector 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
lnK 0.477*** 0.558*** 0.492*** 0.890*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0661) (0.0482) (0.286) 
(lnK)2 -0.0488*** -0.0500*** -0.0489*** -0.230*** 
 (0.00915) (0.00937) (0.00879) (0.0582) 
(lnK)3 0.00206*** 0.00208*** 0.00203*** 0.0193*** 
 (0.000583) (0.000603) (0.000585) (0.00421) 
(lnK)4    -0.000468*** 
    (0.000102) 
lnK* Share of owner’s time -0.0971***  -0.108***  
 (0.0294)  (0.0326)  
Share of owner’s time 3.334***  3.367***  
 (0.333)  (0.350)  
lnK* Share of family labor  -0.162***   
  (0.0516)   
Share of family labor  2.106***   
  (0.398)   
lnK* Share of WFP in total labor    -0.366*** 
    (0.104) 
Share of WFP in total labor    4.232*** 
    (1.196) 
Ability Dummy(High=1)   0.134***  
   (0.0380)  
Share of paid labort 0.621*** 1.623*** 0.619***  
 (0.148) (0.271) (0.147)  
lnL ( of non-owners)t 0.812*** 0.462*** 0.801*** 0.536*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0434) (0.0533) (0.0308) 
No employees (Yes=1) 2.641*** 2.182*** 2.603***  
 (0.196) (0.241) (0.184)  
Firm age t 0.0360*** 0.0369*** 0.0355*** 0.0122*** 
 (0.00437) (0.00416) (0.00409) (0.00350) 
Firm age t2 -0.000766*** -0.000800*** -0.000773*** -0.000107* 
 (9.93e-05) (9.32e-05) (9.24e-05) (6.34e-05) 
Male  owner/manager 1.259*** 1.269*** 1.233***  
 (0.0689) (0.0694) (0.0631)  
Years of schooling of owner/manager 0.0294*** 0.0318*** 0.0279***  
 (0.00983) (0.00985) (0.00954)  
Years of schooling of owner/manager2 0.0219 -0.00313 0.0307  
 (0.0740) (0.0749) (0.0745)  
Observations 
Pseudo R2 
8436 
0.1692 
8436 
0.1631 
8436 
0.1699 
6123 
0.4512 
Median returns to K at max share 83% 73.5% 85% 1.9% 
Median returns to K at P99th share 83% 73.5% 85% 1.9% 
Median returns to K at mean share 72.7% 74.7% 76% 14.5% 
Median returns to K at min share  11.5% 59% 12.6% 16.3% 
Note: Dependent variable is log annual profit. Share of WFP = Share of working proprietors, family workers and partners in total labor input. 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parentheses. Unreported constant, year and sector dummies included.*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
 
 
   
Table 7: Profit equation in formal sector using two-step system-GMM  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
lnKt 0.488*** 0.451*** 0.511*** 
 (0.0842) (0.105) (0.110) 
lnLt 0.819***  -0.891 
 (0.151)  (1.643) 
Share of paid labort 0.399   
 (0.633)   
Share of WFP in total labor  12.41*** 14.80** 
  (4.526) (6.357) 
lnK* Share of WFP in total labor  -1.021** -1.092** 
  (0.415) (0.435) 
lnL (of non-owners)t  0.875*** 1.600 
  (0.162) (1.626) 
Firm age t 0.00162 0.00161 0.0114 
 (0.00748) (0.00764) (0.00891) 
Firm age t2 -5.33e-05 -7.51e-05 -0.000148 
 (0.000105) (9.79e-05) (0.000106) 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 6222 6123 6123 
Number of eid 1825 1804 1804 
AR(1) in 1st differences 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) in 1st differences 0.909 0.673 0.573 
#of instruments 159 203 247 
Hansen test chi2 125.08  170.03 203.59 
P-Value 0.581 0.528 0.701 
Wald chi2 2141.19 2143.64 2119.98 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Median returns to K  16.76% 13.06% 14.62 
Notes: Dependent variable is log annual profit. Share of WFP = share of working proprietors, family workers  
And partners in total labor input. Windmeijer’s robust two-step standard errors in parentheses. Log capital and 
 labor, labor shares and their interaction with capital stock are  instrumented by their two periods lagged first  
difference along with levels of the other explanatory variables  and levels of lagged instruments.*** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
 
Pattern of returns to capital with invested capital stock 
A. Pattern of returns to capital from parametric specifications (table 2) 
  
Figure1: Returns to capital in formal sector   Figure2: Returns to capital in informal sector 
 
B. Pattern of Median returns to capital by K category (table 3-4) 
 
   
 Figure 3: return to Capital in Formal Sector        Figure 4: returns to capital in Informal Sector 
    
C. Median regression after Fan regression (table 5) 
     
     Figure 5. Returns to capital in formal sector          Figure 6. Returns to capital in informal sector 
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1 Introduction
A common argument in the discussion of Africas development problems is that
the African economies are too dependent on agriculture and natural resource
extraction (e.g. Collier, 2008). In view of this, growth in the industrial sector is
often seen as a vehicle for diversication and sustainable economic development
(Page, 2010). One of the least industrially developed countries in Africa is
Ethiopia, where manufacturing accounts for only 5% of total value-added and
agriculture employs 85% of the workforce. Hence, Ethiopia needs substantial
entry of industrial rms in order to speed up diversication. In fact, over the
last decade, gross entry rates in the manufacturing sector have been rather
high (on average 7.6% per year). But exit rates among new rms have been
high too. According to Gebreeyesus (2008), 60% of entering rms exit the
Ethiopian market within 3 years in business. As a result, net entry rates
in the sector have not been high enough to increase the relative size of the
manufacturing sector in the last decade.
In this paper we study the economic performance of Ethiopias new rms.
We ask two specic questions. First, why do young rms have high exit rates?
Previous research on African rms suggests that the likelihood of exit increases
as the economic performance of the rm deteriorates. Regression results re-
ported by e.g. Frazer (2005), Söderbom et al. (2006), Gebreeyesus (2008)
and Shiferaw (2009) indicate that rms generating low levels of revenue, con-
ditional on factor inputs, tend to have relatively low survival rates. Hence,
there is some evidence that African markets drive poorly performing rms out
of business. A common interpretation of this nding is that there is "creative
destruction" in African markets: as resources get reallocated from poor per-
formers to rms that use these more productively, this contributes to higher
aggregate productivity (Frazer, 2005; Söderbom et al., 2006; Gebreeyesus,
2008; Shiferaw, 2007).
However, unless one knows why there is a link between the economic perfor-
mance of the rm and the likelihood of survival, whether the turnover process
implies higher aggregate productivity will remain unclear. In particular, it is
essential to distinguish physical productivity from high prices, or rents. No
previous study in the literature on African rms makes this distinction. Could
it be that the type of rms most likely to survive in Africa are not those with
the highest productivity but those most able to extract rents and charge high
prices? No evidence exists that would enable us to discard this as a possibil-
ity. Moreover, in view of the structure of African markets, this would appear
a question worth taking seriously. In a poorly integrated market characterized
by information problems, rents will be available, and rms that manage to
extract these rents may record high levels of revenue even under low levels of
productivity. This is just one example of a setting in which a positive relation-
ship between a revenue-based measure of performance and rm survival does
not necessarily imply that rm turnover results in aggregate e¢ ciency gains.
In the context of industrial expansion and the contribution to such a
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process of new rms, patterns of rm survival are informative of one side of
the story only. The other is performance conditional on survival. This leads
us to our second research question: how do physical productivity, prices and
demand develop in the initial years following upon entry? Similar to the liter-
ature on rm survival, there exist several studies that study the relationship
between revenue-based measures of economic performance and rm age (e.g.
Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002; Van Biesebroeck, 2005), but none that dis-
tinguishes between productivity and prices. Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002)
infer "learning" from regressions indicating a negative relationship between
rm age and sales and employment growth, but unless productivity e¤ects
can be isolated from price e¤ects the type of learning implied by such results
is unclear. In principle, it is possible that previous results on learning based
on revenue-based measures of performance are unrelated to physical produc-
tivity gains, which is what the underlying literature really emphasizes (e.g.
Jovanovic, 1982).
In this paper we seek to ll these gaps in the literature. To this end, we
use a rm-level panel dataset that covers the entire population of domestic
manufacturing rms in Ethiopia that use electricity in production and that
employ ten or more workers. This dataset has been used in previous work
by Bigsten and Gebreeyesus (2007), Gebreeyesus (2008) and Shiferaw (2007,
2009). Importantly for our purposes, this dataset contains a detailed product-
level module that enables us to construct product-specic prices and quantities
at the rm-level. Equipped with these data, we can thus distinguish between
prices and physical productivity and investigate how these correlate with the
likelihood of exit and how they develop in the rst few years following entry
into the market.
Our analysis also relates to an ongoing discussion about the relative im-
portance of di¤erent types of skills for enterprise success. Several authors
have emphasized lack of technical capacity as a key reason why many rms
in developing countries perform poorly (e.g. Pack, 1982; 1993; Lall, 1992).
Sutton and Kellow (2010), however, downplays the importance of technology
as a key determinant of company success in Africa, arguing that basic manu-
facturing technology is relatively easy to master. Based on in-depth interviews
with leading industrialists in Zambia and Ethiopia, and Kellow highlight "...a
crucial role played by detailed knowledge and experience both of the local
market and of the international market" (Suttonand Kellow, 2010, p.4) and
argues that this kind of expertise "...constitutes a more important aspect of
capabilityin the present setting than does any kind of technological know-
how." (Sutton and Kellow, 2010, p.4). Establishing the importance of physical
productivity for rm survival contributes to this discussion.
Finally, our research addresses some key concerns in the general liter-
ature on rm performance. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syversion (2008) and
Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2008) show that a revenue-based measure of total
factor productivity (TFPR) will confound true e¢ ciency with price, elastic-
ity and scale economies and that the discrepancy between TFPR and a more
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appropriate measure of physical productivity may be considerable. For exam-
ple, Foster et al. (2008) note that microeconomic theory predicts a negative
correlation between physical productivity and prices, but then nd a positive
correlation between TFPR and prices in their data. Katayama et al. (2008)
nd TFPR to be very weakly correlated with alternative productivity mea-
sures based on the rms contribution to consumer and producer surplus, again
suggesting that a revenue-based measure of productivity is a poor proxy for
true physical productivity.1
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 denes our price
and quantity variables and explains how these are measured in the data and
how they are used to decompose TFPR into physical productivity and demand
side variables. Section 3 discusses the outcome variables of interest. Section 4
contains the empirical results. The last section concludes and discusses policy
implications.
2 Denitions
2.1 Prices and Quantities
As discussed in the introduction, much of our analysis focuses on separating
productivity e¤ects from price e¤ects. In particular, we want to distinguish
between the e¤ects of prices and productivity on rm survival rates, and doc-
ument growth patterns in prices and productivity amongst young rms. To
this end we use census panel data on Ethiopian manufacturing establishments
collected by Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA). The dataset, which
covers the period 1996-2006, includes all establishments in the country that
employ at least 10 workers and that use electricity in production. Hence mi-
croenterprises are not represented in the dataset. In 2009, this class of rms
accounted for 51% of manufacturing employment but only 11% of total manu-
facturing value-added. The aggregate economic performance of the manufac-
turing sector is thus primarily determined by the performance of medium-sized
and large rms. We take this to be our population of interest.
Information available in the dataset includes capital, labor, raw material
and energy inputs; investment as well as other industrial costs. The number
of rms in the manufacturing sector increases from around 600 in 1996 to
approximately 1,100 in 2006. Key for our purposes is a special module in
the survey instrument on prices and quantities. Every year, each rm has to
provide detailed information about the type of products produced, the unit
of measurement (e.g. kilos, tonnes etc.), the sales price per unit and the
quantity produced, for up to 9 products. Using these data, and ignoring a
composite product category labeled other products, our starting point is a
1Assuming that rmscosts and revenues reect Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a di¤erenti-
ated product markets, and incorporating demand system they impute each rms unobserved
quantities, qualities, marginal costs and prices of each product from observed revenues and
costs to construct rms contribution to consumer and producer surplus as welfare-based
measure of productivity.
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dataset containing approximately 17,000 rm-year-product observations over
our sampling period. Several of these, however, refer to products that are
not precisely dened or products that will di¤er markedly in quality. We
root out such cases using two rules. Our primary selection rule is based on
the idea that a product category should be such that consumers would not
di¤erentiate between unlabeled products belonging to it. To illustrate how we
use this rule, we would exclude "meat" a priori (on the grounds that there are
likely substantial quality di¤erences within this category), but would consider
"beer" to be a suitable product category. Of course there are di¤erent types
of beer, and perhaps one ought to distinguish between dark beer and lager,
or between beers of di¤ering alcoholic strength, however this is not possible
given the information available. We consider brick of clay, cement block,
cement oor tiles and cement to be the least heterogenous types of products
in our data, and dene these to be homogenousproducts. In the empirical
analysis below, some of the robustness checks will be done based on this subset
of homogenous products only.
In addition, we included other set of products based on a secondary se-
lection rule that, in a cross-section of rms producing a given product, the
coe¢ cient of variation of output price should not exceed 0.5 and the number
of observation should be larger than 100.2 Taken together, these rules imply
we end up with a total of 27 di¤erent products in our core sample. These are
listed in table A1 in the appendix. Our set of selected products constitutes
around 7800 product-year observations covering 13 sectors. Food, Beverage,
Textiles, Footwear, Chemicals and Non-Metal sectors constitute 94% of the
total product-year observations of selected products.
In our dataset, while most of the products, such as bricks of clay, cement
blocks, nails, sugar, bread and wheat our, are reported separately as a single
product, some of our products can be considered to be a composite product
aggregating over similar products. These products include: edible oil, liquor
and soft drinks among others. This is the level of aggregation CSA uses and we
take that as given and assume that there is high substitutability between the
components of such aggregated products. The product soft drink for example
contains Coca Cola, Fanta and other similar brands of soft drinks. Even
though consumers can di¤erentiate between such products, we assume that
there is high substitutability between such products and treat soft drink as
homogenous product. The same type of argument follows for products such
as tea, milled co¤ee, edible oil, liquor, beer. This is also the approach followed
by Foster et al (2008). All quantity measures are standardized so as to have
a common unit of measurement, e.g. weights are measured in KG, volumes
in liter, areas in square meter or square feet ...etc depending on the product.
Output prices are then adjusted using the standardzed unit of measurments.
In table A1, we present summary statistics of nominal output prices of
our selected products after controlling for outliers by ignoring the bottom and
2Note that products deemed to be homogenous according to the primary selection rule
do not necessarily have to satisfy the secondary selection rule.
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top 3 percentiles of our observation on product prices. Besides having wide
industry coverage, our selected products have a major economic signicance
for their producers. Table A2 in the appendix presents summary statistics of
revenue share of our selected products when these products are the rms most
important product.3 We dene major product as the product with highest
revenue share in total output among set of rms selected products. This will
give us a smaller sample size of about 3500 where the average revenue share
is 74%. Among rmsmajor products, all products except Leather garment,
Crust and Wet blue hides; and Wires have a median revenue share of 50% or
more.
2.2 Productivity and Demand
We assume that the production by rm i of product u at time t can be repre-
sented by a production function which we write in logarithmic form as:
log Yiut = logAiut + logF (Kiut; Liut;Miut; Eiut); (1)
where Yiut denotes physical output, Aiut is physical total factor productivity,
Kiut is capital stock, Liut is labor input, Miut is raw material inputs, Eiut
is energy, and F () is a Cobb-Douglas function featuring constant returns to
scale:
logF (Kiut; Liut;Miut; Eiut) = (1  Lj   Mj   Ej) lnKiut
+Lj lnLiut + Mj lnMiut + Ej lnEiut(2)
whereLj ; Mj ; Ej are production function parameters, specic to sector j.
Taking this framework as our point of departure, we construct two productivity
measures: the conventional revenue-based productivity (TFPR), and physical
quantity based productivity (TFPQ).
The denition of TFPR is standard and straightforward:
TFPRit = log
 X
u
PiutYiut
!
  logF (Kit; Lit;Mit; Eit);
i.e. the log of total sales net of the contribution of the inputs to output.
Note that the inputs here are dened at the rm-year level. The parameters
Lj ; Mj ; Ej are estimated using a cost shares approach. Specically, Lj is
calculated as sector j0s average share of the wage bill in total sales, while Mj
and Ej are calculated as sector averages of the shares of total raw materials
and energy expenditure, respectively, in total sales.4 Labor Lit is measured as
the number of workers, Mit and Eit are measured as the rms expenditure on
3The average combined revenue share of our selected products including rms non-major
products is 92%.
4Energy input includes expenditures on fuel, electricity; and wood and charcoal.
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raw material and energy inputs, and Kit is the value of the capital stock.5 All
nancial values are expressed in constant terms using a GDP deator. One
implication of dening Mit, Eit and Kit in value terms is that our measure of
productivity will reect heterogeneity in input prices with rms facing higher
input prices appearing as less e¢ cient.
The denition of physical productivity (TFPQ) is as follows:
TFPQiut  logAiut = log Yiut   logF (Kiut; Liut;Miut; Eiut): (3)
For multi-product rms we need to deal with aggregation issues. The rst
issue is that factor inputs are not observed at the product level, which makes
it problematic to dene TFPQiut for multiproduct rms. To address this
problem we assume that the intensity with which inputs are used for producing
product u is proportional to the value share:
Xiut = iut Xit;
X = fK;L;M;Eg, where
iut =
PiutYiutP
u PiutYiut
 PiutYiut
PitYit
:
The second aggregation issue, again arising for multiproduct rms, concerns
the construction of a rm-year level measure of physical productivity based on
product-rm-year level productivity levels dened by (3). Adopting a weight-
ing scheme based on the product revenue shares would not be helpful here as
this would yield TFPR. Instead, we focus on the major product of rms, in
terms of sales values, and calculate physical productivity for the major product
only. Hence, we write
TFPQit = log Yi(u=m)t   logF (Kiut; Liut;Miut; Eiut)  log i(u=m)t; (4)
where u = m indicates the major product for rm i at time t. Note that, for
single-product rms, the aggregation issues do not arise; log i(u=m)t = 0.
An important driving factor of output prices is the underlying consumer
demand for the products. We obtain a measure of the state of demand by
estimating the following demand equation using rmsmajor product.
log Yi(u=m)t = 1 lnPi(u=m)t + lt + u + "iut (5)
where 1 is the price elasticity, lt is a town-year xed e¤ect (controls for
variation in demand across locations and over time), u is product xed e¤ect
and "iut is residual demand, capturing shifts in the demand curve due to
5Capital stock is measured by the average of capital stock at the beginning and end of the
year at replacement value. We construct a capital stock using perpetual inventory method
where di¤erent depreciation rates are assumed for di¤erent category of capital. We used 5%
for dwelling houses, non-residential buildings and construction works; 8% for machinery and
equipment; and 10% for vehicles and furniture and other xtures.
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idiosyncratic demand shocks. To estimate "iut consistently, we need to take
into account the endogeneity of the price variable.6 Following Foster et al.
(2008), we instrument the price variable using physical productivity as dened
in (4). We focus on the set of homogenous products with comparable product
quality to estimate our demand equation.
3 Outcomes of Interest
3.1 Firm Survival
We start with a simple probit specication where we model the likelihood of
rm exit as dependent on revenue-based productivity, rm age, size and a
vector of control variables Xt:
Pr(exiti;t+1 = 1) = 
 
0 + 1 ln(Ageit) + 2 ln(Sizeit) + 3 lnTFPRit +X
0
it4

;
(6)
where exitt+1 = 1 if rm i exits the market between t and t + 1 and  () is
the cumulative density function for the standard normal distribution. The
vector of control variables Xit includes variables such as: type of ownership;
whether the rm has any export; and year, sector and sometimes product xed
e¤ects. We use this specication primarily to relate to the existing literature.
Previous studies (e.g. Frazer, 2005; Söderbom et al., 2006; Gebreeyesus, 2008;
Shiferaw, 2009) have documented a positive relationship between revenue-
based productivity and rm survival, but as discussed in the introduction it
is not clear whether this association in the data is due to higher physical
productivity or higher prices.
One of our two main goals in this paper is to shed light on the relative
importance of physical productivity and output prices for rm survival.
The importance of demand and productivity on rm survival is investigated
by generalizing the exit model introduced above as follows:
Pr(exiti;t+1 = 1) = (0 + 1 lnAgeit + 2 lnSizeit + 31 lnTFPQit (7)
+32Demandit +X
0
it4);
where Demandit  "^iut is the estimated residual from (5). Note that TFPQ is
dened as output conditional on inputs used in the production process, while
Demand is dened as output conditional on the price charged to customers.
We also consider specications in which we replace Demand by the output
6Estimation of our demand equation using OLS will give us biased estimates of the price
elasticity as the output price is positively associated with the unobserved component of
demand. This is because rms optimally increase output prices as a result of favorable
demand shocks. We need an instrument closely related to prices but orthogonal to demand
shocks. Supply side variables, such as physical productivity and input prices, are potential
candidates as they are correlated with production cost and hence output price. Physical
productivity is a relevant IV as e¢ cient rms are likely to have lower costs and pass this on
to customers by charging lower output prices.
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price directly. Given that these alternative specications condition on TFPQ,
the coe¢ cient on the price variable is interpretable as measuring a demand
e¤ect.
3.2 Growth
How do physical productivity, prices and demand develop in the initial years
following upon entry? To answer this question we run regressions of the fol-
lowing form:
ln	it = 0 + 11Enterit + 12 lnAgeit + 2 lnSizeit +X
0
it3 + eijt; (8)
where 	it is physical and revenue-based productivity, price and demand for
rm i at year t. Enterit is a dummy variable equal to one if rm i is a new
entrant in period t and zero otherwise. We control for rm size, rm age,
and a vector of control variables. physical productivity, TFPQit; is used as
an additional control variable for price regressions in (8). Controlling for rm
size is important for two reasons. First, the demand residual obtained from
(5) is dependent on scale; for example, large rms will produce a high level of
output conditional on price. Second, it is of interest to see whether rms of
di¤ering size have di¤erent levels of productivity and demand.
4 Empirical Analysis
Having a dataset that covers the entire population of formal manufacturing
rms employing at least 10 workers is key to construct our entry, exit and
rm age variables. A rm is considered to be an entrant if it is observed in
our dataset for the rst time in the sample period 1996-2006. If we observe a
rm in 1996 for the rst time in our dataset, we use an information on year
of establishment to decide whether the rm entered in year 1996 or earlier.
We then create a dummy variable Entryt = 1 if a rm enters between t   1
and t: Similarly, we construct an Exitt+1 dummy equal to one if a rm exits
the market between years t and t+ 1: We observe a small number of cases of
muliple-entry in our dataset, i.e. rms re-entering the market after exit (less
than 5% of the observations fall into this category). When making comparison
of performance of rms in di¤erent stage of their life cycle, we only consider
rst time entry. Entryt is then coded zero for subsequent entries since these
rms may have better market information than genuine new entrants. It is
also possible that rms exit and enter because they cross the size threshold for
the Ethiopian census i.e. 10 workers. We view such cases as exits and entrants
for our population of interest which is the formal sector.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the key variables used in this
analysis. On average, 23% of the observations constitute entrants while the
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average exit rate is 21%.7 Young rms constitute a signicant share of our
sample. The median rm age is only four years of business experience and 55
% of the rms are aged ve years or less. It is also worth noting that majority
of the rms (82%) are domestic privately owned rms. As few as 6 % of the
rms have any export.
Table 2 shows pair-wise correlations between measures of log output price
and the productivity measures netting out product and year xed e¤ects. We
nd that physical productivity is negatively correlated with price. This is con-
sistent with the theoretical prediction that more e¢ cient rms can produce at
lower cost, enabling them to lower their prices. It is this feature of physical
productivity measure that makes it a candidate instrumental variable for out-
put prices in our estimation of demand equation. In contrast, revenue-based
productivity is positively related to price.
Estimation of demand equation is key for decomposing demand side vari-
ables into price and demand shocks. Table 3 presents results for our demand
equation. Town-year xed e¤ects are included to control for average income
of rms local market over time. Product xed e¤ects capture scale di¤erences
in prices across products. Column (1) shows OLS results. The OLS estimate
of the price elasticity is equal to -0.739. We suspect this is severely biased to-
wards zero, as rms likely raise prices in response to positive demand shocks.
Consistent with this hypothesis, estimating the demand equation using phys-
ical productivity as an instrument for price provides us with a larger negative
price elasticity (around -4), suggesting that rms face an elastic demand curve
(Column 2).8
Demand residuals capture unusually high output demand for a given price.
This is potentially capturing quality di¤erences for a given product across
rms, which may lead to a biased price elasticity of demand and consequently
to a biased measure of demand. We investigate whether this appears to be a
problem by adding to the specication an interaction term between the price
variable and a dummy for the set of homogenous products in the data (i.e.
Brick of clay, Cement Block, Cement oor tiles and Cement). The results,
shown in column (3), indicate that the coe¢ cient on this interaction vari-
able is relatively small and wholly statistically insignicant. This suggests
the estimated price elasticity is not contaminated by product heterogeneity
within product categories. The residuals of our demand equations in column
2 and 3 are used as the basis for calculating idiosyncratic demand shocks for
subsequent analysis below.
Next we investigate the persistence in prices, productivity and demand.
Current physical productivity, average product price and demand shocks are
regressed on their one period lag and a set of control variables including owner-
7Of the 23% of entrants, 18% are new entrants (Age0t = 1) with the remaining 5% being
multiple entrants.
8 In the rst stage regressions, we nd a negative and signicant relationship between
output price and our instrument: physical productivity with the coe¢ cient of -0.26 and
signicant at 1 percent for column 2 for instance.
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ship status, exports and product dummies.9 A coe¢ cient closer to one on the
lagged dependent variable indicates stronger persistence. Results are shown
in Table 4. We nd that the demand side variables - log price and demand
shock- are more persistent than physical productivity. Di¤erences in rm per-
formance on these key variables and their implication for rm survival are
investigated below.
4.1 Firm survival
We start our analysis of rm survival by adopting specications similar to
those used in previous studies. Table 5 thus shows exit probits for which
the explanatory variables are rm age, size, revenue-based productivity, and
controls. The results indicate that young and small rms are more likely to exit
the market than larger and more established rms. The quadratic relationship
between rm age and survival indicates that rms have better prospect of
survival as they grow older but the contribution of age for survival decreases
over time. This result is robust after controlling for ownership (Publict and
Anyforeignt) and whether the rm has any export during the survey year
(Export Dummyt). In line with previous empirical ndings, more productive
rms, as measured by value added per employee in column 2, are more likely
to survive. However, when using value of output of rms major product as
a measure of productivity, after controlling for input usage, output becomes
insignicant in column 3.
We now investigate how the likelihood of rm survival relates to physical
productivity and demand. Results based on our extended specication of the
exit probit (7) are shown in Table 6. We nd that rms with higher output
demand are more likely to survive.10 In contrast, there is no signicant phys-
ical productivity e¤ect on survival. The marginal impact of demand shocks
on probability of survival ranges between 0.94 - 2.16 percentage points. This
result is robust to the inclusion of alternative rm size measures except in
column 3 where contemporary labor and capital inputs are added at the same
time leading demand measures to be insignicant. This is because they are
highly correlated with physical productivity which takes contemporary capital
and labor into account. Signicance is largely improved when we use startup
capital and labor inputs (column 4). However, we do not nd signicance
demand e¤ect when use output price instead of demand shocks in column 5.
It is also worth noting that, even conditional on performance variables, we
nd robust evidence that rm age and size matters for rm survival. Hence,
small and young rms are unlikely to survive even if they perform well, though
prospect of survival improves with rm age.
9For rms stating multiple prices for same product in a given year, we take average
reported price of the product for each year.
10We nd very similar pattern when using alternative demand residual using demand
residual of col 3 of table 3. These results are not presented to save space.
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4.2 Growth
Comparison of various components of productivity across rms in di¤erent
stage of their life cycle is informative about the nature of competition and
business environment in which young rms operate. In particular; we are
interested in the growth patterns of new rms in the market. In table 7,
we compare productivity, price and demand shocks of entrants to that of
established rms controlling for rm size and age, ownership, any exporting
as well as year, product and sector dummies. Entrants have lower revenue-
based productivity which is due to the lower price they charge for their output
and lower demand shocks they face. However, we do not nd any signicant
di¤erence in physical productivity of entrants and established rms in column
4. Whereas rms with larger initial number of workers are more productive
and face favorable demand shocks, rms with larger start up capital have lower
revenue and physical productivity though they have more favorable demand
shock. The quadratic rm age e¤ect, in column 2 and 3, implies that demand
and output price of newly established rms catch up with time but no such
evidence is found for productivity.
Comparing the performance of new rms using age dummies for the rst
ve years of rms in the market provides better picture on persistence of
demand and productivity disadvantages of new rms. In table 8, we add 5
age dummies for the rst ve years of rmsoperation with rm age larger
than ve years used as base category. New rms (with Age0t = 1) have
lower revenue-based productivity due to lower output price and demand they
face rather than due to being less e¢ cient than established rms. Price and
demand disadvantages of new rms persists until rmssecond year, but this
is not the case for physical productivity. Lower demand shocks are observed
as late as rmsfth year in column 3. This is in line with the results in table
4, that price and demand shocks are more persistent than productivity. These
ndings suggest that small and young rms are vulnerable to demand side
constraints. And in the absence of evidence of catching up e¤ect with regards
to physical productivity, previous results of learning e¤ect may be picking up
demand side e¤ects than rms updating their productivity. The evidence that
absence of/limited market access is the rst major growth constraints reported
by rms in our dataset seems to support our ndings.
Taken together, we nd clear evidence that small and young rms face
a signicant demand constraints, i.e, lower prices and idiosyncratic demand,
early on when they enter the market. There is no robust evidence that entering
rms are less e¢ cient than incumbents. When it comes to rm survival, it
is demand constraints that matter most rather than physical productivity.
Thus the idea that African markets drive out ine¢ cient rms is not strongly
supported. The fact that there is some evidence for catching up e¤ect on
demand side over time is good news, though how long it takes to close the gaps
may matter for rm survival. We nd no robust evidence for the presence of
catching up e¤ect with regards to technological learning.
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5 Conclusions
In this study we investigate the relative importance of supply and demand side
constraints to rm performance. Previous rm level studies on productivity
and rm performance are limited by the use of revenue-based productivity
measure which confounds true e¢ ciency with price e¤ect. The current study
takes advantage of the availability of both price and physical quantity of rms
products to decompose revenue-based productivity into physical productivity
and price e¤ects using 11 year panel dataset of Ethiopian manufacturing sector.
The idea that African markets drive poorly performing rms out of business
is not strongly supported in our rm exit analysis. Age and size matter for
rm survival, even conditional on performance variables and the latter do
not seem to have strong explanatory power. Hence, small and young rms
are unlikely to survive even if they perform well. When comparing physical
productivity and demand of entrants with more established rms, young rms
are no less productive than mature rms on average but they do face lower
demand during the rst 1-5 years. This may be part of the explanation as to
why young rms have high exit rates.
This is supported by our exit probit regressions using physical productiv-
ity and demand side variables of rm performance. We nd that rms with
favorable demand shocks are less likely to exit with no evidence that phys-
ical productivity improves prospect of survival. There is some evidence for
catching up e¤ect in closing demand gap with rm age. How long this process
takes may matter as rms might be forced to exit the market before they are
able to catch up and compete with more established rms. Securing access
to markets and providing assistance on marketing skills during most vulnera-
ble stage of rm entry are policy implications of our results. Aggregation of
physical productivity for multi-product rms and extension of the analysis to
other rm performance measures are the natural next steps.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables used 
Variables Description Mean Median stdev 
Dependent Variables 
TFPRt Revenue based productivity  2.5 2.42 0.82 
TFPQ_slctt Physical productivity using firm’s major product 0.59 0.93 1.6 
Log  price Log output price per unit 2.02 1.49 1.58 
Entryt Entryt=1 if firm enters between t-1 and t 23%   
Exitt+1 Exitt=1 if firm exits between t and t+1 21%   
     
Explanatory Variables 
(lnVA/L) t Log value added per person 9.3 9.23 1.28 
(lnpt *Q) t Log value of output of firm’s major product 13.46 13.19 2.21 
rev_sh  Revenue share of firm’s major product 0.74 0.85 0.28 
lnK t Log of firm’s capital stock  13.37 13.23 2.58 
lnL t Log of firm’s  labor input 3.72 3.26 1.42 
lnE t Log of firm’s  energy input 10.34 10.18 2.5 
lnM t Log of firm’s  raw material input 13.3 12.96 2.2 
lnKi Log of startup capital stock 13.19 13.21 2.76 
lnLi Log of startup labor 3.69 3.14 1.47 
Firm aget Firm age in years 11.60 4 15.78 
Age0 t Dummy=1 for Firm aget =0 18%   
Age1t Dummy=1 for Firm aget =1 10.7%   
Age2t Dummy=1 for Firm aget =2 8.8%   
Age3t Dummy=1 for Firm aget =3 6.8%   
Age4t Dummy=1 for Firm aget =4 5.9%   
Age5t Dummy=1 for Firm aget =5 4.5%   
Age6t Dummy=1 for Firm aget >5 45%   
Exportt Export=1 if a firm has any export in year t 6%   
Publict A dummy = 1 if publicly owned firm 16%   
Any foreignt A dummy = 1 if any foreign contribution to firm’s  
 current  paid up capital 
2%   
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CSA, 1996-2006 data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Prices, output and productivity: Correlations conditional on product and year 
fixed effects 
 Log output 
price  
Physical 
productivity 
Revenue 
productivity 
Log physical 
output  
Log output price  1.0000    
Physical productivity (TFPQ_slct) -0.4868*   1.0000   
Revenue productivity (TFPR) 0.0711* 0.8367* 1.0000  
Log physical output  -0.1765* 0.4661* 0.4215*                     1.0000 
Note: The numbers reported in the table are pair wise correlations of predicted residuals based on OLS 
regressions in which the price, output and productivity variables are regressed on year and product dummies. * = 
significant at 1% 
  
Table 3: Estimates of the demand equation  
 (1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) 2SLS 
Log pricet  -0.739*** -3.980*** -4.031*** 
 (0.1487) (0.216) (0.226) 
Log pricet*Homogt   0.304 
   (0.662) 
Product dummies Yes  Yes Yes 
Town-year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3175 3175 3175 
R-squared 0.5990 0.3456 0.3437 
Number of town-year  571 571 571 
Note: Dependent variable is log physical output. The instrument in col. (2) is TFPQ_slct. The instruments in col. 
(3) are TFPQ_slct and TFPQ_slct*Homog. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses in col. (1) 
and conventional standard errors in parentheses in col. (2) & (3). Homog is a dummy variable equal to one when 
the products included are: Brick of Clay, Cement Block, Cement Floor tiles, Cement. These products are 
hypothesized to be most homogenous. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Unreported constant included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Persistence in productivity, prices and demand 
VARIABLES (1) Physical 
productivity 
(2) log price (3) Demand 
shock 
TFPQ_slctt-1 0.344***   
 (0.0308)   
Log average pricet-1  0.414***  
  (0.0461)  
Demand Shockt-1   0.623*** 
   (0.03728) 
Publict 0.149*** -0.140*** 0.585*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0377) (0.1309) 
Any foreignt  -0.0673 0.0145 0.150 
 (0.0649) (0.0637) (0. 1825) 
Export Dummyt 0.0433 -0.0833 0.282 
 (0 .0617) (0.0542) (0.175) 
Constant 1.273*** 0.743*** -0.246 
 (0.0767) (0.1391) (0.179) 
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  
Product Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2027 2027 2027 
R-squared 0.196 0.298 0.466 
Number of products 27 27 27 
Note:  Current productivity, price and demand residuals are regressed on their respective lags in a                                                                                                                           
product fixed effect estimation. The demand shock is the residual for the regression shown in Table 3, col. (2). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Age, size, revenue productivity, and the likelihood of exit: Probit estimates 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Firm aget -0.0395*** -0.0388*** -0.0350*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00677) (0.00700) 
Firm age squaret 0.000591*** 0.000586*** 0.000496*** 
 (0.000141) (0.000140) (0.000151) 
lnKt -0.0672*** -0.0509*** -0.0650*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0200) 
lnL t -0.291*** -0.286*** -0.157** 
 (0.0566) (0.0563) (0.0700) 
lnEt   -0.0334 
   (0.0326) 
lnMt   -0.181*** 
   (0.0663) 
Log revenue share (lnsh2)t   -0.0170 
   (0.0940) 
Publict 0.161 0.182 0.122 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.162) 
Any foreignt 0.0997 0.109 0.0426 
 (0.264) (0.266) (0.275) 
Export Dummyt 0.0209 -0.00444 0.0925 
 (0.326) (0.313) (0.322) 
Log (Value added/L)t  -0.104***  
  (0.0296)  
Log value of major product t   0.103 
   (0.0719) 
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector Yes  Yes  Yes  
Product   Yes  
Observations 2509 2509 2499 
Pseduo R2 0.1580 0.1628 0.1694 
 Note: Dependent variable is Exitt+1=1 if a firm exits between t and t+1. The output variable in col. (3) is that 
underlying the calculation of TFPR. Standard errors clustered at firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Unreported constant included.  
 
  
Table 6. Exit using Probit Model  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TFPQ_slct t -0.0259 0.0647 0.00290 0.0247 -0.0118 
 (0.0556) (0.0526) (0.0565) (0.0564) (0.0643) 
Demand shockt (T3:2)t -0.0610*** -0.0399** -0.0295 -0.0632***  
 (0.0195) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0205)  
lnKt -0.116***  -0.0733***   
 (0.0214)  (0.0219)   
lnLt  -0.326*** -0.247***   
  (0.0564) (0.0611)   
lnKi (initial)    -0.0642*** -0.0730*** 
    (0.0238) (0.0243) 
lnLi (initial)    -0.0800 -0.132** 
    (0.0570) (0.0562) 
Log output price t     -0.0944 
     (0.107) 
Firm aget -0.0399*** -0.0350*** -0.0366*** -0.0381*** -0.0405*** 
 (0.00699) (0.00704) (0.00699) (0.00710) (0.00705) 
Firm age squaret 0.000504*** 0.000515*** 0.000519*** 0.000493*** 0.000532*** 
 (0.000151) (0.000154) (0.000153) (0.000154) (0.000151) 
Publict -0.0815 0.139 0.134 -0.0668 -0.0608 
 (0.149) (0.164) (0.163) (0.171) (0.169) 
Any foreignt 0.0936 0.0915 0.0968 0.120 0.122 
 (0.266) (0.270) (0.268) (0.268) (0.266) 
Export Dummyt -0.148 -0.0462 0.0243 -0.169 -0.165 
 (0.317) (0.332) (0.335) (0.318) (0.312) 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Product Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2499 2499 2499 2392 2392 
Pseudo R2 0.1561 0.1594 0.1636 0.1543 0.1508 
Notes: Dependent variable is Exitt+1=1 if a firm exits between t and t+1. Standard errors clustered at firm level in 
parentheses. Unreported constant included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 7. Prices, demand and productivity: Comparing new entrants to established firms 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TFPR Log P Demand TFPQ 
Entryt   -0.0744** -0.0387** -0.320*** -0.0491 
 (0.0317) (0.0188) (0.102) (0.0385) 
TFPQ_slctt  -0.272***   
  (0.0284)   
lnKi (initial) -0.0641*** -0.00962* 0.127*** -0.0748*** 
 (0.0125) (0.00540) (0.0290) (0.0134) 
lnLi  (initial) 0.0565** 0.0113 0.829*** 0.0621** 
 (0.0284) (0.0167) (0.0880) (0.0306) 
Firm aget 0.00254 0.00405** 0.0241** -0.00208 
 (0.00359) (0.00184) (0.0113) (0.00408) 
Firm age squaret -3.54e-05 -8.40e-05*** -0.000444** 6.67e-05 
 (4.82e-05) (2.91e-05) (0.000209) (5.94e-05) 
Publict 0.102 0.0273 0.0118 0.103 
 (0.0668) (0.0368) (0.222) (0.0733) 
Any foreignt -0.0903 -0.0221 -0.110 -0.0937 
 (0.104) (0.0724) (0.349) (0.0834) 
Export Dummyt 0.120 0.0951 0.435 0.0345 
 (0.0789) (0.0698) (0.306) (0.0928) 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Product Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3001 3001 3001 3001 
R-squared 0.506 0.953 0.336 0.834 
Notes: The dependent variable is TFPR in col. 1 and TFPQ_slct in col. (4). Demand is residual of demand 
equation in column 2 of table 3.  Unreported constant included.  Clustered standard errors at firm level in 
parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table. 8, The evolution of prices, demand and productivity for new firms 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TFPR Log P Demand TFPQ 
Age0t  -0.0966** -0.0717*** -0.579*** -0.0342 
 (0.0405) (0.0246) (0.126) (0.0477) 
Age1t -0.0624 -0.0468* -0.362*** -0.0214 
 (0.0487) (0.0248) (0.128) (0.0528) 
Age2 t -0.0447 -0.0187 -0.230* -0.0359 
 (0.0496) (0.0266) (0.137) (0.0572) 
Age3 t 0.0625 0.0286 0.00211 0.0467 
 (0.0500) (0.0272) (0.143) (0.0538) 
Age4 t 0.0493 -0.0389 -0.206 0.121** 
 (0.0513) (0.0340) (0.159) (0.0572) 
Age5 t 0.00766 -0.0332 -0.260* 0.0563 
 (0.0553) (0.0256) (0.142) (0.0608) 
TFPQ_slct t  -0.273***   
  (0.0285)   
lnKi (initial) -0.0655*** -0.00767 0.134*** -0.0796*** 
 (0.0121) (0.00480) (0.0280) (0.0133) 
lnLi (initial) 0.0598** 0.00412 0.799*** 0.0767*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0156) (0.0832) (0.0274) 
Public t 0.106 0.0304 0.0172 0.104 
 (0.0654) (0.0379) (0.224) (0.0722) 
Any foreign t -0.0940 -0.0362 -0.179 -0.0796 
 (0.104) (0.0722) (0.343) (0.0823) 
Export Dummy t 0.118 0.103 0.466 0.0198 
 (0.0763) (0.0694) (0.302) (0.0901) 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Product  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Sector Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 3001 3001 3001 3001 
R-squared 0.507 0.953 0.336 0.834 
Notes: The dependent variable is TFPR in col. 1 and TFPQ_slct in col. (4). Demand is the residual of the 
demand equation shown in Table 3, column 2. Unreported constant included. Clustered standard errors at firm 
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Abstract
We use census panel data on Ethiopian manufacturing rms to ana-
lyze the e¤ects of enterprise clustering on two key determinants of rm
performance: physical productivity and output prices. We show that
distinguishing between productivity and prices is important for under-
standing the e¤ects of agglomeration and competition. We nd a negative
and statistically signicant e¤ect of agglomeration of rms on prices, sug-
gesting that new entry leads to higher competitive pressure in the local
economy. We also nd a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of
agglomeration on physical productivity, consistent with the notion that
clustering leads to positive externalities. The net e¤ect of enterprise clus-
tering on revenue-based measures of performance is small and not signif-
icantly di¤erent from zero. Our results thus highlight the importance of
separating price from productivity e¤ects in this type of analysis.
Keywords: Agglomeration economies, African manufacturing, Ethiopia,
productivity, Prices.
JEL Classication: R10, R32, D24, O14, O55, L11
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1 Introduction
Starting with Marshall (1920), many economists have argued that geograph-
ical agglomeration, or clustering, of enterprises can be a source of improved
rm performance.1 The basic idea is that, by locating close to suppliers, cus-
tomers and competitors, an enterprise may be able to benet from information
spillovers, obtain better access to (skilled) labor, face lower transaction costs,
etc. Numerous studies (Glaeser et al., 1992, Henderson et al., 1995, Henderson,
1997, Combes, 2000, Blien et al., 2006) provide empirical evidence indicating
that agglomeration economies have been an important source of employment
growth in USA and European countries. Other studies (De Lucio et al., 2002)
show that there are positive productivity e¤ects. For less developed economies,
little quantitative evidence on these mechanisms exists however, and for Sub-
Saharan Africa as far as we know - there is none.2 In this paper, we use
census panel data on Ethiopian manufacturing rms to empirically analyze the
e¤ects of enterprise clustering on rm performance. We will consider both the
e¤ect on physical productivity and the e¤ects of increased competition (due
to agglomeration) on the pricing behavior of rms.
The objective of this paper is thus to analyze whether agglomeration ef-
fects are economically important in Ethiopia, an economy where productivity
gains in the non-farm sector are urgently needed. Our data are well suited for
this purpose. Over our sampling period, 1996-2006, the enterprise landscape
has changed quite dramatically. For example, the number of formal manufac-
turing rms grew by 83%, a number that in most cases will dwarf net entry
rates in developed countries.3 Such a big change to the structure of the market
is useful from an empirical point of view. Moreover, access to census data im-
plies that we can dene agglomeration variables based on complete data on all
members of the relevant economic cluster. We are therefore able to measure
agglomeration variables more accurately than would be possible with survey
datasets. The panel dimension in the data enables us to allow for time invari-
ant unobserved heterogeneity in performance across rms. This is important,
given that cluster characteristics and rm performance may be correlated for
1Sonobe and Otsuka (2006, p.4) dene a cluster as the geographical concentration or
localization of enterprises producing similar or closely related goods in a small area. Porter
(1990, p. 18) denes it as a geographical concentration of interconnected companies and
institutions in a particular eld Swann et al (1998, p 1) dene it as a large group of
rms in related industries at a particular location. Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) simply dene
industrial cluster as sectoral and spatial concentration of rms.
2See Sonobe and Otsuka (2011) for a case study of cluster-based industrial development
in Africa and Asia, and Fafchamps and Söderbom (2011) for a descriptive study of the role
of business networks for di¤usion of new technology and business practices in Ethiopia and
the Sudan. See Fafchamps and El Hamine (2004), and Fafchamps (2004), for an analysis of
agglomeration economies in Moroccan manufacturing (Morocco, of course, is rather much
more developed than most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa).
3Few African countries undertake industrial censuses. Sandefur (2008) reports that, for
Ghana, the number of manufacturing rms with more than 10 workers grew by 23% between
1987 and 2003, thus implying a considerably more modest growth rate than for Ethiopia
(see Table 2.1 in Sandefur, 2008).
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many reasons, some of which may have nothing to do with agglomeration per
se. The wide geographical coverage in the data is another unusual feature
compared to other African rm-level datasets, and ensures there is plenty of
variation in the cluster variables across rms. Since our main goal is to in-
vestigate the e¤ects of agglomeration in clusters on rm performance, this is
clearly of vital importance. Finally, the relatively broad coverage of indus-
trial sub-sectors in the data enables us to investigate whether agglomeration
e¤ects are sector-specic or not. The ndings will tell us whether sectoral
composition matters for the performance of clusters.
The premise of the current study is that, in a poorly integrated economy,
an increase in the density of producers in a given location may have two e¤ects.
First, entry into the local market may be associated with a reduction in the
market power of incumbent rms. This would show up as a decrease in the
output prices charged by rms following new entry. Second, entry may lead to
higher productivity, either because competition provides a disciplinary device
on rms or because the higher density of rms results in externalities. The
current study accordingly investigates the impact of agglomeration on two
key rm performance variables: physical productivity and output price. By
treating output price and physical productivity separately, the current study
makes a major contribution to the literature by addressing the methodological
weakness of previous empirical work that have used revenue based productivity
estimates to analyze the impact of competition and agglomeration. (Katayama
et al. 2008, Melitz, 2000, and Foster et al., 2008)
We nd a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect of agglomeration of
rms on prices, suggesting that new entry leads to higher competitive pressure
in the local economy. All else equal, this is positive for consumer welfare but
negative for enterprise protability. In addition, we nd a positive and statis-
tically signicant e¤ect of agglomeration on physical productivity, consistent
with the notion that clustering leads to positive externalities. All else equal,
this is positive both for consumer welfare and for enterprise protability. We
also show that the productivity and price e¤ects on enterprise revenues by
and large cancel each other out. For example, we nd no signicant e¤ect
of agglomeration on revenue-based measures of productivity, such as sales of
output per employee or revenue based productivity measure though we nd a
signicantly positive agglomeration e¤ect on value added per employee net of
factor inputs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the
relevant literature and section 3 discusses the data and variable construction
of our key variables. Section 4 deals with the empirical strategy, while the
main results are presented in section 5. Section 6 presents various robustness
checks and section 7 concludes.
3
2 Previous Studies
This paper seeks to understand how agglomeration a¤ects two dimensions of
rm performance, namely physical productivity and pricing. We will relate
to both the classical literature on the e¤ects of agglomeration on productivity
and a more recent literature that explicitly incorporates the e¤ects of agglom-
eration on pricing behavior.
For the analysis of productivity e¤ects it is the information spillover that is
important. Firms located close to each other are well placed to learn from each
other about new technologies, new ways of marketing, or new management
techniques, for example. Such externalities can clearly enhance the techno-
logical capacity of rms. In countries with weak formal institutions, informal
contract enforcement and cooperation are important for business and likely
work better if the parties involved are located close to each other (McCormick,
1999). Physical proximity could also make rms better informed about which
entrepreneurs can be trusted.
The analysis of the e¤ects of information spillovers is complicated by the
fact that we cannot directly observe ows of information. Therefore the liter-
ature has sought to relate productivity (and growth) e¤ects to various cluster
or agglomeration measures. Several authors have for example argued that
agglomeration e¤ects will depend on the sectoral composition of the cluster.
Rosenthal and Strange (2003, p. 12) conclude from their literature review
that doubling city size seems to increase productivity by an amount that
ranges from roughly 3-8%, suggesting that agglomeration e¤ects are not
sector-specic. Henderson et al. (1995) nd that the presence of activities
outside the own sector encourages growth particularly in high-tech industries
in the U.S. However, Henderson (1997; 2003) and Desmot and Fafchamps
(2005) nd that generally, in the U.S., own-sector externalities are stronger
than those generated by other sectors. So the evidence about the relative ef-
fects on performance of being located together with own sector rms or other
rms is mixed.
The factors just described are measures of the size or level of activity
of various types of rm clusters. The impact may however also vary along
certain structural dimensions. One is diversity, that is having a wide variety of
sectors in a region. A broad variety of producers may possibly generate a more
comprehensive information set that can benet producers. In a classical study
Jacobs (1969) argued that particularly cross-sectoral e¤ects are important,
and that sectoral diversity raises productivity via the exchange of information
and pecuniary externalities across sectors.
Apart from information externalities there is a wide range of agglomer-
ation mechanisms that lower the operating costs of the rms. The cost of
labor may fall as a result of agglomeration, since locating in a large local
labor market makes it easier to nd specialized labor (this is sometimes re-
ferred to as the thick labor market externality; Glaeser et al., 1992). A large
local labor market also implies scope for specialization and division of labor
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among enterprises. The cost of xed capital may be lower in locations where
there is a functioning market for second hand capital (e.g. equipment) so that
rms investment decisions are reversible rather than irreversible (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994). Proximity to input suppliers and consumers and shared in-
frastructure lowers transportation and transaction costs. The review in Bun
and El Makhlouf (2007) also indicates that diversity is generally correlated
with economic development in advanced countries. Joint location may also
facilitate sharing of indivisible goods and facilities. Clusters may also attract
traders that make it easier for rms to market their goods.
The current study also relates to rm level studies of the e¤ect of com-
petition on rm performance.4 Aghion et al. (2008) study the e¤ect of low
level product market competition on productivity growth in South Africa. Us-
ing price-cost margins as measure of competition, they nd that a low level
of competition has a negative impact on productivity growth in the South
African manufacturing industry. They use xed e¤ect estimation where pro-
ductivity growth is regressed on lagged price-cost margins and industry and
year xed e¤ects where productivity growth is measured using Halls (1990)
decomposition and assuming constant returns to scale.
Increased competition has two e¤ects on revenue based productivity mea-
sures: a decline in market share of existing rms and possibly their price; and
pressure on rms to improve productivity to survive the competition. The
two have opposing e¤ects on revenue based TFP and the resulting e¤ect of
competition depends on the relative magnitude of the two e¤ects. Moreover,
Katayama et al. (2008) argue that ndings that geographically clustered rms
are relatively productive attributed to agglomeration economies may simply
reect high wages and rental costs in urban areas which translates into higher
production costs and hence higher output prices.
At aggregate level, Syverson (2004a; 2004b; 2007) studies the e¤ect of pro-
ducer density on productivity and output price dispersions across producers
of narrowly dened industries. The major premise in these studies is that
consumers can easily switch between suppliers when producers are densely
clustered in a market, making the market more competitive. Syverson (2004a
& b) nds evidence that markets with high demand density and thus high
producer density have higher lower-bound and average productivity levels and
exhibit less productivity dispersion among their products as ine¢ cient pro-
ducers nd it di¢ cult to operate protably. On the output price side, higher
producer density implies lower prices due to lower optimal mark-ups in the
case of homogenous product markets where rms have identical production
costs. Syverson (2007) argues that if rms di¤er in their production costs, not
only do average prices fall as density increases, but that upper-bound prices
and price dispersion should also decline as high cost rms are forced to exit the
market. Regressing various moments of log price at market level on producer
density and local market demand controls, it is found that higher producer
density reduces the upper-bound of prices rms charge. After adding controls
4See Syverson (2010) for a recent review of determinants of rm productivity
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for input prices, it is still found that producer density negatively a¤ects log
prices implying that producers in dense-market have low costs not because
factor prices are lower in dense markets but rather because they are more
e¢ cient.
Entry threat is another measure of competition often used in the IO liter-
ature. Aghion et al. (2009) study how rm entry threats, proxied by lagged
actual entry rates; a¤ect innovation incentives in incumbent rms in the UK.
They nd that the threat of technologically advanced entry spurs innovation
incentives in sectors close to the technology frontier, where successful inno-
vation allows incumbents to survive the threat. However, entry threat dis-
courages innovation in lagging sectors, where the threat reduces incumbents
expected rents from innovating. Their result is robust to the use of foreign
entry, domestic entry and entry through imports and controlling for average
protability of incumbent industries. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), drawing
on evidence from major US airlines, also nd that incumbent, threatened by
entry cut prices signicantly.
Finally, our paper also relates to methodological papers on improving mea-
sures of rm productivity, output and inputs. Katayama et al. (2008) argue
that productivity indices constructed using real sales revenues of output, de-
preciated capital spending and real input expenditures have little to do with
technical e¢ ciency, product quality or contributions to social welfare when
applied to di¤erentiated product industries. Assuming that rmscosts and
revenues reect Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a di¤erentiated product mar-
kets, and incorporating a demand system, they impute each rms unobserved
quantities, qualities, marginal costs and prices of each product from observed
revenues and costs. Firms contribution to consumer and producer surplus is
used as an alternative welfare-based measure of productivity. When compar-
ing their welfare-based measures of productivity with conventional productiv-
ity measures using panel data on Colombian paper producers, they nd that
the two are only weakly correlated. Melitz (2000) also demonstrates one way
to incorporate consumer tastes into plant level performance measures when
output price and quantity data are unavailable. He notes that the residuals
from a revenue function can be used to infer a quality adjusted productivity
index, which provides the basis for ranking rms contributions to social out-
put. The main limitations of this approach are that it forces identical markups
on all rms and the presumption of availability of data on inputs in physical
units.
The presence of rm level data on prices and physical quantities of output
makes it possible to estimate physical output based productivity measures and
to decompose the revenue based productivity measure into true e¢ ciency and
price e¤ects. Using such an approach Foster et al. (2008) nd that physical
productivity is inversely related to price while revenue based productivity is
positively related to price.
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Variable Construction
We use a census based panel dataset of Ethiopian large and medium scale
manufacturing establishments for the period 1996-2006 collected by the Cen-
tral Statistical Authority (CSA) of Ethiopia. The dataset includes information
on quantity and unit prices of the rmsproducts, capital, labor, raw mate-
rial and energy inputs as well as investment and other industrial costs for
establishments employing at least 10 workers.
The number of rms in a local market or cluster is used as a measure of
competition and agglomeration. The number of rms in a town at a given
year is used as a measure of cluster size.5 Using product information, our
measure of cluster size is then disaggregated into: the number of own-cluster
rms producing the same product as rm i (NSAMEPRODt) and the num-
ber of own-cluster rms producing products di¤erent from rm is products
(NDIFFPRODt).6 The former captures competition between rms produc-
ing similar products, while the latter captures general agglomeration e¤ects
such as information spillovers, better access to skilled labor, lower trans-
action costs due to geographic clustering of rms producing di¤erent prod-
ucts. We further disaggregate the number of rms producing other products,
NDIFFPRODt, by sector in order to account for product distance between
own product and other products. The idea is that products in the same sector
are more similar than products belonging to di¤erent sectors. As a result, we
generate three variables capturing agglomeration e¤ects on rm performance:
the number of own-cluster rms producing the same product, the number of
own-cluster rms in own-sector producing di¤erent products and the number
of own-cluster rms producing di¤erent products in a di¤erent sector.
How we constructed NDIFFPRODt deserves further explanation. Cal-
culating NDIFFPRODt is straight forward when a cluster consists of single
product rms only. In this case, NDIFFPRODt is the di¤erence between
number of rms in own-town and number of rms producing the same prod-
uct as rm i. This is illustrated in panel A of table A0 in the appendix. All,
single product, rms in the cluster will have equal number of rms in town;
NSAMEPRODt and NDIFFPRODt. This approach has, however, some
limitation when applied to multi-product rms. A multi-product rm will
not be counted in number of rms producing di¤erent products if it is already
counted in NSAMEPRODt. This is ne for our purpose, since we are mainly
5With the exception of rms with missing information on town and sector, we count all
rms in our dataset including those rms with no product information. Throughout this
paper, we use own-cluster rmsto refer to rms co-locating in same cluster at a given year.
6 It is sometimes the case that rms report Other productas their produce. Given the
possibility that this product category can be used for various heterogeneous sets of products;
we do not consider them when calculating the number of rms producing similar products
in town. This also applies to rms with missing product information. Instead, rms with
Other productproduct categories and those with missing product information are counted
among own-cluster rms producing di¤erent products (NDIFFPRODt).
7
interested in investigating agglomeration externalities from other rms in the
cluster.7 In clusters with multi-product rms, as in panel B of table A0 in the
appendix: (i) we rst, pick a product category j and count number of rms
producing product j to get NSAMEPRODt; (ii) we list all other products
i 6= j in ones own cluster; (iii) we then list rms in own-cluster that are
producing these other products i 6= j; (iv) and nally we count rms in (iii),
which are not already counted in (i).8
A census dataset covering all large and medium scale manufacturing rms
is ideal for analyzing agglomeration e¤ects because the number of rms is not
an artifact of survey design but rather the actual number of rms in Ethiopian
manufacturing sector as a whole. Annual census datasets are collected for all
waves for the period 1996 -2006 except 2004/05. Unfortunately, CSA switched
to a survey instead of census based data collection method for selected sectors,
hence biasing the number of rms in a cluster for the 2004/05 wave. For this
reason, we drop the survey year from our main regression analysis. Obser-
vations from the survey year are, however, used for robustness checks to our
main regression results.
Another major advantage of this dataset is the availability of both price
and quantity information of rmsproducts and this is what made this study
possible. The product module of the dataset includes: the type of rmsprod-
ucts, their unit of measurement, price as well as quantity produced.9 Ignoring
a composite product category labeled other products, we have around 17, 000
product-year combinations in the period 1996-2006 belonging to 15 two-digit
sectors.10 A number of adjustments are made to generate comparable price
and quantity information across di¤erent rms producing a given product. We
converted various units of measurements rms use to a common unit of mea-
surement such that all weights are measured in kilograms, volumes in liter,
area in square meter or square feet depending on the product. . . etc. We then
standardized all our price and quantity measures to the selected common unit
of measurement.
3.2 On TFP calculation
We construct the conventional revenue based productivity (TFPR) using the
following production function:
Yi = AiF (Ki; Li;Mi; Ei) (1)
7As an alternative, one can also control for NDIFFPRODt by directly adding the num-
ber of rms in town along with NSAMEPRODt.
8Using this approach, we count rms only once, i.e., if there is one rm producing two
other products in own-cluster, number of rms producing di¤erent products in this cluster
is taken to be one. Thus a rm is either counted in NSAMEPRODt or NDIFFPRODt
even if it is a multi-product rm.
9See table A1 in the appendix for list of products in the dataset
10Among these, 7800 product-year observations are selected as a set of homogenous prod-
ucts to check robustness of our regression results to quality variations within a product
category.
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where Yi is rm is output, Ai is measure of rms productivity, Ki is capital
stock, Li is labor input Mi is rms raw material inputs and Ei is energy used
in production. Expressing (1) in log terms :
lnAi = lnYi   lnF (Ki; Li;Mi; Ei) (2)
where lnF (Ki; Li;Mi; Ei) = k lnKi + L lnLi + M lnMi + E lnEi
Various measures of productivity di¤er in the way they measure output
(lnYi). Revenue based productivity measures (TFPR) use real revenue from
the sales of output, whereas physical productivity measures (TFPQ) use phys-
ical quantities of output produced. Thus our TFPR measure can be expressed
as:
TFPRi = ln(
X
k
PkQk)  lnF (Ki; Li;Mi; Ei) (3)
where Pk and Qk are output price and physical quantity of product k of
rm i respectively. Physical productivity, on the other hand, uses physical
quantity of rms output as in (4). Estimating physical productivity of multi-
product rm, however, faces a few aggregation problems. Since we measure
physical output, we cannot sum up di¤erent physical units of di¤erent products
to get an aggregate output of the rm. We avoid such aggregation issues
by separately controlling for physical output and input usage as a proxy for
physical productivity. The approach will be discussed further in empirical
section..
TFPQi = ln(
X
k
Qk)  lnF (Ki; Li;Mi; Ei) (4)
Instead of estimating productivity as a residual of a production function,
we calculate the input component of (3) and (4) (second term on the right hand
side) using sector average shares of the inputs calculated from our dataset. We
use two digits ISIC classication to dene sector. The factor shares of labor,
raw material and energy inputs are calculated as the shares of the wage bill,
raw material and energy expenditures in a rms total output respectively.
Assuming constant returns to scale, the share of capital is then calculated as
the residual share after deducting the shares of labor, raw material and energy
inputs from one.11 Labor is measured as the number of workers, permanent
and year equivalent number of seasonal workers. Deated rms expenditure
on raw material and energy are used to measure raw materials and energy
inputs using the GDP deator. Deated xed capital stock at replacement
value is used to measure rms capital input.12 Since we use the value instead
11The calculated input shares are reported in table 1 in parenthesis along with summary
statistics of the inputs used.
12Capital stock is measured by the average of capital stock at the beginning and end of the
year at replacement value. The average capital stock is then deated using GDP deator.
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of physical quantities of capital, energy and raw material inputs, measures of
productivity will be contaminated by input prices with rms facing higher in-
put prices appearing to be less e¢ cient. TFPR additionally confounds output
prices with true e¢ ciency. The current study deals with the latter problem and
contributes to the literature in disentangling output price e¤ect from physical
productivity.
4 Empirical Strategy
In this paper, we want to answer the following question: Are prices lower in
areas characterized by high competition? And how does rm productivity
respond to increased competition due to rm entry in the local market? The
major contribution of this study is to disentangle the price and true physical
productivity e¤ects, which was not possible in previous studies using revenue
based productivity measures. (5) presents our basic estimation strategy.
Yijt = 0 + 1NSAMEPRODt + 2NDIFFPRODt +
P
k
kXkit
+4 ln shijt + i + j + t +  + "ijt (5)
where Yijt includes a range of outcome variables of interest such as price,
physical and value of output, and revenue based productivity measures. Xkit
includes input k used in the production process. Alternatively, we use an
aggregate measure of input usage: tfp_costSEi = K lnKi + L lnLi +
M lnMi + E lnEi where i is sector average income share of input i in
total output, constructed under the assumption of constant returns to scale,
i.e. K = 1   L   M   E . Because we are using product level measures
for the dependent variable while inputs are reported at rm level, we adjust
for input usage of each product by controlling for the revenue share of each
product of the total sales value of rms output (lnshijt).13 The assumption
here is that, the share of rms total inputs allocated to the production of
product j is equivalent to the revenue contribution of product j to rm is
total revenue from sales of all its products.14 i; j and t are rm, product
and year xed e¤ects with "ijt being the error term. Additionally, we control
for town xed e¤ects, , to account for rms that switch location.
We construct a capital stock using perpetual inventory method where di¤erent depreciation
rates are assumed for di¤erent category of capital. We used 5% for dwelling houses, non-
residential buildings and construction works; 8% for machinery and equipment; and 10% for
vehicles and furniture and other xtures.
13Similar approach is used in Foster et al (2008), they divide rms reported output by
the products revenue share.
14The limitation of such an approach is that, assuming inputs are used proportionately
to each products revenue share is the same as assuming that the use of inputs are perfectly
separable across products. This may be a strong assumption to make; however, the bias is
less important if rms are specializing in few products. Figure 1a shows that rms often
specialize in 1-3 products. The median (mean) number of products rms produce is 1 (1.79)
products.
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The extent of competition is captured by the number of rms in own town
producing similar product (NSAMEPRODt). We also control for the number
of rms in own town producing di¤erent products to analyze the impact of
a more general agglomeration e¤ects from rms producing di¤erent products
(NDIFFPRODt). NDIFFPRODt in (5) is further decomposed by sector,
using two digits industry classication, to control for product distance between
own product and other products in local market.
Yijt = 0 + 1NSAMEPRODt + 2NSAMESEC2t + 3NDIFFSECt
+
P
k
kXkit + 5 ln shijt + i + j + t +  + "ijt (6)
where NSAMESEC2t and NDIFFSECt are number of rms producing
other products in own and other sectors respectively. (5) and (6) are then
estimated by rm xed e¤ects using panel dataset of the Ethiopian large and
medium scale manufacturing sector rms for the period 1996-2006 except for
2004/05. The availability of both product price and quantity information
enables us to analyze the price and physical productivity e¤ects separately:
lnQijt = 0 + 1NSAMEPRODt + 2NSAMESEC2t + 3NDIFFSECt
+
P
k
kXkit + 5 ln shAijt + i + j + t +  + "ijt (7)
where ShAijt =
(PjQj)it"
nP
z=1
PzQz
#
it
where Qijt is physical output per unit for product j of rm i at a given
year t is used as a dependent variable in (7). We also control for inputs usage
adjusted by revenue share of product j in rm is total revenue from sales of
all its products, z = 1; 2; :::; n, as well as rm, product, town and time xed
e¤ects. Similarly, we estimate price e¤ect of competition in (8), where we
additionally control for physical productivity, since more productive rms are
more likely to translate that into lower output prices.
lnPijt = 0 + 1NSAMEPRODt + 2NSAMESEC2t + 3NDIFFSECt
+4TFPQi + i + j + t +  + "ijt (8)
Since we measure output using physical units, when using physical pro-
ductivity, we cannot just sum up di¤erent physical units to come up with
an aggregate output of the rm. Instead we separately control for individual
components of productivity: output and input usage, in (9).
lnPijt = 0 + 1NSAMEPRODt + 2NSAMESEC2t + 3NDIFFSECt
+4 lnQijt +
P
k
kXkit + 6 ln shBijt + i + j + t +  + "ijt (9)
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where ShBijt =
Qijt
nP
z=1
P ztQizt
The revenue share of product j in total sales value of all rm is output
is used as input adjustment factor in the output regression in (7). For the
price regression, on the other hand, the share of rm is physical quantity of
product j in rm is total physical output is used to avoid inclusion of the
dependent variable on the right hand side of (9). Total physical output, the
denominator of the shB expression, is constructed as a weighted sum of phys-
ical quantities of rm is products, z = 1; 2; :::; n, where the average prices of
each product, z = 1; 2; :::; n, across all the rms producing the product at a
given point in time (P zt ) are used as weights. We expect that higher com-
petition (NSAMEPRODt) forces rms to improve productivity and hence
decreases output price. In addition, competition has a direct e¤ect on prices
as rms compete for demand for their product for a given market share. Ag-
glomeration of rms producing di¤erent products in own-cluster is expected
to be benecial to rm productivity due to technology spillover e¤ects, better
access to market information and cheaper inputs.
We test if the composition of a cluster matters to rm performance using
equation 10:
Yijt = 0 + 1NSAMEPRODt + 2NDIFFPRODt +
P
k
kXkit
+4 ln shijt + 5 t + i + j + t +  + "ijt (10)
where  t controls for time varying cluster characteristics such as number
of employees, average rm age, share of new entrants; and share of exporters in
own cluster,  , at time t. Controlling for the number of employees in a cluster
can additionally serve as a control for big city e¤ects, since big cities are more
likely to have lower prices due to economies of scale advantage of having a
larger population size and market. Since we are using product level dependent
variables, price and quantity of a product, (5)-(10) are estimated using our
product module dataset in a product-year space. That is, if rm i produces
ve products at a given year t and we observe rm i in our dataset for ten
years, rm i will have 50 product-year observations. As shown in data section
and in table A0, NSAMEPRODt and NDIFFPRODt are constant within
a product category at time t but vary across product groups in a cluster. Our
dependent variable, on the other hand, varies even within a product category
across di¤erent rms producing it.  t , which controls for time-varying cluster
characteristics only varies across clusters, but not within.
Few econometric problems exist in our identication strategy discussed
above. First, when estimating our physical output regression, we are compar-
ing productivity of rms across di¤erent physical products and even within a
product category; quality of a given product may vary across di¤erent rms
producing it. Controlling for product xed e¤ect takes care of quality varia-
tion across di¤erent products, whereas focusing on selected homogenous prod-
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ucts takes care of quality variations within a product between di¤erent rms.
To this end, we select fairly homogenous products using a primary criterion
that consumers should not di¤erentiate between unlabeled products of rms
producing the same product category. In addition, we included other set of
products based on a secondary selection criterion that, in a cross-section of
rms producing a given product the coe¢ cient of variation of output price
should not be more than 0.5 and the number of observation should be larger
than 100.15 As a result, we have chosen 27 products presented in table A2 in
the appendix.
We follow a similar approach for price regressions as well in controlling
for quality variation when counting number of rms producing same product,
though this is less of a problem for monetary variables. We expect the second
product selection rule to signicantly reduce variation in price as a dependent
variable, although output prices might still vary between rms, even after
we control for quality variation, due to localization of markets and horizontal
di¤erentiations and long established customer-supplier relationships (Foster et
al., 2008, p 406).
The second identication problem we face is rmsendogenous choice of
location. New rms have an incentive to enter in locations with higher pro-
ductivity as this might be associated with better investment climate in these
local markets. By the same reasoning, existing rms also have an incentive
to switch to more productive locations. It also pays for rms to locate them-
selves in markets, where they can secure higher prices for their products. Thus,
our measure of competition and agglomeration are subject to endogenity bias.
Endogenity of this kind is more serious to output than to price regressions.
This is because, if indeed competition reduces output prices, this result works
against the direction of the endogeneity bias, where rms endogenously choose
locations which provide higher prices for their products. As regards the phys-
ical output regressions, larger productivity benet due to competition and
agglomeration may be alternatively interpreted as rms locating themselves
in higher productivity markets, making it di¢ cult to establish casualty. The
use of town and rm xed e¤ects goes a long way towards controlling for
time invariant di¤erences in the investment climate of the local markets rms
operate in, but time-varying unobserved local market characteristics are still
uncontrolled. Besides, few rms change their location upon entry. We also
use the one period lagged number of rms to analyze price and productivity
e¤ects of competition and agglomeration to mitigate the endogenity bias.
However, losing observations of the 2005/06 wave is more costly in regres-
sions using lagged number of rms as the last wave of the dataset is the year
with the largest number of rms operating in the Ethiopian large and medium
scale manufacturing sector.16 Instead of dropping the 2005/06 wave of our
15Note that products deemed to be homogenous according to the primary selection crite-
rion do not necessarily have to satisfy the secondary selection criterion. See a companion
paper Siba and Söderbom (2011) for detailed discussion on the product selection. A similar
approach is also followed by Foster et al. (2008).
16There were 1140 rms in the last wave of our dataset, 2005/06, as opposed to 762 rms
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dataset, as a result of biased lagged number of rms, we estimated the cor-
rectnumber of rms in 2004/05 by using information in the years before and
after the survey year to determine whether these rms operated in the market
despite being excluded from the survey. We use the simple rule that if a rm
was in the market both in the years before and after the survey period, then
it is assumed to have been in the market during 2004/05. We then added
the number of these rms, which we assume were left out of the survey, to
the actual number of rms in our dataset for the year 2004/05. We made an
exception, to this simple rule, for rms that are observed for the rst time in
the dataset in 2005/06. These rms are treated as genuine new entrants in
2005/06 and hence we do not adjust for them. However, using this approach
we are not able to distinguish between rms exiting the market in the survey
year and rms that were in the market but were left out of the survey. We are
also unable to capture rms, which entered and exited the market in 2005/06.
This is less of a concern, since it is less likely that rms enter and exit the
market in the same year.As a result of this adjustment, we come up with 980
instead of 762 rms operating in the market in 2004/05.17
5 Results
We start our analysis by investigating the impact of competition and agglom-
eration on various revenue based measures of productivity in table 2. We use
three alternative measures: value added per employee, sales value of output
per employee as well as the revenue based productivity measure (TFPR) in
logs at rm level. These are then regressed on number of own sector and
non-own sector rms in town, as measures of competition and agglomeration;
log of inputs and rm age using OLS (in column 1-6) and rm xed e¤ects
(column 7-12). Controlling for year, town and sector xed e¤ects, number
of rms in own sector and town is found to negatively a¤ect log value added
per employee in OLS specications (column 1 and 2). When using rm xed
e¤ect, on the other hand, we nd a statistically weak positive e¤ect on value
added per employee (in column 7 and 8). However, we do not get any support
for positive impact on productivity when using log sales value of output per
employee and revenue based productivity measure (TFPR).
This study capitalizes on the major weakness of the revenue based output
and productivity measures in confounding price and physical productivity,
and estimates the two e¤ects separately by using product level information on
output price and quantity. Because the dependent variables are at product
level, all the regressions below are estimated using the product module dataset,
in the 2004/05 survey year.
17Once we correct for the number of rms in the survey year, all the regression results
are run based on the sample of rms in our actual dataset. In other words, the imputation
is only used to correct for number of rms for rms already observed in the data but not
to increase our number of observation. We also run all regressions using the actual dataset
without any imputation to check the sensitivity of our results to the imputation. Results
are even stronger and in line with the reported results in this study.
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in a rm-product-year space. Competition is expected to have a negative
impact on output price both through its e¤ect of enhancing productivity and
through its e¤ect of reducing market share of incumbent rms. In Table 3, the
number of rms producing same product in own-cluster has a robust negative
e¤ect on output price controlling for productivity and year, product, town and
rm xed e¤ects in columns 1-4. Number of rms producing other products
in own cluster, on the other hand, do not have any signicant e¤ect on price.
This is not surprising since, agglomeration of rms producing other products
is expected to decrease price only through productivity improvement, which
is already controlled for. In line with the above results, we also nd that rms
that are the only rm in sector and town (Monply_st) charge a signicantly
higher price as they face less competition in the product market.
How we control for productivity needs some explanation. We separately
include individual components of physical productivity: physical output and
inputs, into product price regressions and adjust for input usage of each prod-
uct by the revenue share of each product as discussed in empirical strategy
section. Thus, for a given units of inputs used, higher physical output (lnQijt)
leads to higher physical productivity, which in turn translates into a lower out-
put price. In Table 3, we nd a highly signicant negative e¤ect of physical
output on output price. Similarly, for a given output, larger input usage leads
to lower productivity due to increased production costs and hence higher price.
Thus, we should expect a positive relationship between the level of input used
and output price after adjusting for the share of inputs used in producing a
given product (lnsh_new2).
In columns 1-2, we add inputs separately and in columns 3-4, we use an
aggregate measure of input usage, where inputs are aggregated by multiplying
sector average income share of inputs by rm level capital, labor, and raw
material and energy inputs. We nd positive e¤ects of level of inputs used
on output price. The input adjustment variable (lnsh_new2) itself is positive
and highly signicant implying that the larger the share of inputs used into
the production of a given product, the higher its price. We nd similar results
in columns 3-4 when using an aggregate measure of inputs together with its
adjustment factor.
The analysis of the e¤ect of competition on physical output provides an
explanation for why we did not nd any productivity e¤ect of competition
using revenue based productivity measures or value of output. Controlling for
inputs used; and year, product, town and rm xed e¤ects; we nd a positive
e¤ect of number of own-cluster rms producing the same products on physical
output in column 5-8 of table 3. An increase in number of rms producing
same product by one, leads to an increase in physical output of about 0.9
%. This magnitude might look rather small, but it is only for one of rms
products and rms with more number of products have higher productivity
advantage in total. This result is robust to the inclusion of alternative input
measures as well as to controlling for lone rms in own sector and town. Firms
with larger inputs also produce more output. The e¤ect of an increase in the
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number of rms in own sector and town by one (Monply_st), on output price
is more robust than its e¤ect on productivity.
An increase in the number of rms in own sector and town by one
(Monply_st) has stronger e¤ect than the average e¤ect of increasing num-
ber of rms producing same product by one unit (NSAMEPRODt) indicating
possible non-linear e¤ects of cluster size on our variables of interest. In table
4, we investigate non-linear e¤ects of number of rms in own sector and town
by using dummies for having: only 1, 2, 3, 4, and atleast 5 rms in own sector
and town. Nsty_2, for instance, is a dummy equal to one if there are only
two rms in own sector and town whereas Nsty_5 is a dummy equal to one if
there are at least 5 rms in own sector and town, zero otherwise. Nsty_1, a
dummy for being the only rm in own sector and town, is used as a base cat-
egory. As before, an increase in the number of rms producing same product
has a negative price and positive productivity e¤ects with similar coe¢ cient
estimates to table 3. Moving from one to two rms in own sector and town
decreases price by about 11% and increases productivity by 17% though the
latter e¤ects are signicant at 10%. With the exception of Nsty_4, an in-
crease in number of rms by more than one rm seems to have larger price
e¤ect but no such pattern is observed for output e¤ect.
In table 5, we address two major econometric issues in interpreting the
above results as agglomeration e¤ect on price and productivity. The rst
one involves causality. Firms may strategically locate themselves in high pro-
ductivity locations and in locations where they can secure higher prices for
their products making our agglomeration measures endogenous. As argued
above, the results on output price are less prone to the bias as the negative
e¤ect on price works against the direction of the endogenity bias as a result of
rms locating themselves in towns where they can secure higher price for their
products. To mitigate the endogenity bias due to rms strategic choice of
locations, we run all the regressions above using lagged number of rms as our
measure of competition and agglomeration using town and rm xed e¤ects
to control for time invariant di¤erences in the investment climate of the local
markets rms operate in.18 The price and productivity e¤ect of competition
still holds when using lagged number of rms with slightly lower coe¢ cient
estimates for price regressions in absolute terms. As before, more productive
rms have lower output price whereas rms with larger share inputs allocated
to production have higher prices. The output e¤ect is similar to the above
estimates using contemporary number of rms. The monopoly e¤ect on price
disappears with the use of lagged number of rms while being the only rm
in own sector and cluster still have, large but statistically weak, productivity
loss.
Secondly, one may wonder about the validity of grouping products, with
potential quality variation across rms, into one product category. Although
it makes sense to group a product such as concrete produced by di¤erent
rms in a cluster, it may not be obvious to assume that di¤erent rms pro-
18as discussed above the number of rms is adjusted for the survey year 2004/05
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ducing clothes produce a comparable quality of the same product. We create
a dummy, selected, with a value equal to one for 27 selected homogenous
products and zero otherwise and interact this dummy with our agglomeration
variables to investigate the sensitivity of our results to quality variations. The
absence of joint signicance of the interaction variables is taken as an evidence
for robustness of our results to quality variation. The use of product xed ef-
fects also controls for quality variations across di¤erent products. In table 5,
price dumping e¤ect of competition loses signicance, though we reject joint
signicance of the interaction e¤ects (in column 3). This may be due to re-
duced variation in prices as we used lower variation in price across rms as one
of the selection criteria for homogeneous products. The productivity e¤ect, on
the other hand, becomes stronger and highly signicant (in column 6) while
the interaction e¤ects are jointly signicant only at 10%.19
6 Robustness Checks
In this section we make a number of checks to see whether our cluster size
measures are really capturing agglomeration e¤ects rather than other e¤ects
such as population size, as big cities may have lower prices due to economies
of scale of having a larger population and market size. In column 1 of table
6, we include number of employees in town and in own sector as proxies for
population size.20 It is interesting to see that our agglomeration variables
remain signicant with slightly lower coe¢ cient estimates as some of the e¤ects
are taken away as population e¤ect. Number of employees in own sector and
town has a negative e¤ect on output price and a positive e¤ect on productivity.
The latter is, however, signicant only at 10%. We do not nd such an e¤ect
for number of employees in town.
Another way of checking if our cluster size variables are capturing agglom-
eration e¤ects is to control for rm entry and age. If our cluster size variables
are indeed picking up agglomeration and competition e¤ects, we would expect
this to work through the mechanism of increased entry. Hence, we expect lower
or no e¤ect from cluster size variables when controlling for entry. Average rm
age in the cluster in turn captures the resulting rm churning e¤ects due to in-
creased competition. In table 6, the cluster size variables become insignicant
when share of entrants in own-town interacted with the cluster size variables is
included in column 3 and 7, conforming to our reasoning that agglomeration
e¤ects are mainly driven by increased entry resulting in higher competitive
pressure. NDIFFPRODt in levels has no signicant e¤ect though its inter-
action with share of entrants in the cluster is positive and signicant for price
regressions. Results are largely similar when doing the same analysis using
19When using interactions with contemporary measures of agglomeration, the e¤ect of
NSAMEPRODt is signicant with the expected sign both for price and productivity e¤ects.
Results are presented up on request.
20Population census in Ethiopia is undertaken every 10 years which restricts our ability
to come up with town level population size for our sample period.
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share of entrants in own sector and town level in column 4 and 8.
The second robustness check concerns the underlying assumption we make
that rms operate in localized market. If agglomeration e¤ects work through
the mechanism of new entry into a cluster creating competitive pressure and
reducing market share of existing rms, this e¤ect should be less important
for rms that are not restricted to selling their products in local markets.
We test this hypothesis, in table 7, using our cluster size variables interacted
with share of exporters in a cluster and export dummy equal to one if rm
i exports. When using share of exporters in a cluster, we nd a signicant
positive interaction e¤ect for price regressions in column 1 and 3 while the
coe¢ cient estimates for cluster size gets even larger in absolute terms. For
output regressions, the interaction e¤ect with NDIFFPRODt has the right
sign, though not statistically signicant, and we nd a negative interaction ef-
fects with number of rms producing di¤erent products at 10%. This supports
the hypothesis that agglomeration e¤ects are stronger for rms operating in
localized markets.21 When using export dummy, on the other hand, we do
not nd empirical support for localized market argument in both for price and
output regression. There is also positive correlation between productivity and
exporting (column 5 and 6).
21Alternatively, one can control for distance to roads and markets
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have used census panel data on Ethiopian manufacturing
rms to empirically analyze the e¤ects of enterprise clustering on two key de-
terminants of rm performance: physical productivity and output prices. We
show that distinguishing between productivity and prices is crucial for un-
derstanding the e¤ects of agglomeration. We nd a negative and statistically
signicant e¤ect of agglomeration of rms on prices, suggesting that new entry
leads to higher competitive pressure in the local economy. All else equal, this
is positive for consumer welfare but negative for enterprise protability. In
addition, we nd a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of agglomeration
on physical productivity, consistent with the notion that clustering leads to
positive externalities. All else equal, this is positive both for consumer welfare
and for enterprise protability. We also show that the productivity and price
e¤ects on enterprise revenues by and large cancel each other out. For example,
we nd no robustly signicant e¤ect of agglomeration on revenue-based mea-
sures of productivity, such as sales or value added net of factor input e¤ects.
Given that agglomeration has no e¤ect on rm protability, we hypothesize
that agglomeration may not spur enterprise growth despite the positive e¤ect
on productivity. Analyzing Agglomeration e¤ect on other rm perfomcance
measures such as rm growth and investment is open for future research.
Taken together, our ndings suggest there is a lot to be said for encouraging
local competition and agglomeration of rms: individual rms will see their
productivity rise and their prot margins reduced, and both e¤ects benet
Ethiopian consumers. Cluster formation through creating industrial zones;
and enhancing networking, technological learning as well as rm competition
are key policy recommendations to boost enterprise productivity and cluster-
based industrial development.
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Table 3: Effect on price and output using contemporary number of firms  
  Price      Output  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NSAMEPRODt -0.00685*** -0.00685*** -0.00648*** -0.00648*** 0.00837** 0.00836** 0.00922** 0.00920** 
 (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00221) (0.00221) (0.00390) (0.00389) (0.00396) (0.00396) 
NSAMESEC2t -0.000483 -0.000492 9.96e-05 9.32e-05 -0.000548 -0.000537 0.000968 0.000977 
 (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00225) (0.00225) 
NDIFFSECt 0.000171 0.000111 4.89e-05 -8.00e-06 -0.000124 -5.74e-05 -0.000472 -0.000393 
 (0.000326) (0.000325) (0.000337) (0.000337) (0.000518) (0.000520) (0.000535) (0.000537) 
Monply_st   0.111**  0.104**  -0.122  -0.143* 
  (0.0517)  (0.0514)  (0.0811)  (0.0862) 
lnQijt -0.285*** -0.285*** -0.277*** -0.277***     
 (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0198)     
lnKt 0.00506 0.00478   0.0170 0.0173   
 (0.0127) (0.0126)   (0.0226) (0.0225)   
lnLt 0.0543** 0.0553**   0.151*** 0.150***   
 (0.0251) (0.0248)   (0.0480) (0.0479)   
lnMt 0.221*** 0.222***   0.676*** 0.675***   
 (0.0177) (0.0176)   (0.0277) (0.0276)   
lnEt 0.0115 0.0114   0.0819*** 0.0821***   
 (0.00944) (0.00942)   (0.0173) (0.0173)   
tfp_costSEt   0.334*** 0.334***   1.084*** 1.082*** 
   (0.0277) (0.0276)   (0.0391) (0.0390) 
lnsh_new2t 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.144*** 0.144***     
 (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0178)     
lnsh2t     0.966*** 0.966*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 
     (0.00845) (0.00846) (0.00846) (0.00847) 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Product  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Town Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 14344 14344 14344 14344 14344 14344 14344 14344 
R-squared 0.666 0.666 0.665 0.665 0.843 0.843 0.840 0.840 
Number of firm 1351 1351 1351 1351 1351 1351 1351 1351 
Note: The dependent variable is log output price per unit in col 1-4 and log physical output in col 5-8. Results in col 1-8 are estimated at 
firm-product-year level with clustered standard errors at firm level. Unreported constant included.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Effect of being Monopoly in own sector and town: Step-wise 
 Price Output 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
NSAMEPRODt -0.00646*** 0.00922** 
 (0.00221) (0.00396) 
NSAMESEC2t 0.000106 0.00100 
 (0.00131) (0.00226) 
NDIFFSECt -3.58e-05 -0.000452 
 (0.000343) (0.000558) 
Nsty_2 (only 2 firms)t -0.0994** 0.155* 
 (0.0500) (0.0864) 
Nsty_3 (only 3 firms)t -0.119* 0.103 
 (0.0667) (0.113) 
Nsty_4 (only 4 firms)t -0.0945 0.170 
 (0.0723) (0.141) 
Nsty_5 (>= 5 firms)t -0.128* 0.0990 
 (0.0723) (0.157) 
lnQijt -0.277***  
 (0.0199)  
tfp_costSEt 0.334*** 1.082*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0392) 
lnsh_new2t 0.144***  
 (0.0178)  
lnsh2t  0.965*** 
  (0.00848) 
Year  Yes  Yes  
Product Yes  Yes  
Town  Yes  Yes  
Firm Yes  Yes  
Observations 14344 14344 
R-squared 0.665 0.840 
Number of firm 1351 1351 
Notes: dependent variable log output price in col: 1 and log physical output in col: 2. Dummy                                                                                   
for only one  firm in own sector and town (Nsty_1) is used as a base category whereas Nsty_5                                                                                           
is a dummy variable equal to 1 when there are 5 or more firms in own sector and town.  All                                                                                       
results are estimated at firm-product-year level with clustered standard errors in parenthesis.                                                                                     
Unreported constant included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Effect on price and output using lagged number of firms  
  Price   Output  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NSAMEPRODt-1 -0.00609** -0.00545* -0.00496 0.00850** 0.00869** 0.0120*** 
 (0.00305) (0.00328) (0.00382) (0.00365) (0.00385) (0.00455) 
NDIFFPRODt-1 -0.000437   -0.000124   
 (0.000406)   (0.000528)   
Monply_s t-1  0.00597   -0.112*   
 (0.0559)   (0.0608)   
NSAMESEC2t-1  0.00205 0.00198  0.000178 -0.00333 
  (0.00217) (0.00300)  (0.00263) (0.00363) 
NDIFFSECt-1  -0.000663* -0.000568  -0.000111 -0.000182 
  (0.000364) (0.000413)  (0.000509) (0.000552) 
SAMEPRODt-1* Selected   -0.00255   -0.00882 
   (0.00439)   (0.00538) 
SAMESECt-1* Selected   -0.000327   0.00579** 
   (0.00236)   (0.00282) 
DIFFSEC t-1* Selected   -0.000202   0.000105 
   (0.000353)   (0.000421) 
lnQijt -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.218***    
 (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0224)    
tfp_costSE t 0.233*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 1.086*** 1.089*** 1.089*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0445) (0.0444) (0.0437) 
lnsh_new2 t 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.104***    
 (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0203)    
lnsh2 t    0.955*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 
    (0.00864) (0.00864) (0.00862) 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Product  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Town  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Selected    Yes    Yes  
Observations 10792 10792 10792 10792 10792 10792 
R-squared 0.609 0.609 0.610 0.851 0.850 0.851 
Number of firm 901 901 901 901 901 901 
Note: The dependent variable is log output price per unit in col 1-3 and log physical output in col 4-6. All results                                                  
are estimated at firm-product-year level with clustered standard errors at firm level in parenthesis. Unreported                                           
constant included.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Controlling for share of exporting firms in a cluster 
  Price   Output  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NSAMEPRODt -0.0139*** -0.00626*** -0.0140*** 0.0140** 0.00852** 0.0142** 
 (0.00400) (0.00213) (0.00402) (0.00664) (0.00351) (0.00660) 
NDIFFPRODt 4.25e-05 -2.70e-05 -1.66e-05 0.000712 -0.000112 0.000832 
 (0.000362) (0.000304) (0.000361) (0.000632) (0.000542) (0.000642) 
Share of exporters in own townt -0.298 0.0834 -0.183 0.158 -0.343 -0.131 
 (0.205) (0.183) (0.222) (0.303) (0.301) (0.357) 
NSAMEPROD*Share of exporters in own townt 0.253**  0.256** -0.177  -0.177 
 (0.116)  (0.117) (0.207)  (0.207) 
NDIFFPROD*Share of exporters in own townt -0.00312  -0.00314 -0.0183*  -0.0185* 
 (0.00561)  (0.00564) (0.00984)  (0.00983) 
Export_D  (Dummy=1 if firm i exports)t  -0.123 -0.124  0.322** 0.321** 
  (0.0777) (0.0777)  (0.147) (0.147) 
NSAMEPROD* Export_Dt  -0.00216 -0.00393  -0.00746 -0.00563 
  (0.00663) (0.00674)  (0.00639) (0.00657) 
NDIFFPROD* Export_Dt    0.000237 0.000277  -0.000284 -0.000302 
  (0.000232) (0.000235)  (0.000353) (0.000353) 
Log number of employees in sector & townt  -0.0858** -0.0851** -0.0849** 0.0815 0.0902* 0.0800 
 (0.0356) (0.0352) (0.0356) (0.0536) (0.0535) (0.0534) 
Log number of employees in townt  0.0337 0.0316 0.0330 0.0210 0.0256 0.0223 
 (0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0597) (0.0591) (0.0593) 
Mean firm age in own townt -0.000523 -0.00107 -0.00104 0.00344 0.00412 0.00466 
 (0.00432) (0.00430) (0.00432) (0.00700) (0.00722) (0.00719) 
lnQijt -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.276***    
 (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0196)    
tfp_costSEt 0.340*** 0.342*** 0.341*** 1.077*** 1.071*** 1.074*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0390) (0.0391) (0.0389) 
lnsh_new2t 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.143***    
 (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0177)    
lnsh2t    0.965*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 
    (0.00847) (0.00851) (0.00848) 
Observations 14297 14297 14297 14297 14297 14297 
R-squared 0.665 0.665 0.666 0.841 0.840 0.841 
Number of firm 1347 1347 1347 1347 1347 1347 
Notes: dependent variable is log output price in col. 1-3 and log physical output in col. 4-6. All results are estimated at firm-product-year level 
with clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  Unreported constant, year, product, firm and town fixed effects are included. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A. Cluster with Single Product firms only 
Town Product  Firm No. of firms in Town NSAMEPROD NDIFFPROD 
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Abstract
The conict in Darfur has been described both as an ethnic cleansing campaign,
carried out by the Sudanese government and its allied militias, and as a local struggle
over dwindling natural resources between African farmers and Arab herders. In this
paper, we use a previously unexploited data set to analyze the determinants of Jan-
jaweed attacks on 530 civilian villages in Southwestern Darfur during the campaign
that started in 2003. Our results clearly indicate that attacks have been targeted at
villages dominated by the major rebel tribes, resulting in a massive displacement of
those populations. Resource variables, capturing access to water and land quality,
also appear to have played an important role. These patterns suggest that attacks in
the area were motivated by both ethnic cleansing and resource capture, although the
ethnic variables consistently have a larger impact.
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1
1 Introduction
The conict in Darfur is one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world. Since
the onset of hostilities in 2003, it is estimated that some 300,000 people have died and
that 2.7 million people have ed their homes (BBC, 2008). In a statement before the US
Congress, State Secretary Colin Powell referred to the conict as a genocide already in
September, 2004.1 The war has led to a massive international aid operation as well as the
deployment of a large UN-backed peace-keeping force. On July 12, 2010, the prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague extended the previous warrant
of arrest for Sudans incumbent president Omar al-Bashir to also include genocide, in
addition to war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur (ICC, 2009, 2010).
In this article, we use a previously unexploited data set to analyze the determinants
of attacks on 530 civilian villages in Southwestern Darfur. Our data was collected by
an international organization working in the area and covers attacks perpetrated during
the campaign that was initiated by the government and the Janjaweed militia in 2003.2
The data set is unique in the sense that it includes detailed information about the ethnic
composition in villages before and after the onset of the conict and comprises all known
rural villages in the area. On the basis of our reading of the literature, we propose two
main hypotheses that we bring to the data: The probability and intensity of attacks on
villages should increase with (i) the proportion of rebel tribes in the village population
and (ii) with the level of appropriable natural resources.
The rst of these hypotheses - stipulating a targeting of certain ethnic groups by the
government and its loyal militias - receives very strong support in our empirical investiga-
tion. Regardless of our choice of resource variables, control variables, samples, and levels of
aggregation, we consistently nd that the proportion of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa (rebel
tribes) households in the village population before conict is our strongest determinant of
the probability and intensity of attacks. We further show that about 59,000 rebel tribe
households have been displaced from our area of study and that 329 villages out of 530
in our sample have been completely abandoned during the conict. We argue that our
results are clear indications of an ethnic cleansing campaign and of serious violations of
international law.
This nding conforms broadly with the general view of the ICC and the interna-
tional community. In the most recent version of the warrant of arrest against Sudans
president, the ICC briey refers to "acts of murder and extermination" being perpe-
1 In Powells own words: When we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team, along with other
information available to the State Department, we concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur
and that the Government of Sudan and the jinjaweid bear responsibility  and genocide may still be
occurring. (America.Gov, 2004). It is further interesting to note that the investigation commissioned by
the UN Security Council found evidence of crimes against humanity but not of genocide (United Nations,
2005).
2Given the current security situation in Darfur, we have agreed not to disclose the identity of the
organization(s) that have provided the data that our study builds upon. Until the situation in the area
improves, more details about the data will only be communicated through personal correspondence with
the authors.
2
trated against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups in certain localities in West Darfur
(ICC, 2010, p 6). The arrest order species three potential cases of genocide in the re-
gion. Among very few studies on Darfur in the wider social science literature, Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond (2008) analyze 932 individual interviews collected by the American
Bar Foundation among refugees in Chad and identify the Sudanese governments "racial
dehumanization"-campaign against the three rebel tribes as key for understanding the
acceptance among local Arabs to participate in ethnic cleansing against the civilian pop-
ulation of the targeted groups. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Kevane and Gray
(2008) and Prunier (2007).3
Compared to these investigations, our study covers information from a much larger
part of the Darfur population (530 villages that host approximately 792,000 individuals)
and is the only study with village-specic information on ethnic composition before and
after conict.
Our second main hypothesis - that an important determinant of attacks was the level
of appropriable natural resources in the villages - also receive some support. On the basis
of GIS data, we create a number of proxy variables for appropriable natural resources;
the density of vegetation, access to alluvials soils, and distance to surface water. We also
create measures for related variables such as distances to roads and administrative centers
and control for neighborhood spillover e¤ects, altitude, population size, regional e¤ects,
etc. Our regression analysis shows that when we hold all other variables constant, villages
that are located close to alluvial soils and to roads tend to su¤er from a higher probability
and intensity of attacks. The marginal impacts are however smaller than for the ethnic
variables.
The o¢ cial view held by the GoS is that the hostilities in Darfur are primarily a local
struggle over dwindling natural resources between farmers and herders with no government
involvement and that the conict probably has not taken more than 10,000 lives. The
importance of land degradation and a deteriorating climate for understanding Darfur has
also been emphasized by UNEP (2007) and Ki-Moon (2007). Among scholars, Sachs
(2006) makes a similar argument and supports his line of argumentation on the nding
that decreased rainfall has been shown to have an indirect e¤ect on conict risk in Africa
via poor economic growth (Miguel et al, 2004). Using annual data on rainfall in Darfur,
Kevane and Gray (2008) fail to nd any clear link between rainfall and conict onset.
As far as we can tell, the only other quantitative study on the role of natural resources
in Darfur is Vanrooyen et al (2008) who use interview data from refugees in Chad in order
to analyze in detail the nature of attacks and the scope of human and resource losses in
three villages. Olsson (2011) uses the same data as we do but focuses exclusively on land
reallocation issues and implications for post-conict reconstruction.4
3The government of Sudan (GoS) however denies any links to the Janjaweed and to the conict (Prunier,
2007).
4 In a recent study based on satellite imagery, Schimmer (2008), claims that the large population and
livestock displacements have recently resulted in a resurge of vegetation in the area. Further empirical
studies of the conict in Darfur include Depoortere et al (2004), who provide estimates of mortality during
3
The empirical study in this paper is related to a large volume of articles studying the
general determinants of civil war and social conict using cross-country data (Collier and
Hoe­ er, 1998, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al, 2004; Azam and Hoe­ er,
2002). The specic role of environmental stress and scarcities is given particular attention
in Homer-Dixon (1994), Diamond (2005), and Schubert et al (2008), but more formal
statistical analyses have generally not found any strong e¤ect of environmental stress on
conict risk (Nordås and Gleditsch, 2007). The analysis in this paper is one of rather few
other attempts at analyzing the determinants of violence at micro level.5 What makes
our study unique compared to existing analyses is primarily the detailed village level data
on the ethnic composition before and after the onset of the conict. Also, unlike any of
the papers surveyed, we nd robust evidence of aggression primarily targeted at certain
ethnic groups.
Although we believe our empirical analysis is the main contribution of our paper, we
also o¤er a basic theoretical framework for understanding how ethnic cleansing might
emerge as an equilibrium outcome in a conict between competing groups.6 We postulate
that the capture and possession of rival natural resources is always a motivating factor
for a representative individual of a militia. The militia is further loosely allied to the
government who has a goal of displacing certain rebel groups from the area. During
normal times, the militia will be constrained from predating on other groups due to direct
opportunity costs (losing production from normal work) and indirect social costs (psychic
or legal costs or costs from loss of future cooperation). A key insight from our model is
that attacks by the militia on villages hosting other ethnic groups, will only take place (i)
if the direct opportunity cost of predation is low due to poor normal production potential,
(ii) if the government has supported the militia so that they are militarily dominant in
relative terms, and (iii) if the perceived social costs of attacking certain ethnic groups
have decreased due to government propaganda aimed at making the groups in question
legitimate targets of attack. Ethnic cleansing by a local militia is basically modelled as an
externality (purposefully generated by the government) from an interethnic struggle over
the rst year of the crisis. Bloodhound, a Denmark-based NGO, has independently compiled a large
number of witness accounts of attacks (Petersen and Tullin (2006a).
5Buhaug and Röd (2006) study the determinants of civil war in Africa by using grid cells with a
resolution of 100x100 km as the basic unit of analysis. In a study of more than 5,000 villages in Aceh,
Indonesia, Czaika and Kis-Katos (2007) nd that ethnicity does not seem to matter much for (forced)
migration patterns and that general socioeconomic variables matter more. Other studies with conict
intensity as the dependent variable include Murshed and Gates (2005) and Do and Iyer (2007) (on 75
districts in Nepal) and Bellows and Miguel (2006) (on 152 chiefdoms in Sierra Leone). See also André
and Platteau (1998) and Verwimp (2005) who both study individual-level data from Rwanda and show
that land stress appears to have played a key role for the conict outbreak in 1994. Blattman and Miguel
(2008) provide a recent overview of the literature on civil war.
6Our model is related to the work of Azam and Hoe­ er (2002) and a recent paper by Esteban et al
(2010). The former paper models a governments choice of terrorizing and displacing a rebel population as
a conscious military strategy aimed at weakening the rebel group. In the latter paper, the authors imagine
a tradeo¤ for a group in power between on the one hand exterminating a rebel population and keeping all
government revenue for themselves, or on the other hand to let the rebels live and squeeze tax revenues
out of them. Our model di¤ers from both these attempts since we consider the choice of a local militia
who is an imperfectly monitored agent of the government and who has an agenda of its own.
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resources.7 Based on our model, we identify the increase in government military support
and its strategy of dehumanizing its opponents, as the likely reasons for why the major
conict erupted in 2003, despite decades of a environmental deterioration.
Our article is structured as follows: In section 2, we provide a general background to
the conict in Darfur and discuss the nature of ethnic cleansing and the specic context
of our study. In section 3, we outline a conict theoretical framework in order to clarify
the key causal linkages. The data, the empirical strategy, and the regression analysis are
presented in section 4, whereas section 5 concludes.
2 Background8
2.1 The Darfur conict
Darfur is Sudans westernmost province, sharing an extensive border with Chad in the
west and with an area of roughly 500,000 sq km (approximately the size of Spain). Its
northern parts are largely uninhabited desert areas, whereas the central and southern
parts belong to the African Sahel belt.
Darfur is believed to host about 6.5 million inhabitants belonging to a multitude of
ethnic groups. The population is often subdivided into "African" and "Arab" tribes,
although the distinction between the two is not always clear. The African tribes are
usually sedentary agriculturists and include some of the largest and traditionally most
inuential groups such as the Fur tribe, which has given the region its name.9 The Arab
tribes are typically either cattle or camel herders and practice a nomadic lifestyle with
seasonal migrations across farmer lands. Both the African and Arab tribes are Muslim
and Arabic serves as a lingua franca in the region.
The recent conict in Darfur is generally regarded to have started in February 2003
when the rebel groups JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) and the SLA (Sudanese
Liberation Army) announced their programs in opposition to the government in Khar-
toum. The SLA group consisted mainly of Fur and Masalit tribesmen, whereas JEM was
dominated by the African (yet nomadic) Zaghawa tribe. Both groups claimed that the
basic reason for their rebellion was the consistent marginalization of Darfur in a national
context. Figure 1 gives schematic overview of the sequence of events. After some success-
ful initial attacks on government outposts, which appeared to catch the GoS by surprise,
Khartoum started to mobilize loyal Arab tribes in Darfur to ght SLA and JEM (stage 2
7We adhere to the denition of ethnic cleansing provided by Petrovic (1994, p 351), claiming that
"...ethnic cleansing is a well-dened policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate
another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin." As such, ethnic
cleansing typically involves violence on a large scale and a series of specic crimes against humanity such as
murder, mass rape, torture, and forced displacement of populations (Bell-Fialko¤, 1993; Petrovic, 1994).
See Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) for a related (informal) model or Horowitz (2000) for a general
overview of ethnic conict.
8The general information in this section builds mainly upon Prunier (2007) and Flint and de Waal
(2008).
9"Darfur" means literally "the land of the Fur".
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in Figure 1) (Prunier, 2007; Flint and de Waal, 2008; ICC, 2009). The Sudanese army was
still engaged in the south to secure the emerging peace process with the SPLA rebels. To
date, the GoS still denies that it has played any role in the mobilization and subsequent
actions of the Janjaweed.
A massive military campaign was then launched during the second half of 2003 (stage
3 in Figure 1). Supported by government intelligence, coordination, and aircraft, the
Arab militias - referred to locally as the Janjaweed - attacked hundreds of civilian African
villages throughout Darfur during late 2003 and early 2004 (stage 3a). The typical pat-
tern was an initial bombing by Antonov airplanes or helicopter gunships, whereupon the
Janjaweed would move in, mounted on camels or small pickup trucks, and kill many civil-
ians, rape women and girls, destroy as much equipment as possible, poison the wells, and
eventually set the whole village ablaze (Prunier, 2007; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond,
2008; Vanrooyen et al, 2008). The horses, camels, and cattle in the village were usually
either driven out into the desert or were stolen and loaded onto trucks (Vanrooyen et a,
2008). The villages tended to be unprotected since the rebel ghters in JEM and SLA
were typically hiding elsewhere. Many villages were totally abandoned after such attacks
and the surviving population ed to refugee camps near the larger towns or just west of
the Chadian border. Similar attacks have repeatedly occurred also after the most intense
campaigns in winter 2004. By winter 2008, it was estimated that the crisis has resulted in
some 300,000 deaths and about 2.7 million refugees (BBC, 2008).
On the basis of a large number of interviews of refugees, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond
(2008) attempt to reconstruct the "sociology" of these attacks. In particular, the authors
document how racial and dehumanizing epithets such as "All the people in the village
are slaves; you make this area dirty; we are here to clean the area" were very common.
According to Hagan and Rymond-Richmonds model and terminology, this "racial de-
humanization" of the African groups (in particular the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa) was
primarily instigated by locally-organized "ethnopolitical entrepreneurs" who sought to mo-
bilize local Arab populations into collective violent action. These local militia leaders were
in turn agents of the GoS who for a long time had held an Arab supremacist ideology and
who were responsible for a general collective framing process that di¤erentiated between
Arabs and Africans.
Apart from attacking civilian villages, the Janjaweed also fought the actual rebels in
regular military battles (stage 3b). Compared to the campaign against civilian villages,
these activities had a relatively small impact on the ow of refugees.
But if the GoS indeed mobilized the Janjaweed to pursue a counter-insurgency cam-
paign, why should it let them attack civilian villages rather than the actual rebel ghters?
One suggested explanation is that the attacks against villages should simply be regarded
as a counter-insurgency campaign that went out of hand and unintentionally resulted in a
humanitarian disaster (Prunier, 2007). A more cynical explanation is that the government
and the Janjaweed very consciously had come to the conclusion that a terror campaign
against the rebel ghtershome villages would be a more e¤ective military strategy than
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trying to ght the rebels hiding somewhere in the Sahel.10 The result of this strategy was
a massive "cleansing" of civilian rebel tribe populations from the area.
It has been argued that the conict in Darfur has at least two key dimensions.11 The
most obvious one is the cultural and economic tension between an Arab center of the
country in Khartoum and a marginalized African population in the periphery. Darfur was
not included into the British colony until 1916 and had previously been an autonomous
sultanate for hundreds of years with an own sense of identity. The colonial government,
as well as the governments of independent Sudan, had in common a lack of interest in
developing Darfur. The Arabization ideology embraced by Omar al-Bashirs government
certainly did not contribute to improving the situation for Sudans African groups. Even-
tually a rebellion arose in early 2003.
The current conict in Darfur also has deep roots within the social fabric of Darfur
itself. It represents a rapid escalation of a conict that has long divided di¤erent groups
in Darfur over land use and competition for scarce natural resources, particularly water.12
According to the customary land tenure system in Darfur, most of the land has been
controlled by the biggest ethnic groups indigenous to the area the Fur and the Masalit.
The communal leaders of these tribes, the sultans, omdas and sheiks, were responsible
for the administration of their respective areas (dars). It was they who gave permission
to outsiders to reside in villages and grazing rights to herders. As a result, there is a
clear social stratication among Darfurians in relation to access to land into two groups:
dar owners - the indigenous people and cattle nomads and non-dar owners, including
Arabic camel nomads and newcomers who migrated from Chad and northern Darfur due
to drought of the 1970s and 80s.13 Essentially, the new African arrivals were well integrated
with the dar owners but occupied a lower social and economic status.14
The traditional system of managing resources facilitated relatively peaceful coexistence
between nomads and farmers. The Arab nomads (particularly the camel nomads) had no
dar of their own. Instead, they made seasonal movements, south and north, in search of
water and pasture for their herds. In the past, this had been done without too much friction
as land was abundant. During the farming season, nomadic movements were restricted to
certain annually-marked migration routes. After the harvesting season, the nomads were
allowed to use all of the grazing land, except for the fenced vegetable/fruit gardens. Con-
icts and disputes among tribes and individuals were settled by the traditional authorities
(OFahey and Tubiana, 2009; Abdul-Jalil, 2006).
The dar -system was formally abolished by the central GoS in 1970, without being re-
10See for instance Azam and Hoe­ er (2002) for a model of such a choice situation or Mann (2005) for
a review of similar events throughout history.
11See Brosché (2008) and Prunier (2007) for an in-depth analysis of the multicausal nature of the Darfuri
conict.
12See Olsson (2011) for an analysis of the role of land tenure institutions in the current conict.
13Such as the Tama, Gimier, Mararit, Eringa, Kajaksa, Borgo, Mesiria Jabal, Mimi, Singar, Dajo and
Falatta tribes.
14Anecdotal evidence also indicates that when the conict erupted in August 2003, many of the new
African tribes chose not to side with the traditional African tribes of the area which made them considered
by the other African groups as collaborators.
7
placed with mechanisms that would facilitate the relationship between nomads and farm-
ers. The consequence was the disappearance of the various native courts and much of
the expertise on land tenure and the resolution of inter-ethnic conicts. However, the
abolition was never complete though the old system was severely weakened. It remained
as a parallel authority structure embedded in the state making a number of land tenure
systems co-exist in Darfur (OFahey and Tubiana, 2009; Abdul-Jalil, 2006).
The issue of land became more critical following the growing pressures on natural
resources as a result of land degradation and desertication, combined with expanding
rain fed and wadi cultivation to meet the demands of increased population. Expansion of
agricultural land triggered the blocking of animal migration routes and decreased access to
water sources for animals, which has been one of the common causes of grassroots conicts
in Darfur (Abdul-Jalil, 2006). According to this view then, the conict should primarily
be seen as a struggle over natural resources.
2.2 Ethnic cleansing
As discussed in the introduction, ethnic cleansing is most often described as a sustained
attempt by one group to remove another group - dened in ethnic, religious, or political
terms - from a given territory. In this sense, ethnic cleansing can be distinguished from
the related term "genocide" by the notion that whereas the former features an intent
to remove a population, the latter aims at destroying a population, in whole or in part
(Petrovic, 1994). It might thus be argued that genocide is also an act of ethnic cleansing,
but the reverse needs not to be true.15
A further di¤erence is that while genocide is described by a specic UN convention
from 1948, ethnic cleansing is not dened by international law.16 Rather, ethnic cleans-
ing can be understood as an overarching term for a series of crimes against humanity
such as massive deportation, torture, large scale rape and sexual assaults, for war crimes
such as attacking civilian targets with military, as well as for other crimes such as robbery,
destruction of homes and livelihoods, destruction of cultural and religious monuments, ver-
bal harassments, and the use racist propaganda, all with the aim of removing a particular
group from a territory (Petrovic, 1994).
Though the term ethnic cleansing did not become commonly used until the early 1990s
during the conict in former Yugoslavia, the phenomenon is far from new. Bell-Fialko¤
(1993) traces incidents of ethnic cleansing at least back to antiquity. During the Middle
Ages, various religious groups were often violently expelled from countries, for instance
Jews (from Spain, England, France, and other countries), and Protestant Huguenots were
famously expelled from France in the late 1680s. The Armenian holocaust in 1915, when
15Mann (2005) uses the term "murderous ethnic cleansing" to describe all kinds of activities involving
extreme violence on a massive scale aimed at a certain population. According to this denition, genocide
is therefore the most extreme form of murderous ethnic cleansing.
16 It is, however, mentioned in a Security Council Resolution from 2006, stating that member countries
should assume the responsibility "...to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity." (Security Council, 2006, p 2)
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an estimated 1.5 million Armenians succumbed in the Ottoman empire, and the Holocaust
during World War II, both involved massive ethnic cleansing campaigns alongside outright
exterminations. The most well-known example of ethnic cleansing during recent years is
undoubtedly the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s.
In 2004, a Security Council resolution requested that an investigation should be carried
out on the situation in Darfur concerning alleged violations of international law. The
investigation was also commissioned to determine whether acts of genocide had occurred.
Their conclusion, reported in 2005, was that although there were strong indications of that
the GoS/Janjaweed forces had committed serious crimes against humanity throughout
Darfur, the investigators could not nd evidence of a policy aimed at exterminating a
specic subpopulation. A similar conclusion was initially drawn by the International
Criminal Court, which nonetheless issued a warrant of arrest against Omar al-Bashir on
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity (ICC, 2009).
However, in July 2010, the ICC extended its warrant of arrest to also include genocide.
More specically, the extended charges included three counts of genocide and found rea-
sonable grounds to believe that Omar al-Bashir was responsible as an indirect perpetrator
for trying to "...destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups" by "...delib-
erately inicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction..." (ICC,
2010, p 8). The arrest order also states that "...as part of the GoSs unlawful attack
on the above-mentioned part of the civilian population of Darfur...GoS forces subjected,
throughout the Darfur region...hundreds of thousands of civilians, belonging primarily to
the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups, to acts of forcible transfer." (ICC, 2010, p 6).
2.3 Context of the study
As discussed above, the causes of the conict in Darfur are complex and multifaceted. In
this study, we will focus on one particular geographical area - Southwestern Darfur - and
one particular dimension of the conict; the campaign that started in 2003 in which the
government-supported Janjaweed militia attacked civilian villages (stage 3a in Figure 1).
The choice of area is mainly dictated by data availability, as discussed further below.
The fact that we restrict our analysis to the campaign against civilian villages is similarly
primarily explained by our access to village-level data. Our study will therefore not be
concerned with rebel ghters(from JEM or SLA) direct military encounters with Jan-
jaweed or government forces (stage 3b in Figure 1), which is another central aspect of
the conict. Neither will we study the actions of other groups in the area like NGOs,
UN peacekeepers, etc. However, it is generally recognized that the government-supported
Janjaweed attacks on civilian villages that we study here are by far the most important
factor behind the current refugee crisis and what has caused the ICC to indict Sudans
incumbent president for war crimes and genocide.
The main issue that we analyze is to what extent the probability and intensity of
attacks against civilian villages can be explained by ethnic variables, as suggested by the
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hypothesis of a government-led ethnic cleansing campaign, and to what extent they can
be explained by resource-related variables, as suggested by the GoS.
3 A Model
In the model below, we propose a framework for understanding how ethnic cleansing might
become an equilibrium outcome in a local conict between groups. The basic scenario is
an environment with several ethnic groups who compete over limited resources.
More specically, we assume a conict that has reached the equivalent of stage 3a in
Figure 1, i.e. a rebellion has previously occurred (stage 1), a militia has been mobilized
with or without government assistance (stage 2), and the militia has decided that the
most promising strategy for obtaining its goals is to attack civilian villages rather than
the rebel forces.17 The main aim of the militia is to capture resources. The government is
a political ally of the militia and its support can take two forms; it can provide military
assistance that increases the militias ghting power, and/or it can grant exemption from
punishment and moral support for any attacks that the militia makes on the governments
enemies. Normally, the social costs of trying to steal a competing groups resources are
too high for predation to occur. But if the government ensures that the attacking group
is militarily strong and that its members will not be punished, an equilibrium with a
predatory aggression against the governments political enemies might arise. A result of
such aggression is that people ee from the attacked villages. Ethnic cleansing in this way
becomes an indirect consequence of a struggle for resources.18
3.1 Basic assumptions
Let us imagine an environment with a total population consisting of three distinct ethnic
groups.19 For the purpose of concreteness, let us refer to these groups as Arabs, New
Africans, and Rebel tribes. Arabs are politically allied to the government whereas Rebel
tribes are political enemies of the government. The latter have even initiated a rebellion
against the government. New Africans are politically neutral.
The focus of our model is a campaign that starts when an Arab militia has been
mobilized. The militia is an agent of the government and is provided with certain kinds
of support, but the government can only imperfectly monitor the militias activities. The
militia can choose between either doing their normal economic activities or to attack
civilian villages in the area in order to loot or steal productive resources. Their choice
depends on the type and level of support provided by the government.
17Azam and Hoe­ er (2002) explicitly model the choice between ghting rebels or terrorizing the rebels
home villages in order to decrease their ghting strength.
18Although we think that this approach to modelling the ethnic cleansing mechanism might be applied
for understanding several historical conicts apart from Darfur (for instance to Rwanda in 1994), we would
not claim that it is universally applicable. More research is needed into the motivations and constraints
faced by agents in other ethnic cleansing episodes.
19 In reality, there are also other African groups in Darfur but with a very small share of the total
population.
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The model therefore has two main types of collective agents; the Arab militia (the
Janjaweed) consisting of N > 0 potential attackers on the one side, and a number of
civilian villages (i = 1; 2; :::I) whose populations Li > 0 will potentially be preyed upon,
on the other.20 We assume that the N members of the militia do not live in the civilian
villages but that other Arabs do so. The government is not a strategic player in the model
but inuences (exogenously) the cost and e¤ectiveness of the militias operations. The key
decision in the model is the militias independent choice whether to attack some village
i or not. If the militia is purely resource-motivated, they might even predate on Arab
villages.
The time frame of the model is t 2 f1; 2; :::Tg where T > I. An attack on one village
takes one unit of time (perhaps a week or a couple of days). Since T > I, there is time for
attacking every village in the area. The time discount rate is zero. The militia can reach all
villages without incurring any transportation costs. They consider every village a potential
target of attack and their decision whether to attack or not is made on an individual basis
for each village and is independent of the choices made for other villages.21
We assume that the militiamen at each point in time t gain material utility U from
two potential sources: From consuming their own (peaceful) normal production of size
Q or from the consumption of looted or captured resources from some other village Zi.
Total available e¤ort from the militia during some t is normalized to unity. E¤ort devoted
to predation on village i is zi  0 whereas normal productive e¤ort during the period is
1 zi. If e¤ort is devoted to predation, this activity will entail a social cost C which could
include many factors such as risk of punishment by a court, psychic costs of committing
crimes against neighbors, or loss of future collaboration with the attacked villagers. Total
utility for the militia during any time period is given by
W = U (Z (zi) ; Q (1  zi))  C (zi) : (1)
We assume that the marginal utilities are @W=@Z = UZ > 0 and @W=@Q = UQ > 0. Con-
sumption from predation Z increases with z such that Zz > 0. However, e¤orts devoted
to predation mean that normal production is crowded out since less e¤ort is available for
production (Qz < 0). In addition, predatory activities give rise to a marginal social cost
Cz > 0 that will be explained further below. Hence, predation has a direct opportunity
cost in terms of forgone production, but also an indirect social cost.22 These marginal
benets and costs of predation will determine whether any predation is undertaken.
The usual rst-order conditions for maximum imply that optimal predatory e¤ort on
village i should be set such that
UZ  Zzi = Czi   UQ Qzi :
20We do not explain in this model how this militia has been formed or how it has solved collective action
problems, etc.
21 In the empirical analysis, we will control for neighborhood spillover e¤ects.
22For simplicity, we assume away all other direct monetary costs of waging wars.
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The expression simply shows that the marginal utility of predation should in optimum
equal the sum of its marginal direct and indirect costs. The normal situation in most
societies throughout history is that UZ  Zzi < Czi   UQ  Qzi at all zi  1 and for all i.
In that case, no predatory aggression will occur. Such a scenario is likely if the marginal
product of normal activity Qzi and the marginal cost of predation Czi are high. This
is typically the case in developed economies characterized by rule of law but does not
necessarily apply to regions like Darfur.
3.2 Functional forms
By using the general functions above, we cannot derive any explicit solutions for the
optimal level of e¤ort zi. Neither can we say anything about the role of resources or
ethnicity. We therefore make some specic assumptions about functional forms:
U = Z +Q (2)
Z =  (zi)Ri =
Nzi
Nzi + Li
 Ri (3)
Q = A (1  zi) (4)
C = !(zi)Lici =  (zi)Lis ((1  ) fi + ni + (1 + ) (1  fi   ni)) (5)
Starting from above, we make the extreme simplication that Z and Q are perfect
substitutes. In (3), we assume that the total success of predation on village i will depend
on the level of appropriable resources Ri. This variable potentially includes non-lootable
resources like better-quality land and strategic access to water, as well as readily appropri-
able resources such as livestock, stored harvests, or village equipment and property.  > 0
is a parameter indicating how easily these resources can be transformed into consumption
and utility. A fraction  (zi) 2 [0; 1) of all resources are captured or looted.
 (zi) is given by a standard contest success function Nzi= (Nzi + Li) : In this expres-
sion, Nzi is made up of the share of total available e¤ort devoted to attacking village i, zi,
multiplied by the number of militiamen N . The whole village population Li defends the
village. The parameter  describes the relative strength of the militia.  > 1 means that
the militiamen are more e¤ective on the margin than the defenders, and vice versa with
 < 1.23 In this model,  is a parameter capturing the indirect military support from the
government to the Janjaweed. It is easily shown that  (0) = 0,  (1) = (1 + Li=N)
 1 < 1;
0 (zi) > 0 and 00 (zi) < 0.
Peaceful normal production is given in (4) by a linear function Q = A (1  zi) where
A > 0 is a labor productivity parameter capturing for instance climate and institutional
quality.24 This parameter is invariant of i since it involves productivity in the militias
own home environment. Production is the normal activity even for the militia.
In case of an attack, the social costs of predation are given by C. We assume that after
23See Grossman and Kim (1995) and Olsson and Congdon Fors (2004) for a similar assumption.
24A might equivalently be thought of as a general opportunity cost of violence.
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the realization of the ghting between the militia and the village population, a fraction
!(zi)  1 of the total village population Li, regardless of race, is killed or abandon the
village as a consequence of the attack. For simplicity, we suggest that ! is linearly related
to the extent of looting so that !(zi) =  (zi) where we assume that  > 1.
There are at least two rationales for our specication of !(zi). First, one might view
population displacement as an external and unintended e¤ect of an attack that is aimed
at capturing resources. Second, it might alternatively be argued that resource capture and
population displacement have strong complementarities; in order to secure a longer-term
possession of a village and its resources, it might be necessary to also displace the local
population. Hence, displacement could be intentional and serve both the predatory militia
and the government.
Note that since  is larger than unity, there might exist a level zi = ~zi such that
!(~zi) =  (~zi) = 1. When this is the case, the whole village is abandoned. Some algebra
shows that ~zi = Li=N (   1) :
The militias social costs of predation are given by
c (fi; ) = s  ((1  ) fi + ni + (1 + ) (1  fi   ni))
where fi is the share of the rebel tribe population in the village (Fur, Masalit, and Za-
ghawa), ni is the share of New African populations, and the residual (1  fi   ni) is the
share of the militias own people (Arabs) in the village. It is an empirical fact that rebel
tribe farming populations and Arab herding populations tend to live in a segregated man-
ner.25 Hence, an increase in fi is usually associated with a lower fraction of nomadic Arabs
as in the expression above.
s > 0 is a general indicator of the social cost of any person eeing and   0 is a
parameter reecting di¤erences in the marginal social cost of eeing between groups. In
a society with a benevolent and impartial government that honors human rights and the
rule of law, we would have that  = 0 and that general costs s are at a su¢ ciently high
level to discourage potential predation. In societies with a culture of impunity, the costs of
predation are low in general. In some countries - such apartheid South Africa - the govern-
ment actively supports some groups in society against others and even encourages attacks
on certain populations. In Darfur, we argue that the governments racial dehumanization
of rebel tribe groups, as documented by Vanrooyen et al (2008), should imply that  > 0
so that the marginal cost of a rebel tribe individual eeing is lower than that of a New
African eeing, which in turn is lower than the cost of an Arab eeing. It might even
be argued that   1 so that the social costs of attacking populations with rebel tribes
might be zero or negative, i.e. the militia is rewarded for attacking rebel tribe villages.
We will discuss this further below. The partial derivatives of ci are cfi =  2s < 0 and
c = s (1  2fi   ni) < 0 if (1  ni) =2 < fi. The latter derivative shows that social costs
decrease with the level of racial discrimination against the rebel tribes  if their proportion
25The correlation coe¢ cient between the share of rebel tribe and Arab populations in the sample is -0.71.
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in the village population fi is high.
Given all these functional forms, the utility function of the militia can be written as
W (zi) = A (1  zi) + Nzi
Nzi + Li
 (Ri   Lic(fi; )) :
The optimization problem is to nd the value zi 2 [0; 1] that maximizes utility. The
marginal utility of predatory e¤ort zi isWzi = 
0 (zi)(Ri   Lic(fi; )) A: The di¤erent
solutions for zi are characterized in (6):
zi :
8>>><>>>:
= 0 i¤ N (Ri   Lic(fi; )) < ALi
= zmaxi =
Li
N
q
N(Ri Lic(fi;))
ALi
  1

i¤ zmaxi 2 (0; 1)
= 1 i¤ zmaxi  1
(6)
As mentioned above, the historically most common situation in Darfur and in most
other societies is that Wzi is negative at all zi  1; implying that the marginal utility of
e¤ort in peaceful production exceeds the marginal utility of predation at all possible levels
of predation. In that case, optimal predatory e¤ort is simply zi = 0.
If there exists some zi in the range (0; 1) where Wzi is positive, then z

i > 0 and there
will be an attack on village i. The necessary condition for a positive zi to exist is that
the value of zi where the utility function reaches its maximum, zmaxi , is larger than zero,
implying that N (Ri   Lici(fi; )) > ALi. To start with, it is noteworthy that the
probability of attack will increase with N and decrease with A. This is certainly in line
with intuition: All else equal, predatory aggression should be more likely the greater the
number N and relative military strength  of the attackers and the lower the marginal
product of peaceful activities A.26 It is further only natural that an attack is more likely
if there are plenty of resources Ri and if the social cost of attacking ci(fi; ) is low. If
N (Ri   Lici(fi; )) =ALi is very high, then it might be the case that the maximum is
attained beyond the feasible range of zi, implying that all e¤ort is optimally devoted to
predation; zi = 1.
The equilibrium value of the contest success function can be found by inserting the
di¤erent values of zi into (z

i ). In the cases of z

i = 0 and z

i = 1; the solutions are
simply (0) = 0 and  (1) = (1 + Li=N)
 1 > 0; as mentioned above. If zi = z
max
i , the
equilibrium proportion is:
(zmaxi ) =
Nzmaxi
Nzmaxi + Li
= 1 
s
ALi
N (Ri   Lic(fi; )) (7)
This expression shows the equilibrium percentage of appropriable resources that are con-
quered or looted from the village.
The share of the population that is displaced is one of the main variables in the em-
26Similar results have been derived in many other conict models, for instance Olsson and Congdon Fors
(2004).
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pirical section. Recall that this share is given by !(~zi) =  (~zi) and that the critical level
of ~zi, beyond which the whole population abandon the village, was ~zi = Li=N (   1).
Total abandonment will thus happen if ~zmaxi  ~zi. A formal comparison of these two levels
denes a threshold function:
zmaxi   ~zi =
Li
N
0@sN (Ri   Lic (fi; ))
ALi
  
   1
1A = y(Ri; c (fi; )) (8)
The village is abandoned if y(Ri; c (fi; ))  0. Inspection of this expression makes
it clear that the probability of total abandonment increases with Ri and with fi (since
y decreases with c (fi; ) which in turn decreases with fi). Hence, abandonment is more
likely if there are plenty of appropriable resources and if the proportion of the targeted
tribes is large.
Another outcome variable of interest in the empirical section is the total size of the
village population that is displaced as a result of a potential attack. This number equals
 (zi)Li = Li. From the results above, we can solve for the equilibrium level of population
displacement:
Li :
8>><>>:
= 0 i¤ zi = 0
= 

1 
q
ALi
N(Ri Lic(fi;))

Li 2 (0; Li) i¤ zi = zmaxi < ~zi
= Li i¤ zi = z
max
i  ~zi
(9)
There are thus three possible outcomes: (i) The village is not attacked at all and that
nobody ees. (ii) An attack occurs that results in the displacement of a certain part of
the population. (iii) The village is completely abandoned by the whole population. The
key sources of variation across villages among these determinants of attacks (except the
size of the village population Li) are resources Ri and the proportion of rebel tribes fi.
Also the expression in (9) shows that the intensity of attacks increases with fi and with
Ri.
In Figure 2, we show a simulation of the relationship between Li and fi at varying social
costs of displacing particular groups, using (9) and assuming a total village population of
Li = 500.27 The dashed, at line shows the case when  = 0 so that no discrimination is
made between the groups. In this case, the size of the population eeing is unresponsive
to fi and about 2/3 of the population is displaced regardless of the ethnic composition.
The dotted concave line assumes  = 0:1, whereas the thick solid concave line assumes
 = 0:2. In the last case, the village will only be attacked when the proportion of rebel
tribes in the village is fi  0:283 and the whole village will be abandoned (Li = Li = 500)
at fi  0:768:28
27See the gure note for the assumed parameter values. A similar model has not been simulated in the
literature before and the choice of parameter values is therefore necessarily arbitrary.
28The associated equilibrium level of predatory e¤ort is zi = 0:667.
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In the area as a whole, the total size of the displaced population is
IX
i=1
Li = D (; ) (10)
where the total level of displacement D is a function of the governments choice of pa-
rameter levels  and . Clearly, the level of displacement increases in general with the
militias relative military strength, . To what extent attacks will be targeted on rebel
tribes depends on the level of . It can be shown that for a given level of , the size of
population displacement will increase with  if fi is high on average in the villages.
An extended model might have included a rst stage of the conict when the govern-
ment chose parameter levels  and  that maximized a government utility function with
D as an argument.29 We leave that for future work.
3.3 Interpretation and empirical predictions
What does our model have to say about the potential reasons behind the militias attacks
on villages? To start with, there are many indications of a very low level of labor produc-
tivity A at the time, mainly due to a sustained period of drought since the 1970s (Kevane
and Grey, 2008; Olsson, 2009). Furthermore, the ideology and propaganda of Arabization,
practiced by the government in Khartoum and its local agents, presumably implied that
the Janjaweed forces considered the social costs of attacking villages with rebel tribe pop-
ulations to be very low, i.e.  was relatively high at the time. From summer 2003, there
was further a sudden increase in , resulting from the governments policy to assist the
militia with ghter airplanes, helicopters, and army intelligence. In terms of our model,
this should have led to a general boost in optimal levels of ghting e¤ort (see eq. (6).
Without this active ideological and military government support, it is highly unlikely that
the Janjaweed ghters would have been able to carry out violence on such a massive scale.
However, these factors are constant across villages and do not explain why individual
villages were attacked. The main dependent variable in the empirical section is a binary
variable for whether villages are abandoned or not. In our theoretical framework, the
choice is determined by the sign of y (Ri; c (fi; )) in (8), which we consider to be a latent
variable that we try to estimate in the empirical section. According to our model, the main
motivating factor for the militia is the possibility of capturing appropriable resources. It
is easy to show that
@y (Ri; c (fi; ))
@Ri
=
  pLip
4NA (Ri   Lic (fi; ))
> 0;
implying that the militia is more likely to predate on more resourceful villages, holding
ethnic composition constant, and that the level of the marginal e¤ect will depend on ,
the parameter indicating how resource capture translates into utility.
29See for instance Azam and Hoe­ er (2002) or Esteban et al (2010) for models that take this route.
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Our central hypothesis is that for a given level of resources, the militia should speci-
cally target villages with a large proportion of rebel tribes, fi. The marginal impact of fi
is
@y (Ri; c (fi; ))
@fi
=
sL3=2p
NA (Ri   Lic (fi; ))
> 0: (11)
In our empirical analysis, the regression coe¢ cient for fi is thus expected to be positive
across villages and should give an indication of , the underlying discrimination in the
social costs of violence against rebel tribe populations, which is the root of ethnic cleansing.
Given two villages with the same level of resources, the militia will attack that with the
highest proportion of rebel tribes since the costs of attacking such villages are lower. Note
that if  = 0, then the derivative in (11) is zero and the ethnic composition will not matter
for the choice of attacking. The expression in (11) also shows that the cross-derivative
is @ (y)2 =@Ri@fi < 0, implying that the marginal impact of rebel tribes should decrease
with the level of resources.
Attacks should thus in particular be directed towards villages with a great level of
resources (Ri) and with a high fraction of population from the three rebel tribes Fur,
Masalit, and Zaghawa (fi). These are the main hypotheses that we test in the empirical
section.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
The main data source to our empirical analysis comes from international organizations
operating in the area.30 In 2004/2005, while participating in provision of emergency
assistance and protection interventions, these organizations undertook a return-oriented
proling exercise in Southwestern Darfur to help understand the complex picture of dis-
placement that the 2003 crisis had created and to support war a¤ected communities,
sustain voluntary return and prepare the ground for an eventual voluntary return of a
large number of IDPs and refugees to their villages of origin. An important objective of
the data collection was to provide reliable GIS-based intelligence to emergency organiza-
tions working in the area. The proling was designed to obtain a comprehensive picture of
both the current and pre-conict situations. Pre-conict situations refer to the situation
by early 2003, whereas the latest information about the current situation has November
30, 2005 as the oldest date and June 2008 as the most recent date (the median village had
its latest visit in October, 2007). The organizations were not motivated by attempts at
assisting the ICC trials on war crimes.
The data collection covered eight administrative units with a total area of approxi-
30Given the current security situation in Darfur, we have agreed not to disclose the identity of the
organization(s) that have provided the data that our study builds upon. Until the situation in the area
improves, more details about the data will only be communicated through personal correspondence with
the authors.
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mately 25,000 sq km (almost equivalent to the size of Belgium or Vermont and roughly
5 percent of Darfurs total territory). We inferred from correspondence with the data
collecting sta¤ that their intention has consistently been to gather information from all
villages in the area except in limited cases of exclusion of villages due to lack of roads or a
security situation which did not allow the team to be aware of the very existence of some
settlements. Some secondary towns like Forobaranga and Habila are also included, whereas
major towns like Garsila and Zalingei are not included. Figure 3 gives a general overview
of the area and shows the geographical distribution of surveyed settlements. All in all,
our base sample consists of 530 settlements31 with a total population of approximately
792,000 people before the conict.32
Visiting the villages, the team collected information on the location and general sit-
uation of the place, the typology of settlements, and, most importantly, a retrospective
assessment of the size of population and composition of ethnicities before and after the
crisis. There were also di¤erent specic sections covering health, education, vulnerable
persons in the community, shelter, accessibility, security, economic situation, and land
ownership. In addition to speaking with sheiks and other traditional and administrative
authorities, the teams were instructed to verify the information they gathered with people
in the market and other ordinary residents of each village. Where a location had an inter-
national presence, the team also crosschecked information with that organization. Upon
return from each mission, the team had three-day debrieng sessions with other sta¤ to
compile the data and identify the main issues and trends that emerged from the informa-
tion gathered. This was followed by a one-day debrieng with two sta¤ members from
another organization in the area.
The data source referred to above unfortunately contains few useful proxies for re-
sources, which is a key variable in our model. Ideally, we would have liked to have data
on lootable resources like the total size of each villages livestock, as well as non-lootable
resources like access to water. Since we do not have data on village-specic lootable re-
sources, we create a number of geographical variables capturing the quality of the villages
natural resource environment, which should be strongly correlated with lootable resources.
Water availability, for instance, is obviously a key determinant of the quality of land and of
the ability to maintain herds of camels and cattle. We have assembled data on geograph-
ical distance (in meters) from each village to the nearest major wadi from USAID (2010).
Wadis are seasonally dry rivers where water is usually available beneath the ground. In
Darfur, as well as in many other parts of the Sahel, access to the wadis are important
both for cultivators and for livestock herders (UNEP, 2007).
31The sample originally contained 562 villages. 20 villages in the original sample had an inconsistent
share of inhabitants. Their ethnic compositions fail to add up to one and no logical explanation is provided
for why it is so. As ethnic composition is our primary source of information for identifying African and Arab
predominated villages, we excluded these villages from our analysis. 12 other villages had no population
before the conict. The nal sample size that our study bases on thus contains 530 villages.
32We have reached this gure by multiplying the total number of households 143,938 with an assumed
average size of 5.5 individuals, which was the average household size in a survey on the region collected by
Deporteere et al (2004). The area sampled has roughly 12 percent of the total population in Darfur.
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We have also collected detailed data from USAID (2010) on density of vegetation
(NDVI) for the whole region. The data was distilled from satellite images with a resolution
of 500 by 500 meters that were taken in June 2003, i.e. a few weeks before the initiation
of the counter-insurgency campaign. Furthermore, we have obtained measures of distance
to nearest alluvial soils and distance to nearest road. Alluvial soils are usually found near
wadis and o¤er good pasture and fertile elds. Access to roads should imply a better
access to markets but also an easier access for roaming militias. These measures should be
highly correlated with the true level of Ri. Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution of
villages, wadis, and roads in our sample region. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows alluvial
soils and elevation in an area that was particularly hit by destructive violence.
The rural population is also dependent on health care and education which is typically
provided in local administrative centers. For each village, we have therefore calculated the
geographical distance to its administrative center. We imagine that the closer a village is
to an administrative center, the better its access to public goods like health and schools
but also to police and courts. On the one hand, access to public goods should make the
village a more attractive prize for predators. On the other hand, villages far away from the
center are more likely to be attacked because of a weaker rule of law in the periphery and a
smaller likelihood of attention from media and human rights watchdogs. The hypothesized
direction of the net e¤ect is unclear. Among the geographical control variables is altitude
above sea level, which we have gathered for each village from satellite maps in Google
Earth, as well as village coordinates and dummies for administrative units.
In order to control for the inuence of the situation in each villages nearest neighbor-
hood, we have further divided the region into 0.1 latitude degree by 0.1 longitude degree
grid cells. In either north-south or east-west direction, a 0.1 degree distance is equivalent
to about 10-11 kms so that each grid cell represents an articially constructed neighbor-
hood of 100-121 sq km.33 We found in total 151 populated grid cells and then estimated
the number of abandoned villages, the total population, the total number and proportion
of people eeing, and the ethnic proportions in each cell. For each of the 530 individual
villages, there is thus both an observation of, for instance, total population in the village,
as well as the total population in the grid cell to which the village belongs. Figure A1
shows some grid cell neighborhoods that were particularly a¤ected by violence.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 4 shows the ethnic composition in our sample before and after the crisis. The
dominant rebel tribes (mainly Fur and Masalit) made up about 2/3 of the population
before the crisis. After the conict, 58,989 rebel tribe households had been displaced from
their home villages. The other two main population groups did not experience any losses
and the number of Arab households even increased by about 7,000. All in all, the total
population decreased by almost 1/3.
33A similar grid cell methodology is used in Buhaug and Röd (2006) where 100 km by 100 km cells in
Africa are the basic unit of observation.
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data used in the empirical analysis. Our
main outcome variable in the empirical analysis is abandon, which is a binary variable
taking the value 1 if all inhabitants have abandoned the village. 329 villages (about 62
percent) were abandoned and 201 were not. Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution
of abandoned and non-abandoned villages.
Apart from abandon, we also use a binary variable attack and the number of households
eeing (peopleed) in logs as dependent variables. The dummy attack equals 1 if any
people have ed from the village and 0 otherwise. 400 villages were attacked. A noteworthy
feature is that out of an average population of 270 households before the conict (popsize),
as many as 198 (or around 73 percent) would typically ee.
The proportion of civilian Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa households in the village popu-
lation before conict (rebeltribes) is one of our main explanatory variables. The average
proportion is 0.61, but due to residential segregation the most common situation is that
the proportion is either 0 or 1, as illustrated in Figure 5.34 The gure also shows the
proportional distribution of New Africans and Arabs before conict in abandoned and
non-abandoned villages. Whereas New Africans are relatively dispersed, Arab popula-
tions rarely mix with the other groups. The distributions of rebel tribes and Arabs across
abandoned and non-abandoned villages further suggest a very clear pattern of attacks
being targeted at rebel tribe villages whereas hardly any Arab village was abandoned.
A second ethnic variable is rebeldummy, taking a value of 1 if the villages population
consisted of rebel tribes only. The sample contains 275 such villages, 258 of which were
ultimately abandoned.
Among the resource variables, the mean of the (ndvi) index of vegetation is 3,467
whereas the average distance to a major wadi (dist_wadi) is about 4,360 meters. The
mean distance to alluvial soils (dist_alluvial) is shorter than that and several villages
are even located right on such soils and thus score 0. The average distance to a road
(dist_road) is about 5 km and the mean distance to an administrative center (dist_admin)
is 26.5 kilometers.
Popsize measures population size (number of households) whereas n_popsize is the size
of the population in the neighborhood and should be thought of as population density.
The average grid cell population of 1510 households implies that the average population
density, given that the area is populated, is about 80 people per sq km.35 Some of these
neighborhoods are ethnically homogenous (n_rebels=1). The average village in the sample
is further located at an altitude of about 700 meters above sea level.
Table 2 shows the means of selected variables in abandoned and non-abandoned vil-
lages. The table provides concrete numbers of the patterns revealed in Figure 5 of an
overwhelming predominance of rebeltribes in the villages that were abandoned (88 per-
cent). The mean for rebeltribes in non-abandoned villages, on the other hand, is only
34162 villages in the area had a share of rebeltribes lower than 5 percent whereas 277 villages had a share
larger than 95 percent.
351510 times household size 5.5 divided by grid cell size 100 sq km.
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about 0.18. A standard t-test in the third column shows that this di¤erence is indeed
highly signicant. Abandoned villages further have a signicantly more dense vegetation
and are typically located closer to major wadis, alluvial soils and to roads. This is well in
line with our hypothesis that resourceful villages should be important targets for attacks.
4.3 Empirical strategy
Although several strong correlations are already evident, we need a regression analysis
to estimate the impact of each variable when holding the others constant. The main
dependent variable in our empirical analysis is a binary variable y for whether villages are
abandoned or not. The key predictions of our theoretical model emerge from (8) where it
is shown that the village will be abandoned if y > 0. In line with the argument there,
we will regard A, , N and  as deep parameters which inuenced the general decision by
the Janjaweed to take up arms but which do not display any local variation and thereby
do not determine what village to attack within our sampled region. The primary sources
of local variation are instead the proportion of rebel tribes fi and resources Ri.
More formally, we employ a probability model
Pr(y = 1jx) = Pr(y > 0jx) (12)
where x is a vector of explanatory variables and where y is a latent, unobserved variable
that we estimate by making the simplied assumption that
y = 0 + 1fi + 2Ri +C
03 + : (13)
The dependent discrete variable y is abandon. f i is the proportion of rebel tribes before
hostilities, Ri is a vector that includes our resource proxies vegetation, dist_wadi, and
dist_alluvial, C is a vector of other relevant control variables, and i is a normally dis-
tributed error term. In line with the comparative static in (11), we interpret the size of
1 to reect the militias bias against rebel tribes, . A 1 signicantly larger than zero
should thus imply that  > 0, as illustrated in Figure 2. It would also imply that we
can reject the hypothesis that the conict is merely over local resources. Equivalently, we
would expect to nd that 2 > 0, supporting the local resource struggle hypothesis.
C generally includes village size in number of households before the conict popsize (the
equivalent of Li in our model), dist_road, dist_admin, and other geographical covariates.
It also includes proxies for conict intensity in the neighbourhood to control for local
spillover e¤ects, controls for administrative units, and interaction terms between fi and
Ri.
We further estimate a variant of equation (13) by using the number of households
eeing in each village, peopleed, as a dependent variable (capturing the level of Li in (9)
of our model). Since 25 percent of our villages have zero number of household eeing,
we employ a corner solution tobit model where we use similar explanatory variables as
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in (13). Alternatively, we use a "hurdle model" to allow for heterogeneous impacts of
the explanatory variables on the following two decisions: (i) Whether any household ee
from a given village and, (ii) if so, how many households ed as a result of the conict.36
A hurdle model for a corner solution variable involves two key equations (14)-(15). The
probability of a positive outcome is estimated using a probit model whereas conditional
OLS is employed to estimate (15), using log number of households as a dependent variable
which follows a log normal distribution with mean x and variance 2, conditional on
Li > 0 and our explanatory variables x.
Pr( Li > 0
x) =  (x) (14)
log Li
  Li > 0; x  N  x ; 2 (15)
In these expressions,  is vector of probit coe¢ cient estimates using a dependent variable
(attack) equal to one if Li > 0 and zero if Li = 0. If our dependent variable in eq. (15) is
log normally distributed for the sub-sample of villages with a positive number of house-
holds eeing, we can consistently estimate  as coe¢ cient estimates of the explanatory
variables using OLS (Wooldridge, 2002, p 536). The resulting expression for expected
value, unconditional on Li, which the hurdle model uses to calculate marginal e¤ects, is
given by:37
E
 
Li
x = (x)  expx + 1
2
2

: (16)
A few remarks are in order. Firstly, while we are fairly condent that fi is measured
with some precision, we recognize that the lack of village-specic data on readily lootable
resources such as livestock means that our econometric strategy potentially su¤ers from
omitted variable bias. However, we argue that the included resource proxies should be
highly correlated with lootable wealth. For instance, villages located close to a wadi should
typically have good access to water and fodder for animals.
Secondly, it might be the case that fi and Ri are structurally related in the sense
that the dominant Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa could have obtained possession of the most
fertile lands since they were historically the rst settlers. If this is the case, then fi and
Ri will be positively correlated and the interpretation of 1 will be problematic. We will
deal specically with this issue in the robustness section.
Thirdly, in micro studies like these, it is inevitable to discuss potential problems of
sample selection bias. There are at least three possible sources of selection bias: (i) The
36The tobit model, on the other hand, assumes that a single mechanism determines the choice between
peoplefled = 0 versus peoplefled > 0. We informally investigate the validity of this assumption in the
results section.
37The second term on the RHS of eq (16) captures the expected value in eq (15) converted into lev-
els. The marginal e¤ect of an explanatory variable xk on the number of households eeing is given by
@E( Lijx)
@xk
=

(k (x) +  k (x)) exp
 
x + 1
2
2

where  (x) and  (x) are the probability and cu-
mulative density function of the probit model and k and  k are probit and OLS coe¢ cient estimates of
the explanatory variable xk respectively.
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data collection might focus on villages which are potentially returnable places for displaced
people, (ii) on villages a¤ected by the conict, and (iii) on predominately African villages.
However, since it was an explicit aim of the data collectors to visit every village in this
sub-region of west Darfur, we do not believe this to be a major problem. In addition, both
African villages and nomadic settlements, predominated by Arabic nomads, are covered
in the data collection with the intention of understanding both a¤ected villages and the
needs of the nomadic population.
A fourth potential issue is spatial autocorrelation, i.e. that conict intensity in village
i does not only depend on village specic characteristics but also on local spillover e¤ects.
We argue that our 10 by 10 km grid level analysis checks the sensitivity of our results to
the unit of analysis used.
4.4 Regression results
The baseline set of regression results are shown in table 3 where we report the marginal
e¤ects of the main covariates used with abandon as the dependent variable. We use a linear
(OLS) probability model in column (1) and a probit estimator in all the other columns.
The rst main result is that the estimate for rebeltribes is positive and signicant. The
reported marginal e¤ects in table 3 typically vary around 1. Based on the probit results
in column 3, an increase from rebeltribes=0 to rebeltribes=1 implies a 91.8 percent higher
predicted risk of that village being abandoned. The basic tendency remains intact when
we use rebeldummy in column 6 instead and when we include interaction terms with the
resource variables in column 7. In column 4, only 350 villages with no Arab populations
are included and rebeltribes is still signicant. The interpretation is that the attacking
militia was capable of careful discrimination also between di¤erent African groups.
The second main result concerns our resource proxies. Out of these, vegetation and log
dist_wadi are never signicant and even shift signs. When included, log dist_alluvial is
however always signicant and with the expected sign. All else equal, villages near alluvial
soils are thus more likely to be abandoned, but the e¤ect is smaller than for rebeltribes.
On the basis of column 3, we can calculate that an increase in log dist_alluvial from its
minimum to its maximum value would imply a 34 percent lower risk of abandonment.
When interaction terms are included in column 7, log dist_alluvial*rebeltribes is positive,
indicating that the impact of rebeltribes is weaker in areas close to alluvial soils. Note that
this kind of e¤ect was predicted by the model in eq. (11).38
Distance to nearest road, dist_road, is always negative and signicant, suggesting
that villages close to roads are particularly adversely a¤ected by raids from motorized
militias. Distance from administrative center, dist_admin, is always positive and most
often signicant. This appears to suggest that the Janjaweed preferred to attack more
remote villages, possibly to avoid interference with local authorities or eventual police
38An equivalent interpretation is that the marginal e¤ect of dist_alluvial is weaker in areas with a large
proportion of rebel tribes. In terms of our model, it would appear that the lower social cost of attacking
rebel villages diverts the militia from attacking resourceful villages.
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forces in the centers.
The estimate for the size of the population, popsize, is negative in all columns and
mostly signicant. Local population density, n_popsize, has the opposite e¤ect according
to the estimates. Thus, all else equal, the attacking militias are more destructive in smaller
villages. The results further weakly indicate that villages at lower altitudes and in the
northern part of the area are more likely to be abandoned.
In table 4, we analyze the determinants of the two other outcome variables in eq. (9);
whether villages are attacked or not, and if an attack happens, how many households ee.
We start our estimation with pooled OLS that is used as a baseline where the number of
households eeing (peopleed) is our dependent variable. In column 1, we nd that villages
with a larger share of rebel tribes and with larger population size both in and in the vicinity
of a village before the conict, have signicantly higher numbers of households displaced.
Whereas all our resource variables are insignicant, villages closer to their administrative
center have a higher number of households eeing at a 10 percent level of signicance.
This may be the case as people usually ee to the nearest administrative center when
displaced although villages far away from the centers are more likely to be attacked.
Column (2) in table 4 presents the estimates of the tobit model where the dependent
variable is peopleed. The share of rebel tribes continues to be a highly signicant predictor
of the number of households displaced, and so does the total number of households before
the conict (popsize). It is also worth noting that villages closer to alluvial soils have
signicantly (at 10 percent) larger number of households eeing. When calculating average
marginal e¤ects conditional on peoplefled > 0 in column 5, we nd that an increase from
0 to 1 in the share of rebel tribes results in an increase of 203 displaced households. A one
percent increase in distance to alluvial soil is associated with an additional 4 households
displaced.
Comparison of estimates of the tobit model (column 2) to that of the probit model
(column 3) can be used as an informal test of the single mechanism-assumption underlying
the tobit model. We nd that distances to major road and to administrative centers are
signicant determinants of probability of attack = 1 (peoplefled > 0) but not in the tobit
model where the dependent variable is peopleed. On the other hand, village population
size before the conict is a signicant determinant of peoplefled in column 2 but not
a signicant determinant of likelihood of attack = 1 in column 3. Thus we allow for
heterogeneous impacts of the explanatory variables by using a hurdle model.
Estimation of the hurdle model makes use of the probit estimation results of column
3 as well as conditional OLS estimations where the dependent variable is log of peopleed
(column 4). The latter uses a restricted sample of villages where peoplefled > 0. The
average marginal e¤ects from the hurdle model are presented in column 7. Villages with
larger share of rebel tribes and larger population size before the conict are found to have
signicantly higher number of people ed. More resourceful villages, in terms of a closer
distance to alluvial soils, have a higher number of households eeing. Villages closer to
major roads also have a higher displaced number of households which probably indicates
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ease of transportation to ee from the attacked villages.
4.5 Robustness checks
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the main results obtained so far. A potential
problem referred to above would be if fi and Ri were systematically related so that, for
instance, rebel tribes tended to own the best lands. In that case, 1 could be biased
upwards since it would partly be picking up the indirect e¤ect of resources in addition to
the direct e¤ect from the share of rebel tribes.
In order to address this issue, we compare the means of selected variables in homoge-
nous rebel tribe villages (where rebeldummy=1) with non-homogenous rebel tribe villages
(rebeldummy=0) as in table 5. From the table it appears that homogenous rebel tribe
villages typically have a more dense vegetation, a shorter distance to wadis, and a greater
population. For the other displayed variables, there is no clear di¤erence. When we esti-
mate a probit regression in the last column with rebeldummy as the dependent variable,
it actually appears that homogenous rebel tribe locations also have a longer distance to
alluvial soils and to administrative centers.39
In table 6, we take this analysis one step further. Using a p-score analysis, we screen
observations to obtain a more balanced sample where our resource variables somewhat
equally predict the probability of rebeldummy=1 or rebeldummy=0. More specically,
we consider for a moment rebeldummy to be a binary treatment variable and estimate a
probability score for rebeldummy=1 on the basis of the probit regression in the last column
of table 5. In table 6, we then exclude observations with a very high or very low p-score, as
in Angrist and Pischke (2009, p 90). In this case, rebeltribes should be capturing ethnicity
but not resource e¤ects. The standard set of covariates from the previous tables are used
as regressors, including rebeltribes. In columns 1-3, the included 337 observations have a
p-score between 0.3-0.7. In columns 4-6, the score ranges between 0.4-0.6 and only 193
observations are used.40 Throughout the table, rebeltribes remains positive and signicant,
as well as some of the resource variables.
A second robustness check concerns our level of sample aggregation. Does the same
pattern of a positive and signicant rebeltribes-estimate remain when our observations are
neighborhoods rather than individual villages? In table 7, we run regressions at neighbor-
hood level, using the 148 articially constructed 10 km by 10 km grid cells as our unit of
analysis. We use two dependent variables: A dummy for when all villages in the neighbor-
hood have been abandoned (n_abandon) and the log of the number of households eeing
from the neighborhood (log n_peopleed). The main explanatory variable, n_rebels, is
consistently positive and signicant as before and the average distance to alluvial soils in
39The Pearson correlation coe¢ cients between rebeltribes and the resource variables are: vegetation
(0.24), dist_wadi (-0.215), and dist_alluvial (-0.10).
40The main purpose is of course to discard observations where resource variables might have exerted an
inuence on our "treatment" variable rebeldummy. We recognize that the extent of homogenous rebel tribe
villages is not a proper treatment variable in the conventional sense. See Greiner and Rubin (2010) for a
recent discussion regarding the use of "immutable characteristics" such as race as treatment variables.
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the neighborhood (log n_dist_alluvial) is negative and signicant when included. Also
in this table, it appears that the militia prefer peripheral neighborhoods far from admin-
istrative centers (log n_dist_admin).41 log dist_road is negative for intensity of attack
in line with our previous results though it has a positive e¤ect on probability of attack,
which is counter to what we found earlier.
A third level of aggregation is the eight administrative units. In table A2 in the
Appendix, we run a t-test to check for di¤erences in means in rebeltribes in abandoned
and non-abandoned villages. In all eight administrative units, abandoned villages had a
signicantly higher mean level of rebel tribes. In Garsila alone, with 107 villages in total,
as many as 71 homogenous rebel tribe villages were abandoned.42
As a last robustness check, we try a battery of alternative variables in table A3.43
Among the resource variables, we use an alternative index of vegetational intensity (evi)
as well as two alternative measures of distance to surface water (log dist_river and log
d_wadi). The last of these turn out to be negative and signicant in column 4. A crude
proxy for temperature in six climate zones within the area (temperature) also has some
predictive power whereas an indicator for rainfall in the same six areas does not. We
also include distance measures to the capital cities in Darfur (d_nyala, d_elgen, and
d_elfash) and an ethnic fractionalization index for each village (ethnicfrac). In all cases,
the marginal e¤ects for rebeltribes remain positive and signicant. In the last column, we
use a di¤erent dependent variable: a binary dummy destroyed=1 if the village (according
to the data collectors) was physically destroyed. The estimate for rebeltribes is at a similar
level as before but the coe¢ cient for vegetation is now signicant at a p-level lower than
1 percent.
In summary, our results indicate, as predicted, that the militia has been prone to
attack villages that are relatively resourceful. More specically, villages close to alluvial
soils appear to have been strong targets for attacks, as well as villages close to roads
and far from administrative centers. Our most robust result, however, is that we have
consistently been able to reject the hypothesis that ethnicity did not play any role in the
conict. In all our specications, the proportion of rebel tribes in the population was
the strongest determinant of attacks, even when controlling for numerous other variables,
di¤erent samples, and di¤erent levels of aggregation.
5 Conclusions
The main question addressed in this article is whether the military campaign on civilian
villages by the government-supported Janjaweed forces was primarily an ethnic cleansing
41Explanatory notes and descriptive statistics for the variables in this table are presented in table A1 in
the Appendix.
42We also ran separate probit regressions for each administrative unit, but in several cases the model
could not be estimated due to a signicant reduction in the number of observations. In the administrative
units where the model could be run, rebeltribes had more or less the same sign and level of signicance as
before. Results are available upon request.
43Explanatory notes and descriptive statistics are given in table A1 in the Appendix.
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campaign or a struggle over natural resources. Both are a priori plausible and often
proposed reasons for the conict. As a framework for the empirical study, we outline a
theoretical model for understanding how ethnic cleansing might become an equilibrium
outcome in a local struggle that is primarily driven by limited natural resources.
Our empirical analysis, based on a sample of 530 villages in the southwestern part
of the region, clearly demonstrates that the proportion of the rebel tribes Fur, Masalit,
and Zaghawa in the population is a robust determinant of the probability and intensity
of Janjaweed attacks. The militia also appear to have targeted villages that are close
to alluvial soils and to roads. The evidence might thus be described as being largely
consistent with both of the major hypotheses, although the results regarding natural
resources have smaller marginal e¤ects. Since our model as well as our results suggest
important interdependencies between the ethnic and resource variables, it is most likely
impossible to discriminate completely between the two.
We believe our study has left several issues that remain to be explored. For instance,
an intuitive extension of our model would be to also endogenize the strategic actions of the
government. The question of under what conditions a government chooses to exterminate
an oppositional group rather than trying to accommodate its demands, appears to be an
interesting line of future research. Our data further indicate that a massive reallocation
of land has occurred throughout Darfur as a result of the conict. We believe the future
implications of this process will be an important area for research in years to come.
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 Figure 1: Approximate sequence of events in the Darfur conflict 
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 Figure 2: Simulated relationship between the equilibrium number of village individuals fleeing     and the 
share of rebel tribes fi at three different social costs of displacing rebel tribes (λ).  
 
 
 
Note: The figure plots     based on equation (8) at varying social costs of rebel tribe displacement. We assume 
Li=500, A/θN=60/1500, αRi=900, γ=3/2, s=1.1, and ni=0.1 throughout. The range of fi is 0-0.9. The dashed flat line 
illustrates no differences in the social costs of displacing ethnic groups (λ=0). The dotted curve shows lower costs of 
attacking rebel tribes (λ=0.1) whereas the thick black line shows an even stronger bias against rebel tribes (λ=0.2). 
This line is discontinuous at (Li=500) when the whole village is abandoned (    =500). The associated proportion of 
rebel tribes is fi=0.768. 
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 Figure 3: Map of abandoned and non-abandoned villages in the sampled region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4: Number of households in the three major population groups before and after conflict.  
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 Figure 5: Distribution of major population group proportions before conflict in villages that were 
not abandoned (0) or abandoned (1) after conflict.  
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main variables used in the empirical analysis 
 
Variable Description 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables      
abandon Binary dummy for village abandoned by the 
whole population (peoplefled=popsize) 
530               .621 .486          0 1 
attack Binary dummy for village attacked 
(peoplefled>0) 
530 .754 .431 0 1 
peoplefled No. of households fleeing from village  530 198.42 433.54 0 7200 
       
Ethnic variables (independent)      
rebeltribes Proportion of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
households before conflict in village  
530 .615 .454 0 1 
rebeldummy Binary dummy for village where rebeltribes=1 530 .519 .500 0 1 
  530     
Resource variables (independent)      
vegetation NDVI index as of June 2003 530 3467.6 758.2 1916 6013 
dist_wadi Distance to nearest wadi (meters) 530 4358.7 5112.7 1.4 33250 
dist_alluvial Distance to nearest alluvial soil (meters) 442 1575.6 3342.3 0 24060 
       
Geographical and other variables (independent)      
dist_road Distance to nearest road (meters) 530 5074.2 4931.2 5.6 26079 
dist_admin Distance from village to center of 
administrative unit (meters) 
530 26798 17261 0 80118 
popsize No. of households before conflict in village 530 269.6 536.3 11 7200 
n_popsize Total no. of households in 10 km by 10 km 
neighbourhood (grid cell) 
530 1510 1795 18 8917 
n_rebels Proportion of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa in 10 
km by 10 km neighbourhood (grid cell)  
530 .660 .331 0 1 
altitude Altitude above sea level (meters) 530 697.5 128.8 502 1290 
latitude Latitude degree 530 12.08 .50 10.86 12.95 
longitude Longitude degree 530 23.01 0.36 22.24 23.75 
admin unit Dummies for 7 administrative units (Zalingei 
is reference unit) 
530   0 1 
 
Sources: All variables are taken or constructed from data collected by international organizations in the area except 
vegetation, dist_wadi, dist_alluvial, and dist_road (based on GIS-data from USAID, 2010) and altitude (Google 
Earth). The geographical distances from each village to their relevant administrative center dist_admin were 
calculated using latitude and longitude coordinates in the great circle formula. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Means for selected variables in non-abandoned and abandoned villages 
 
 abandoned 
 
non-abandoned total 
 
Variable 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Obs Difference
 
rebeltribes 329 .881 201 .179 530 .702***
 
  (.015)  (.023)  (.027) 
vegetation 329 3.58 201 3.28 530 .299*** 
  (.045)  (.043)  (.065) 
log dist_wadi 329 7.37 201 7.98 530 -.610*** 
  (.082)  (.083)  (.121) 
log dist_alluvial 283 4.11 159 5.53 442 -1.415*** 
  (.200)  (.247)  (.325) 
log dist_road 329 7.77 201 8.10 530 -.324*** 
  (.080)  (.085)  (.122) 
log dist_admin 329 9.91 201 9.78 530 .131 
  (.051)  (.122)  (.116) 
log popsize 329 4.99 201 4.83 530 .163 
  (.06)  (.08)  (.097) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. In the third column, we carry out a t-test of differences in means. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 Table 3: Probability of a village being abandoned 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent 
variable 
abandon 
Sample full full full no Arabs full full full 
 OLS probit probit probit probit probit probit 
rebeltribes 0.819*** 1.091*** 1.126*** 0.421*** 1.314***  0.950* 
 (0.0330) (0.0845) (0.0957) (0.0702) (0.122)  (0.537) 
rebeldummy      0.746***  
      (0.0381)  
vegetation 0.0255 0.0450 -0.000484 -0.00887 0.0240 0.0449 -0.0684 
 (0.0203) (0.0369) (0.0360) (0.0190) (0.0423) (0.0365) (0.0605) 
log dist_wadi -0.0142 -0.0206 0.00948 0.0108 0.0128 -0.0344 0.0425 
 (0.0105) (0.0212) (0.0240) (0.0123) (0.0281) (0.0258) (0.0465) 
log dist_alluvial   -0.0450*** -0.0216*** -0.0390*** -0.0493*** -0.0759*** 
   (0.0115) (0.00628) (0.0122) (0.0116) (0.0198) 
log dist_road -0.0335*** -0.0712*** -0.0868*** -0.0395*** -0.0592** -0.0676*** -0.0918*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0226) (0.0239) (0.0125) (0.0266) (0.0208) (0.0256) 
log dist_admin 0.0490*** 0.0685*** 0.0489*** 0.0144 0.0443** 0.0149 0.0465** 
 (0.0120) (0.0213) (0.0185) (0.0104) (0.0195) (0.0204) (0.0192) 
log popsize -0.0468*** -0.110*** -0.148*** -0.0841*** -0.150*** -0.0235 -0.157*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0282) (0.0336) (0.0193) (0.0361) (0.0280) (0.0362) 
log n_popsize 0.0125 0.0259 0.0272 0.0121 0.0518 -0.0268 0.0294 
 (0.0116) (0.0303) (0.0323) (0.0161) (0.0372) (0.0275) (0.0366) 
altitude -0.000598*** -0.00118*** -0.000428 -5.96e-05 0.000146 -0.000574 -0.000734 
 (0.000182) (0.000406) (0.000447) (0.000250) (0.000380) (0.000475) (0.000471) 
n_rebels -0.0135 -0.0464 0.0203 0.00401    
 (0.0541) (0.121) (0.136) (0.0883)    
latitude 0.169*** 0.321*** 0.382*** 0.232***  0.396*** 0.455*** 
 (0.0525) (0.116) (0.137) (0.0793)  (0.121) (0.145) 
longitude 0.0476 0.135 0.00665 0.0896  -0.0290 0.113 
 (0.0594) (0.130) (0.147) (0.0825)  (0.159) (0.161) 
vegetation*       0.112 
rebeltribes       (0.0827) 
log dist_wadi*       -0.0548 
rebeltribes       (0.0592) 
log dist_alluvial*       0.0551** 
rebeltribes       (0.0257) 
Adm. unit 
dummies 
no no no no yes no no 
Observations 530 530 442 350 442 442 442 
R
2 
Pseudo R
2 
0.613  
0.552 
 
0.615 
 
0.428 
 
0.683 
 
0.560 
 
0.625 
 
Note: The estimator is OLS in column (1) and binomial probit in (2)-(7). The probit coefficients in (2)-(7) are 
marginal effects. Only villages without any Arab populations are included in column (4). A constant with unreported 
coefficients has been included in each specification. Administrative unit controls include dummies for 7 units with 
Zalingei as the excluded reference category. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Table 4: Determinants of attack and of people fleeing 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. variable peoplefled peoplefled attack log 
peoplefled 
Average marginal effects 
Sample full full full peoplefled
>0 
peoplefled 
>0 
peoplefled 
>0 
full 
 OLS tobit probit OLS tobit OLS hurdle 
rebeltribes 63.10** 446.3*** 4.745*** 0.689*** 203.12*** 178.4158*** 167.5486*** 
 (26.65) (131.5) (0.693) (0.141) (45.94) (36.298) (35.2164) 
vegetation -14.52 -1.289 -0.0415 0.0183 -0.586426 4.736475 3.471091 
 (17.76) (18.57) (0.170) (0.0244) (8.435) (6.347) (5.360) 
log dist_wadi -0.407 -4.852 -0.0892 0.0193 -2.2080 4.990134 3.391568 
 (8.521) (11.54) (0.126) (0.0204) (5.208) (5.276) (4.022) 
log dist_alluvial 0.488 -9.453* -0.118** -0.0231** -4.3018* -5.99143** -5.38393*** 
 (6.312) (5.443) (0.0486) (0.00945) (2.601) (2.392) (1.980) 
log dist_road -0.551 -13.92 -0.230** -0.0464** -6.3342 -12.0087** -10.756*** 
 (12.19) (16.54) (0.102) (0.0190) (7.160) (5.096) (3.627) 
log dist_admin -47.14* -31.32 0.162** -0.00386 -14.255 -1.0001 0.1638092 
 (28.40) (31.99) (0.0800) (0.0209) (15.342) (5.417) (5.132) 
log popsize 242.9*** 305.0*** 0.127 0.914*** 138.79*** 236.689*** 186.2842*** 
 (54.55) (70.85) (0.140) (0.0293) (23.083) (17.28) (24.552) 
log n_popsize 18.84* 21.45 0.252 0.0248 9.7631 6.42146 6.506416 
 (11.27) (15.69) (0.179) (0.0172) (6.876) (4.424) (4.441) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
sigma  390.9***      
  (126.0)      
Observations 442 442 442 337    
R
2 
0.427   0.854    
Pseudo R
2
  0.063 0.760     
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses in all columns except in column (7). Unreported constant included but 
not reported. Controls include: altitude, latitude and longitude. Marginal effects for the tobit model are average 
marginal effects conditional on attack=1 (i.e. peoplefled>0) using the specification in column (2). Average marginal 
effects of the conditional OLS model in column (6) are converted to number of households fled in levels. Robust 
standard errors using delta method is used for average marginal effects of the tobit and conditional OLS models. 
Bootstrapped standard errors, where the probit estimation of column (3) was possible to estimate with none of the 
explanatory variables being dropped in 100 replications, are reported for the average marginal effect of the hurdle 
model. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Table 5: Analysis of selected variables’ influence on rebeldummy 
 
 
 
rebeldummy=1 rebeldummy=0 
 
total 
 
Probit regression 
 
Variable 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Obs Mean 
 
  Obs Difference
 
 
rebeldummy 
vegetation 275 3.62 255 3.31 530 .309*** 0.363*** 
  (.048)  (.042)  (.065) (0.0795) 
log dist_wadi 275 7.46 255 7.77 530 -.312** -0.142*** 
  (.095)  (.077)  (.123) (0.0536) 
log dist_alluvial 232 4.79 210 4.43 442 .356 0.0581*** 
  (.213)  (.239)  (.319) (0.0215) 
log dist_road 275 7.91 255 7.89 530 .021 -0.00526 
  (.086)  (.081)  (.119) (0.0473) 
log dist_admin 275 9.94 255 9.77 530 .165 0.111** 
  (.045)  (.106)  (.113) (0.0436) 
log popsize 275 5.04 255 4.81 530 .228*** 0.219*** 
  (.060)  (.072)  (.094) (0.0598) 
Observations       442 
Pseudo R
2
 ¤       0.078 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. In the third column, we carry out a t-test of differences in means. In the fourth 
column, we estimate a probit regression with rebeldummy as the dependent variable. A constant with unreported 
coefficients has been included.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 Table 6: Regressions using samples prescreened on probability score for rebeldummy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. variable abandon abandon logpfled abandon abandon logpfled 
Sample  pscore: 0.3-0.7 pscore: 0.4-0.6 
 OLS probit OLS OLS probit OLS 
       
rebeltribes 0.822*** 1.184*** 3.217*** 0.835*** 1.206*** 3.377*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0977) (0.174) (0.0457) (0.130) (0.242) 
vegetation 0.00204 -0.0403 0.112 0.0312 -0.0249 0.00979 
 (0.0289) (0.0530) (0.102) (0.0540) (0.115) (0.216) 
log dist_wadi 0.00840 0.0490 -0.00337 0.00935 0.0733 0.106 
 (0.0152) (0.0341) (0.0531) (0.0270) (0.0666) (0.0956) 
log dist_alluvial -0.0216*** -0.0515*** -0.0927*** -0.0160 -0.0507* -0.105** 
 (0.00667) (0.0149) (0.0259) (0.0124) (0.0279) (0.0475) 
log dist_road -0.0420*** -0.104*** -0.178*** -0.0431*** -0.110*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0295) (0.0477) (0.0156) (0.0393) (0.0596) 
log dist_admin 0.0355** 0.0376* 0.0503 0.0337 0.0227 0.0358 
 (0.0156) (0.0220) (0.0387) (0.0239) (0.0498) (0.0859) 
Standard controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 337 337 337 193 193 193 
R
2 
Pseudo R
2 
0.645  
0.623 
0.787 0.685  
0.659 
0.761 
 
Note: The estimator is OLS in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6) and binomial probit in (2) and (5). The probit 
coefficients in (2) and (5) are marginal effects. A probability score-equation identical to the last column of table 5 
was estimated for the purpose of pre-screening observations. In columns (1)-(3), only observations with a p-score in 
the range of 0.3-0.7 are included. In columns (4)-(6), the equivalent range for inclusion is 0.4-0.6. Standard controls 
includes log popsize, log n_popsize, altitude, latitude, and longitude. A constant with unreported coefficients has 
been included in each specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7: Regressions on grid cell level of aggregation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. variable n_abandon n_abandon n_abandon log n_peoplefled log n_peoplefled 
 OLS probit probit OLS OLS 
      
n_rebels 0.704*** 1.130*** 1.500*** 3.407*** 3.271*** 
 (0.0850) (0.165) (0.253) (0.377) (0.438) 
n_vegetation 0.0833 0.0885 0.0417 -0.220 -0.200 
 (0.0535) (0.0899) (0.103) (0.140) (0.145) 
log n_dist_wadi -0.0455* -0.0696* 0.00176 0.0122 0.0490 
 (0.0242) (0.0364) (0.0455) (0.0496) (0.0557) 
log n_dist_alluvial   -0.124***  -0.0706* 
   (0.0347)  (0.0366) 
log n_dist_road 0.0613** 0.0899** 0.130** -0.121** -0.0993* 
 (0.0244) (0.0404) (0.0556) (0.0549) (0.0544) 
log n_dist_admin 0.0830** 0.224*** 0.101 0.205** 0.113 
 (0.0364) (0.0706) (0.0824) (0.0816) (0.0689) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 148 148 121 148 121 
R
2
 
Pseudo R
2 
0.504  
0.521 
 
0.606 
0.832 0.864 
 
Note: The probit coefficients in (2)-(3) are marginal effects. The set of controls includes log n_popsize, n_altitude, 
n_latitude, and n_longitude. A constant with unreported coefficients has been included in each specification. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix  
(not for publication) 
 
 
Figure A1: Map of abandoned and non-abandoned villages in a heavily affected area  
 
 
 
Note: Each grid square constitutes one of our constructed neighborhoods. The circled area shows the most adversely 
affected neighborhood in the sample with 13 abandoned villages, all of them located right on or very close to alluvial 
soils.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A1: Descriptive statistics of additional variables used in tables 7 and A3.  
 
Variable Description 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables      
n_abandon Binary dummy =1 when all villages in 
neighborhood have been abandoned  
148 .365 .483 0 1 
n_peoplefled No. of households fleeing in neighborhood 148 707.2 1203.6 0 8917 
destroyed Binary dummy for a village being destroyed 530 .479 .500 0 1 
       
Ethnic variables (independent)      
n_rebels Proportion of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
households before conflict in neighborhood 
148 .641 .369 0 1 
ethnicfrac Ethnic fractionalization index in village 530 .168 .265 0 .851 
       
Resource variables (independent)      
n_vegetation Average NDVI index in neighborhood as of 
June 2003 
148 3.53 .67 1.92 5.53 
log n_dist_wadi Log of average distance to nearest wadi in 
neighborhood (meters) 
148 7.70 1.33 2.90 10.41 
log n_dist_alluvial Log of average distance to nearest alluvial 
soil in neighborhood (meters) 
121 4.91 2.91 0 10.09 
evi Enhanced vegetation index 530 2562.5 568.8 1275 4564 
log dist_river Log of alternative measure of distance to 
wadi 
530 7.63 1.34 .80 10.26 
log d_wadi Log of alternative measure of distance to 
wadi 
530 7.79 1.59 2.30 10.58 
temperature Annual mean temperature in village’s 
climate zone (Celsius degrees) 
530 25.3 .52 23 26.8 
rainfall Average annual rainfall in village’s climate 
zone (mms) 
530 704.9 63.1 500 730 
       
Geographical and other variables (independent)      
log n_dist_road Log of average distance to nearest road in 
neighborhood (meters) 
148 7.97 1.16 4.65 10.17 
log n_dist_admin Log of average distance from village to 
center of administrative unit in 
neighborhood (meters) 
148 10.03 .87 5.86 11.26 
n_popsize Total number of households in 
neighborhood 
148 962.2 1353.6 18 8917 
n_altitude Average altitude above sea level in 
neighborhood (meters) 
148 711.1 142.3 519.3 1290 
n_latitude Latitude degree of neighborhood 148 11.98 0.51 10.8 12.9 
n_longitude Longitude degree of neighborhood 148 23.02 0.38 22.2 23.7 
d_elgen Distance from village to El Geneina (kms) 530 167.8 56.5 55.35 291.4 
d_nyala Distance from village to Nyala (kms) 530 211.5 39.0 124.0 300.1 
d_elfash Distance from village to El Fasher (kms) 530 310.9 40.6 213.5 408.4 
 
Note: Variables with 148 or less observations on grid cell level are used in table 7. Variables with more than 148 
observations are used in table A2. All variables are taken or constructed from data collected by international 
organizations in the area except n_vegetation, n_dist_wadi, n_dist_alluvial, evi, dist_river, and n_dist_road (based 
on GIS-data from USAID, 2010), d_wadi and altitude (Google Earth), and temperature and rainfall (FAO, 1998).  
 
 
 
 Table A2: Means for rebeltribes in non-abandoned and abandoned villages in eight administrative units 
 
    abandoned non-abandoned total 
Administrative unit Obs Mean Obs Mean   Obs Difference
 
Bindisi 24 .88 39 .24 63 .649*** 
  (.05)  (.05)  (.074) 
Forobaranga 38 .49 13 .023 51 .464*** 
  (.07)  (.02)  (.124) 
Garsila 71 1 36 .17 107 .833*** 
  (0)  (.06)  (.045) 
Habila 49 .89 9 .33 58 .567*** 
  (.04)  (.14)  (.100) 
Mukjar 49 .97 16 .06 65 .904*** 
  (.01)  (.05)  (.037) 
Um-Dukhun 52 .89 51 .21 103 .677*** 
  (.04)  (.05)  (.067) 
Um-Kher 43 .90 32 .16 75 .743*** 
  (.04)  (.05)  (.061) 
Zalingei 3 1 5 .12 8 .884*** 
  (0)  (.12)  (.155) 
All 329 .881 201 .179 530 .702***
 
  (.015)  (.023)  (.027) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. In the third column, we carry out a t-test of differences in means. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0
 Table A3: Probit regressions with additional variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. variable abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon destroyed 
       
rebeltribes 1.120*** 1.080*** 1.105*** 1.103*** 1.190*** 0.919*** 
 (0.0966) (0.100) (0.0853) (0.0870) (0.101) (0.0952) 
vegetation 0.00151 -0.00189    0.129*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0373)    (0.0434) 
log dist_wadi 0.0120 0.00839    0.0372 
 (0.0240) (0.0252)    (0.0245) 
log dist_alluvial -0.0457*** -0.0484***    -0.0219* 
 (0.0116) (0.0121)    (0.0117) 
log dist_road -0.0935*** -0.0882*** -0.0753*** -0.0649*** -0.0845*** -0.00138 
 (0.0246) (0.0236) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0223) (0.0232) 
log dist_admin 0.0523*** 0.0480*** 0.0662*** 0.0763*** 0.0666*** 0.0697** 
 (0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0214) (0.0229) (0.0219) (0.0276) 
d_nyala -0.00946      
 (0.00633)      
d_elgen -0.00823**      
 (0.00410)      
d_elfash 0.00754      
 (0.00577)      
ethnicfrac  -0.349***     
  (0.134)     
evi   4.36e-05    
   (4.96e-05)    
log dist_river   0.00408    
   (0.0202)    
log d_wadi    -0.0507**   
    (0.0210)   
temperature     0.333***  
     (0.0861)  
rainfall     -0.000760  
     (0.000829)  
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 442 442 530 530 530 442 
Pseudo R
2 
0.614 0.626 0.550 0.558 0.571 0.408 
 
Note: The estimator is binomial probit in all columns and the dependent variable is abandon in all columns except 
column (6) where destroyed is the dependent variable. The probit coefficients in all columns are marginal effects. 
The set of controls includes log popsize, log n_popsize, n_rebels, altitude, latitude,and longitude. A constant with 
unreported coefficients has been included in each specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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